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President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems 
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research 
 
Suite 555, 2000 K Street, NW., Washington, DC 20006 (202) 653-8051 
July 9, 1981 
The Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. 
Speaker 
U.S. House of Representatives 
Washington, D.C. 20515 
Dear Mr. Speaker: 
On behalf of the President's Commission for the Study of 
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research, I am pleased to transmit our report concerning the 
"definition" of death. This is one of several subjects which Public 
Law 95-622 directs the Commission to study and regarding which 
we are to report to the President, the Congress and the relevant 
Departments of government. 
We have concluded that, in light of the ever increasing powers 
of biomedical science and practice, a statute is needed to provide a 
clear and socially-accepted basis for making determinations of 
death. We recommend the adoption of such a statute by the 
Congress for areas coming under federal jurisdiction and by all 
states as a means of achieving uniform law on this subject 
throughout the Nation. 
We are grateful for the opportunity to assist in resolving this 
issue of public concern and importance. 
Respectfully, 
 
Morris B. Abram 
Chairman 
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in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research 
Suite 555. 2000 K Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20006 (202) 653-8051 
July 9, 1981 
The Honorable George Bush 
President 
United States Senate 
Washington, D.C. 
20510 
Dear Mr. President: 
On behalf of the President's Commission for the Study of 
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral
Research, I am pleased to transmit our report concerning the
"definition" of death. This is one of several subjects which
Public Law 95-622 directs the Commission to study and 
regarding which we are to report to the President, the Congress
and the relevant Departments of government. 
We have concluded that, in light of the ever increasing
powers of biomedical science and practice, a statute is needed to
provide a clear and socially-accepted basis for making 
determinations of death. We recommend the adoption of such a
statute by the Congress for areas coming under federal
jurisdiction and by all states as a means of achieving uniform law
on this subject throughout the Nation. 
We are grateful for the opportunity to assist in resolving this
issue of public concern and importance. 
Respectfully, 
 
Morris B. Abram
Chairman 
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July 9, 1981 
The President 
The White House 
Washington, D.C. 20500 
Dear Mr. President: 
On behalf of the President's Commission for the Study of 
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral
Research, I am pleased to transmit our report concerning the
"definition" of death. This is one of several subjects which Public
Law 95-622 directs the Commission to study and regarding which 
we are to report to the President, the Congress and the relevant
Departments of government. 
We have concluded that, in light of the ever increasing powers
of biomedical science and practice, a statute is needed to provide a 
clear and socially-accepted basis for making determinations of death.
We recommend the adoption of such a statute by the Congress for
areas coming under federal jurisdiction and by all states as a means
of achieving uniform law on this subject throughout the Nation. 
We are grateful for the opportunity to assist in resolving this
issue of public concern and importance. 
Respectfully, 
Morris B. Abram
Chairman 
Table of Contents 
Summary of Conclusions and Recommended Statute       
 
Introduction 
Overview of the Report 
The Process of the Commission's Study 
 
Chapter 1: Why "Update" Death? 
Developing Confidence in the Heart-Lung Criteria 
The Interrelationships of Brain, Heart, and Lung 
Functions 
Loss of Various Brain Functions Conclusion: 
The Need for Reliable Policy 
 
Chapter 2: The "State of the Art" in Medicine 
Development of the Concept of "Brain Death"  
The Emergence of a Medical Consensus  
Translating Medical Knowledge Into Policy  
 
Chapter 3: Understanding the "Meaning" of Death  
The "Whole Brain" Formulations 
The Concepts 
Critique 
Policy Consequences 
The "Higher Brain" Formulations 
The Concepts 
Critique 
Policy Consequences 
The Non-Brain Formulations 
The Concepts 
Critique 
Policy Consequences 
 
Chapter 4: Who Ought to "Redefine" Death? 
The Scope of Medical Authority 
Judicial Revision of the Common Law 
Legislative Reform 
The Federal Role 
Page 
 
3
5 
8 
 
13 
13 
 
15 
16 
18  
 
21 
22 
24 
29  
 
31 
32 
32 
34 
37 
38 
38 
39 
40 
41 
41 
42 
42  
 
45 
46  
47  
49  
51 
Chapter 5: What "Definition" Ought to be Adopted?  
The Specificity of Public Policy 
The Objectives to be Sought 
Death is a Single Phenomenon 
Death of the Organism as a Whole 
Incremental (Not Radical) Change 
Uniformity Among People and Situations  
Adaptability to Advances in Technique 
The Legal Changes that Have Occurred 
Legislative Developments 
Kansas-inspired Statutes 
The Capron-Kass Proposal 
The American Bar Association Proposal The 
Uniform Brain Death Act 
The American Medical Association Proposal 
Individual State Statutes 
 The Uniform Determination of Death Act 
Judicial Developments 
International Developments 
The Proposal for a Uniform Statute 
The Language and Its History 
Construction of the Statute 
"Individual" 
"Irreversible cessation of functions" 
"Is dead" 
"Accepted medical standards" 
Scope of application 
Personal beliefs 
Ethical Aspects of the Proposal 
Certainty of Diagnosis 
Terminating Medical Interventions on Dead Bodies 
 
Appendices 
 
Figures 
Figure 1. Coffin device 
Figure 2. Anatomic Interrelationships of Heart, Lungs 
and Brain 
 Figure 3. State Statutes on the Determination of Death 
 
55 
55 
57 
57 
58 
58 
60 
61 
61 
62 
62 
63 
64 
66 
66 
66 
67 
68  
70 
72 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
78 
79 
80 
81 
81 
83 
 
85 
 
14 
 
19 
65 

1 
 
Summary of 
Conclusions and 
Recommended Statute 
The enabling legislation for the President's Commission directs 
it to study "the ethical and legal implications of the matter of 
defining death, including the advisability of developing a uniform 
definition of death."1 In performing its mandate, the Commission 
has reached conclusions on a series of questions which are the 
subject of this Report. In summary, the central conclusions are: 
1. That recent developments in medical treatment necessitate a 
restatement of the standards traditionally recognized for determining 
that death has occurred. 
 2. That such a restatement ought preferably to be a matter of 
statutory law. 
3. That such a statute ought to remain a matter for state law, 
with federal action at this time being limited to areas under current 
federal jurisdiction. 
 4. That the statutory law ought to be uniform among the 
several states. 
5. That the "definition" contained in the statute ought to address 
general physiological standards rather than medical criteria and 
tests, which will change with advances in biomedical knowledge 
and refinements in technique. 
6. That death is a unitary phenomenon which can be accurately 
demonstrated either on the traditional grounds of irreversible 
cessation of heart and lung functions or on the 
basis of irreversible loss of all functions of the entire brain. 
7. That any statutory "definition" should be kept separate and 
distinct from provisions governing the donation of cadaver organs 
and from any legal rules on decisions to terminate life-sustaining 
treatment.
                                                 
1 142 D.S.C. §1802 (1978).
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To embody these conclusions in statutory form the 
Commission worked with the three organizations which had 
proposed model legislation on the subject. the American Bar 
Association, the American Medical Association, and the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. These 
groups have now endorsed the following statute, in place of their 
previous proposals: 
Uniform Determination of Death Act 
An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible 
cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) 
irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, 
including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death 
must be made in accordance with 
 accepted medical standards. 
The Commission recommends the adoption of this statute in all 
jurisdictions in the United States. 
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Introduction 
Death is the one great certainty. The subject of powerful social 
and religious rituals and moving literature, it is contemplated by 
philosophers, probed by biologists, and combatted by physicians. 
Death, taboo in some cultures, preoccupies others. In this Report the 
President's Commission explores only a small corner of this 
boundless topic. 
The question addressed here is not inherently difficult or 
complicated. Simply, it is whether the law ought to recognize new 
means for establishing that the death of a human being has occurred. 
The accepted standard for determining death has been the permanent 
absence of respiration and circulation. A question arises about 
continued reliance on the traditional standard because advances in 
medical technique now permit physicians to generate breathing and 
heartbeat when the capacity to breathe spontaneously has been 
irretrievably lost. Prior to the advent of current technology, breathing 
ceased and death was obvious. Now, however, certain organic 
processes in these bodies can be maintained through artificial means, 
although they will never recover the capacity for spontaneous 
breathing or sustained integration of bodily functions, for 
consciousness, or for other human experiences. 
Such artificially-maintained bodies present a new category for 
the law (and for society), to which the application of traditional 
means for determining death is neither clear nor fully satisfactory. 
The Commission's mandate is to study and recommend ways in 
which the traditional legal standards can be updated in order to 
provide clear and principled guidance for determining whether such 
bodies are alive or dead. 
Although it is in most respects straightforward, "the matter of 
defining death" seemed troublesome enough to be included in the 
Commission's statutory mandate for several 
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reasons. Most important, consideration of the new approaches to 
the determination of death has resulted in attention being paid to 
underlying questions about the meaning of life and death. Concerns 
about diagnosing death by measuring the presence or absence of 
brain functions has occasioned a reexamination of the traditional 
techniques. Consequently, questions have been posed about the 
scientific and clinical bases for the traditional standard for death 
and about the understanding of human life upon which that standard 
rests. 
Furthermore, other changes in medical abilities have 
contributed to the concern about the "definition" of death. For 
example, the importance customarily accorded to a person's beating 
heart in differentiating the living from the dead is challenged when 
a "dead" person's heart can beat in the chest of a "living" person 
whose own heart has not merely stopped but has been removed 
from his or her body. 
Finally, confusion arises—which can only be dispelled by the 
application of accepted medical standards in each individual case—
because the same technology not only keeps heart and lungs 
functioning in some who have irretrievably lost all brain functions 
but also sustains other, less severely injured patients. Inexact 
medical and legal descriptions of these two categories of cases have 
led to a blurring of the important distinction between patients who 
are dead and those who are or may be dying. This Report on 
"Defining Death" does not address the medical, legal and ethical 
problems concerning dying patients. Issues in the treatment of dying 
patients will be the subject of a later study by the Commission. This 
Report focuses solely on the determination that death has occurred.  
Although it is possible—indeed, in the Commission's view, 
necessary—to treat "determination of death" and "allowing to die" 
separately as matters for public policy, both arise from common 
roots in society. These roots not only grow in the soil of newly 
developed medical capabilities but are also nourished by the flood 
of popular attention to "death and dying." The "movement" that 
they have generated is now a staple of the popular media.1 The 
portrayals in news stories, dramas and documentaries of vignettes 
and dilemmas about dying touch deep ethical and existential chords 
and reflect broader concerns about the physician-patient 
relationship, personal autonomy and control of treatment, and the 
myriad consequences of modern, 
 
                                                 
1 George Gerbner, "Death in Prime Time: Notes on the Symbolic Functions of Dying in 
the Mass Media," 447 Ann. Am. Acad.Polito &- Soc. Sci. 64 (1980); Michel Vovelle, 
"Rediscovery of Death Since 1960," 447 Ann. Am. Acad. Polito &- Soc. Sci. 89 (1980). 
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high-technology medicine. All of these areas are matters for 
continuing study by the Commission, illuminated by, but not limited 
to, the special setting of death and dying. 
Overview of the Report 
Traditionally, the cessation of heartbeat and of breathing were 
regarded by the lay and. medical communities alike as the definitive 
signs of death. The law, through the judgments of courts in deciding 
individual cases, articulated this general view. In the oft-quoted 
words of Black's Law Dictionary, the common law mirrored the 
physician's "definition" of death "as a total stoppage of the 
circulation of the blood, and a cessation of the animal and vital 
functions consequent thereon, such as respiration, pulsation, etc."1  
 
 
 
Developments in medical 
technology and practice, which are 
reviewed in Chapter One, have 
prompted an examination of the 
adequacy of the traditional view of 
the proper way to determine whether 
death has occurred. Since respiration 
is controlled by brain centers, the 
loss of function in those centers used 
to mean that breathing (and 
consequently heartbeat) would never 
return. Mechanical respirators and 
related therapy now enable 
physicians to reverse the failure of 
respiration and circulation in many 
victims of conditions such as cardiac 
arrest or trauma. If blood flow to the  
brain is restored quickly enough (usually this must be within several 
minutes), these victims may eventually recover unassisted breathing. 
But the brain cannot regenerate neural cells to replace ones that have 
permanently stopped metabolizing. Hence, longer periods without 
blood flow (ischemia) or oxygen (anoxia) may cause complete and 
irreversible loss of all brain functions. When the entire brain 
 
                                                 
1 Black's Law Dictionary, (4th ed.) West Publishing Co., S1. Paul, Minn. (1968) at 488: 
DEATH. The cessation of life; the ceasing to exist; defined by physicians as a total 
stoppage of the circulation of the blood, and a cessation of the animal and vital functions 
consequent thereon, such as respiration, pulsation, etc. 
But see Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.) West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn. (1979) at 
170, which now includes an entry under the heading "brain death," citing recent statutes 
and court cases. 
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has been so severely damaged, spontaneous respiration can never 
return even though breathing may be maintained by artificial means 
for some time (typically, several days). 
Although physicians find themselves unable to rely on 
respiration and circulation as a means of diagnosing death in 
artificially-maintained, comatose patients, they have developed 
means of detecting the existence or nonexistence of brain functions 
and the potential for reversibility in such patients. These tests are 
intended to measure the organic functioning of the brain, not the 
mere existence of cellular activity which may continue in some brain 
cells-as in cells of other organs, such as the heart and lungs-for vary-
ing lengths of time after the organ has lost the ability to fulfill any of 
its functions in an organized manner. From the evidence presented at 
the Commission's July 11, 1980, meeting and in the biomedical 
literature, the Commission concludes in Chapter Two that proof of 
an irreversible absence of functions in the entire brain, including the 
brainstem, provides a highly reliable means of declaring death for 
respirator-maintained bodies. 
The diagnosis of death has, of course, significance beyond its 
role as a physiological concept. Therefore in Chapter Three several 
different explanations of the "meaning" of human life and death are 
examined. Formulations based upon the functions of the whole brain 
include those that focus on the integrated functioning of brain, heart 
and lung and on the primacy of the brain among organs as the body's 
regulator. Some people have argued for a "higher brain" formulation, 
such as one which attempts to enumerate the characteristics essential 
to "personhood" or one that bases death on the loss of "personal 
identity," viewed here as a consequence of discontinuity in certain 
mental processes. Finally, several explanations of death not oriented 
to brain functions are also reviewed, such as those which hold death 
to occur when the soul leaves the body or which equate life with the 
flow of air and blood through the body. The Commission had some 
points of disagreement with all of the formulations. Nevertheless, 
without resolving all the conceptual issues, the Commission found 
that all the formulations, except perhaps the last, were consistent 
with the public policy recommendations of this Report. 
If death were entirely a medical matter, the process of 
"redefinition" might have been left in the hands of the health 
professions, as the Commission notes in Chapter Four. But, as the 
Congress and the President signified in referring this task to an 
interdisciplinary, broadly-based public body for study, the standards 
by which death is determined have significance and consequences 
that are not limited to medical ones. Accordingly, the standards by 
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which death is to be recognized should be arrived at publicly, 
although it will remain for physicians to ,continue to develop criteria 
and tests and to apply them in reaching individual diagnoses. 
Chapter Four examines ways to effect this public response. 
Traditionally, the law on the determination of death was found in the 
common law decisions of judges ruling on individual cases rather 
than in the statute books.1 One could, of course, remain in that 
tradition and await judicial reformulation of the standard. Yet this 
method of law reform has serious drawbacks-among them, delay, 
uncertainty, and lack of consistency in the rules applicable in dif-
ferent jurisdictions. Consequently, in the past decade half the states 
have adopted statutes incorporating the cessation of total brain 
functions as a ground for declaring death. 
Having concluded that change should be effected publicly and 
through legislation, the Commission next addresses several basic 
policy issues. First, how specific- socially or scientifically-should this 
legislation be? After considering the alternatives, from the basic 
concept of death to the precise clinical procedures for diagnosis, the 
Commission concludes that what is required is the promulgation of 
general physiologic standards for recognizing that death has occurred. 
Second, a statute ought to meet several objectives. Most 
important, any law should treat like cases alike and provide 
consistency among jurisdictions when an issue is as important as 
determining that a human being has died. As a practical matter, 
alternative standards may be necessary and appropriate. But the use 
of two standards in a statute should not be permitted to obscure the 
fact that death is a unitary phenomenon. 
It is also desirable, in the Commission's view, to limit change in 
the law on death to the minimum necessary for the problem at hand, 
Le., ambiguity about the status of cases of coma with respirator-
assistance. Extending the "definition" of death beyond those lacking 
all brain functions to include, for example, persons who have lost 
only cognitive functions but are still able to breathe spontaneously 
would radically change the meaning of death. Furthermore, in 
language as well as content, any legislation ought to make personal 
sense to lay people and to reflect scientific knowledge and clinical 
reality. 
Certainty and clarity about the standards for determining death 
are equally matters of concern in the making of public policy 
throughout the country. Practically, patients are transported across 
state lines for treatment; if neighboring states had different 
definitions, confusion would proba-  
                                                 
1See Appendix D, infra. 
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bly result, and abuse become possible. State-by-state variation is not 
justified on a matter that is so fundamental and that rests on 
biological facts of universal applicability. Accordingly, in Chapter 
Five, the Commission recommends that all states adopt a uniform 
statute on determining death to replace existing judicial or statutory 
formulations. Expecting that uniform law will emerge from this 
process, the Commission concludes that this topic remains an 
appropriate subject for state rather than federal legislation, except as 
to those areas where the federal government exercises jurisdiction. 
The chapter also provides a point-by-point examination of the 
proposed statute and the reasons favoring its adoption. 
Finally, Chapter Five concludes with brief comments on 
several ethical aspects of the proposed statute. The purpose in 
changing the law is to regularize its administration and to permit 
more prudent and humane medical care. These improvements will 
better protect life and respect the fact of its end. Plainly, any 
standard for determining death must be capable of certain and 
consistent application. 
The Process of the Commission's Study 
At its first meeting, in January 1980, the Commission decided 
to make the "matter of defining death" one of its first studies. 
Discussion centered on four points: (1) whether a federal 
commisssion is an appropriate body to formulate a position 
regarding a matter traditionally left to state law, (2) whether 
problems of uniformity or implementation had arisen with the 
statutes on death already adopted by many States, (3) whether one 
or more of the existing "model statutes" should be endorsed or a 
new one proposed, and (4) whether to enlarge on the Commission's 
statutory mandate to study with the "definition of death" the related 
but distinct issues presented by decisions to forego life-sustaining 
therapy. 
At its next meeting, in May, the Commission heard 
philosophical and political testimony on the determination of death. 
Professor Daniel Wikler, a University of Wisconsin philosopher, 
proposed a concept of "personal identity" to supplant the common 
understanding of "whole brain" functioning as the basis for "brain 
death." Nevertheless, he urged the Commissioners to focus on the 
legal issue of whether those who are "brain dead" should be ruled 
legally dead. He noted that it may be possible to agree on policy 
without achieving full consensus on the purely conceptual issues. 
Professor Wikler's points are considered in Chapter Three. 
Professsor Robert Veatch of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics at 
Georgetown University cautioned against using the term "brain 
death" because it has two distinct but 
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confusing meanings-cessation of brain functions and the death of a 
person based on that cessation. He noted that the latter phenomenon 
is the one of concern to public policy. Two basic issues identified by 
Professor Veatch are considered in this Report: (1) Should society 
stay with heart-lung criteria for death, since some people still doubt 
that a person is dead while a respirator keeps lungs and heart work-
ing, or, at the other extreme, should death be based solely on the 
loss of "higher" brain functions? and (2) Is diversity in the public 
definition of death (by society, physicians, patients, or their agents) 
possible? Can such diversity be tolerated on so fundamental a 
matter? 
During May the Commission's Executive Director met with 
representatives of the American Bar Association (ABA), the 
American Medical Association (AMA), and the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL). Those 
attending this meeting prepared a statute on the determination of 
death which they recommended for approval by their organizations 
in place of the organizations' preexisting statutory proposals. During 
the summer, the Director served as a special consultant to the 
NCCUSL during its deliberations about the proposed statute, which 
was approved. Subsequently, the new uniform statute was also 
approved by the AMA (October 19, 1980) and the ABA (February 
10, 1981). 
 
 
 
The Commission devoted a day of testimony and discussion to 
the medical and theological aspects of "defining" death at its next 
meeting, in July 1980. During the morning, the Commission heard 
from five expert witnesses: Dr. Frank Veith, Chief of Vascular 
Surgery at the Montefiore Hospital in New York City; Dr. Ronald 
Cranford, 
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Director of the Neurological Intensive Care Unit at the Hennepin 
County Medical Center, and Chairman of the Ethics Committee of 
the American Academy of Neurology; Dr. Gaetano Molinari, 
Professor and Chairman of the Department of Neurology at the 
School of Medicine and Health Services at George Washington 
University, who had served as the principal NIH officer for the 
Collaborative Study of Cerebral Death; Dr. Earl Walker, Adjunct 
Professor Neurosurgery and Neurology at the University of New 
Mexico School of Medicine, Coordinator of the Collaborative Study; 
and Dr. Julius Korein, Professor of Neurology at the New York 
University Medical Center. 
The witnesses agreed that the technological advances which 
have made artificial respiration possible also spawned criteria for 
determining irreversible cessation of brain functions. The physicians 
all concurred that a statutory definition of death should encompass 
irreversible loss of brain functions. They cited a number of reasons: 
 (1) Such a law would establish the legality of pronoun- 
cing death based on brain criteria; 
(2) The use of the brain-based standard when the heart-lung 
standard is not applicable would protect patients against ill-advised, 
idiosyncratic pronouncements of death; 
(3) Legal recognition of the brain-based standard would remove 
the doubt that exists in some states over the use of patients without 
brain functions as organ donors; 
(4) A single set of standards for death pronouncements is 
appropriate for all legal purposes (encompassing inheritance, taxes 
and criminal trials, as well as medical treatment); and 
(5) Maintaining a dead body on artificial support systems 
consumes scarce medical resources and may unnecessarily deplete 
the family's emotional and financial resources. 
Because the medical testimony indicated that the epidemiology 
of total and irreversible brain cessation (including the frequency of 
its occurrence, its effects on the medical management decisions, and 
the relative proportion of survivals and death among comatose 
patients placed on respirators) was not well documented, the 
Commission embarked during the Fall of 1980 on a small empirical 
study. A full description of this project is in Appendix B; some of its 
findings are highlighted in relevant sections of the Report. 
The Commission also considered religious viewpoints. 
Testimony was received from Rabbi J. David Bleich, Associate 
Professor of Talmudic and Jewish Law at Yeshiva University in 
Union of Orthodox Jewish Congre- 
 
 
 
 
11    Introduction 
 
 
gations of America; Rabbi Moses Tendler, Professor of Biology and 
of Talmudic Law at Yeshiva University; Father Paul M. Quay, 
Associate Professor in the Departments of Theological Studies and 
Physics at St. Louis University; Father Kevin O'Rourke, Director of 
the Center for Health Care Ethics at St. Louis University; and 
Professor Paul Ramsey, a leading Protestant theologian who is the 
Harrington Spear Paine Professor of Religion at Princeton 
University. 
Jewish writings do not deal directly with "brain death" but 
contain passages susceptible to opposing readings. Rabbi Bleich 
interpreted Jewish law to require a cessation of corporal blood flow, 
whether or not spontaneous, as a prerequisite for determining death; 
Rabbi Tendler said that the Jewish tradition would recognize 
complete cessation of brain function as "physiological decapitation" 
and hence accept it as a basis for declaring death. 
Catholic and Protestant theological doctrines do not directly 
address the method of determining death. The belief that the human 
essence or soul departs at the moment of death is not inconsistent 
with the establishment, through neurological examination, of the 
time when death occurs.1 The religious concern is, rather, with 
according proper respect to the deceased (which may include the 
termination of unnecessary procedures) while also avoiding 
premature termination of helpful treatment under the guise of 
declaring death. 
The views of leaders in the "right to life" movement were also 
reviewed. In their published statements there is support for the 
enactment of statutes incorporating "total 
brain death" as a basis for determining death. As stated by Dennis 
Horan, President of American Citizens United for Life, 
Legislation limiting the concept of brain death to the 
irreversible cessation of total function of the brain, including 
the brain stem, is beneficial and does not  undermine any of the 
values we seek to support.2
Indeed, by drawing a clear line between the living and the dead, 
legislation of this sort is supported as a means of relieving- "some of 
the pressure for legalizing euthanasia"3 according to a leading pro-
life philosopher, Christian Eth- 
 
                                                 
1 "[I]t remains for the doctor to give a clear and precise definition of 'death' and the 'moment of 
death' of a patient who passes way in the state of unconsciousness." Pope Pius XII, "The 
Prolongation of Life," 4 The Pope Speaks 393, 396 (1957). 
2 Dennis J. Horan, "Definition of Death: An Emerging Consensus," 16 Trial 22,26 (1980). See 
also pp. 81-84 infra. 
3 "[A] correct definition of death, if it would eliminate some false classifications of dead 
individuals [as being] among the living, could relieve some of the pressure for legalizing 
euthanasia-in this case, pressure arising from a right attitude toward individuals really dead 
and only considered alive due to conceptual confusion." Germain Grisez & Joseph M. Boyle, 
Jr., Life and Death with Liberty and Justice: A Contribution to the Euthanasia Debate, Uni-
versity of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana (1979) at 61. Dennis Horan also concludes 
that "total brain death legislation enhances those values [we seek to support] by prohibiting 
euthanasia and allowing only those to be declared dead who are really dead." Gp. cit. at 26. 
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ics Professor Germain Grisez of Mount Saint Mary's College. 
The theological witnesses stated that it is neither necessary nor 
appropriate for public policy to resolve matters of religious belief. The 
Commission agrees; the statute recommended in this Report rests on 
secular foundations and does not purport to dictate religious beliefs. 
Necessarily, however, in reforming the legal standards governing a phy-
sician's determination that someone's biological life has ended, the 
proposed statute will have implications for secular legal and medical 
conduct with respect to the dead, while permitting accommodation of 
religious views and practices.1
Testimony from several of the religious leaders emphasized that 
death is an absolute phenomenon, so that terms such as "brain dead" or 
"virtually dead" are misleading. Father Quay and Professor Ramsey, in 
particular, warned that a statutory definition should not be construed as 
inviting premature organ transplantation. The Commissioners agree that 
since the determination of death is irrevocable, extreme caution must be 
exercized in the process of making public policy and law as well as each 
individual diagnosis. The medical information reviewed in Chapter Two 
of this Report and the guidelines for diagnosis developed concurrently 
by a group of medical experts (see Appendix F) respond to the concern 
for certainty. 
The staff's first draft report was briefly considered at the September 
1980 meeting. A second draft was discussed at the November meeting, 
at which time the Commissioners endorsed the general presentation and 
the model statute. Following that meeting, the draft Report was revised 
and circulated. The Commissioners discussed that revised draft at their 
June 1981 meeting. Final consideration of the subject occurred at the 
meeting of July 9, 1981, at which time the Commissioners present 
unanimously gave formal approval to the Uniform Determination of 
Death Act and to this Report, subject to several editorial corrections. 
 
                                                 
1 See pp. 80-81 infra. 
 
Why "Update" 
Death? 
 
1 
For most of the past several centuries, the medical de-
termination of death was very close to the popular one. If a person 
fell unconscious or was found so, someone (often but not always a 
physician) would feel for the pulse, listen for breathing, hold a 
mirror before the nose to test for condensation, and look to see if 
the pupils were fixed. Although these criteria have been used to 
determine death since antiquity, they have not always been 
universally accepted. 
Developing Confidence in the Heart-Lung Criteria 
In the eighteenth century, macabre tales of "corpses” reviving 
during funerals and exhumed skeletons found to have clawed at 
coffin lids led to widespread fear of premature burial. Coffins were 
developed with elaborate escape mechanisms and speaking tubes to 
the world above (Figure 1), mortuaries employed guards to monitor 
the newly dead for signs of life, and legislatures passed laws 
requiring a delay before burial.1
The medical press also paid a great deal of attention to 
the matter. In The Uncertainty of the Signs of Death and the 
Danger of Precipitate Interments in 1740, Jean-Jacques Winslow 
advanced the thesis that putrefaction was the only sure sign of 
death. In the years following, many physicians published articles 
agreeing with him. This position had, however, notable logistic and 
public health disadvantages. It also disparaged, sometimes with 
unfair vigor, the skills of physicians as diagnosticians of death. In 
reply, the French surgeon Louis published in 1752 his influential 
Letters on 
 
                                                 
1 Marc Alexander, "The Rigid Embrace of the Narrow House: Premature Burial and the Signs 
of Death," 10 Hastings Ctr. Rpt. 25 (1980); John D. Arnold, Thomas F. Zimmerman and 
Daniel C. Martin, "Public Attitudes and the Diagnosis of Death," 206 I.A.M.A. 1949 (1968). 
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the Certainty of the Signs of Death. The debate dissipated in the 
nineteenth century because of the gradual improvement in the 
competence of physicians and a concomitant increase in the public's 
confidence in them. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Kirchbaum's device for indicating life in buried 
 persons, Patent sketch, 1882. 
 
Physicians actively sought to develop this competence. They 
even held contests encouraging the search for a cluster of signs-
rather than a single infallible sign-for the diagnosis of death.1 One 
sign did, however, achieve prominence. The invention of the 
stethoscope in the mid-nineteenth century enabled physicians to 
detect heartbeat 
                                                 
1 Alexander, op. cit. at 30, citing, Orifila, A Popular Treatise on the Remedies to be Employed 
in Case of Poisoning and Apparent Death; Including Means of Detecting Poisons, of 
Distinguishing Real From Apparent Death, and of Ascertaining the Adulteration of Wines, 
trans. from French, Philadelphia, (1818) at 154; G. Tourdes, "Mort (Medicine legate)," 
Dictionnaire Encyclopedique des Sciences Medicales, Ser. II, X (1875) at 579-708, 603. 
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with heightened sensitivity. The use of this instrument by a well-
trained physician, together with other clinical measures, laid to rest 
public fears of premature burial. The twentieth century brought 
even more sophisticated technological means to determine death, 
particularly the electrocardiograph (EKG), which is more sensitive 
than the stethoscope in detecting cardiac functioning. 
 
The Interrelationships of Brain, Heart, and Lung Functions 
The brain has three general anatomic divisions: the cerebrum, 
with its outer shell called the cortex; the cerebellum; and the 
brainstem, composed of the midbrain, the pons, and the medulla 
oblongata (Figure 2). Traditionally, the cerebrum has been referred 
to as the "higher brain" because it has primary control of 
consciousness, thought, memory and feeling. The brainstem has 
been called the "lower brain," since it controls spontaneous, 
vegetative functions such as swallowing, yawning and sleep-wake 
cycles. It is important to note that these generalizations are not 
entirely accurate. Neuroscientists generally agree that such "higher 
brain" functions as cognition or consciousness probably are not 
mediated strictly by the cerebral cortex; rather, they probably result 
from complex interrelations between brains tern and cortex. 
Respiration is controlled in the brainstem, particularly the 
medulla (Figure 2). Neural impulses originating in the respiratory 
centers of the medulla stimulate the diaphragm and intercostal 
muscles, which cause the lungs to fill with air. Ordinarily, these 
respiratory centers adjust the rate of breathing to maintain the 
correct levels of carbon dioxide and oxygen. In certain 
circumstances, such as heavy exercise, sighing, coughing or 
sneezing, other areas of the brain modulate the activities of the 
respiratory centers or even briefly take direct control of respiration. 
Destruction of the brain's respiratory center stops respiration, 
which in turn deprives the heart of needed oxygen, causing it too to 
cease functioning. The traditional signs of life-respiration and 
heartbeat-disappear: the person is dead. The "vital signs" 
traditionally used in diagnosing death thus reflect the direct 
interdependence of respiration, circulation and the brain. 
The artificial respirator and concomitant life-support systems 
have changed this simple picture. Normally, respiration ceases when 
the functions of the diaphragm and intercostal muscles are impaired. 
This results from direct injury to the muscles or (more commonly) 
because the neural impulses between the brain and these muscles are 
interrupted. However, an artificial respirator (also called a venti-
lator) can be used to compensate for the inability of the thoracic 
muscles to fill the lungs with air. Some of these 
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machines use negative pressure to expand the chest wall (in which 
case they are called "iron lungs"); others use positive pressure to 
push air into the lungs. The respirators are equipped with devices to 
regulate the rate and depth of "breathing," which are normally 
controlled by the respiratory centers in the medulla. The machines 
cannot compensate entirely for the defective neural connections 
since they. cannot regulate blood gas levels precisely. But, provided 
that the lungs themselves have not been extensively damaged, gas 
exchange can continue and appropriate levels of oxygen and carbon 
dioxide can be maintained in the circulating blood. . 
Unlike the respiratory system, which depends on the neural 
impulses from the brain, the heart can pump blood without external 
control. Impulses from brain centers modulate the inherent rate and 
force of the heartbeat but are not required for the heart to contract at 
a level of function that is ordinarily adequate. Thus, when artificial 
respiration provides adequate oxygenation and associated medical 
treatments regulate essential plasma components and blood 
pressure, an intact heart will continue to beat, despite loss of brain 
functions. At present, however, no machine can take over the 
functions of the heart except for a very limited time and in limited 
circumstances (e.g., a heart-lung machine used during surgery). 
Therefore, when a severe injury to the heart or major blood vessels 
prevents the circulation of the crucial blood supply to the brain, the 
loss of brain functioning is inevitable because no oxygen reaches the 
brain. 
 
Loss of Various Brain Functions 
The most frequent causes of irreversible loss of functions of 
the whole brain are: (1) direct trauma to the head, such as from a 
motor vehicle accident or a gunshot wound, (2) massive 
spontaneous hemorrhage into the brain as a result of ruptured 
aneurysm or complications of high blood pressure, and (3) anoxic 
damage from cardiac or respiratory arrest or severely reduced blood 
pressure.1
Many of these severe injuries to the brain cause an ac-
cumulation of fluid and swelling in the brain tissue, a condition 
called cerebral edema. In severe cases of edema, the pressure within 
the closed cavity increases until it exceeds the systolic blood 
pressure, resulting in a total loss of blood now to both the upper and 
lower portions of the brain. If deprived of blood flow for at least 10-
15 minutes, the brain, including the brainstem, will completely 
cease func- 
 
                                                 
1 Ronald E. Cranford and Harmon L. Smith, "Some Critical Distinctions  Between Brain 
Death and Persistent Vegetative State" 6 Ethics in Sci. and Med. 199, 201 (1979). 
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tioning.1 Other pathophysiologic mechanisms also result in a 
progressive and, ultimately, complete cessation of intracranial 
circulation. 
Once deprived of adequate supplies of oxygen and glucose, 
brain neurons will irreversibly lose all activity and ability to 
function. In adults, oxygen and/or glucose deprivation for more than 
a few minutes causes some neuron loss.2 Thus, even in the absence 
of direct trauma and edema, brain functions can be lost if circulation 
to the brain is impaired. If blood flow is cut off, brain tissues 
completely self-digest (autolyze) over the ensuing days. 
When the brain lacks all functions, consciousness is, of course, 
lost. While some spinal reflexes often persist in such bodies (since 
circulation to the spine is separate from that of the brain), all 
reflexes controlled by the brainstem as well as cognitive, affective 
and integrating functions are absent. Respiration and circulation in 
these bodies may be generated by a ventilator together with 
intensive medical management. In adults who have experienced 
irreversible cessation of the functions of the entire brain, this 
mechanically generated functioning can continue only a limited time 
because the heart usually stops beating within two to ten days. (An 
infant or small child who has lost all brain functions will typically 
suffer cardiac arrest within several weeks, although respiration and 
heartbeat can sometimes be maintained even longer.3) 
Less severe injury to the brain can cause mild to profound 
damage to the cortex, lower cerebral structures, cerebellum, 
brainstem, or some combination thereof. The cerebrum, especially 
the cerebral cortex, is more easily injured by loss of blood flow or 
oxygen than is the brainstem. A 4-6 minute loss of blood flow—
caused by, for example, cardiac arrest—typically damages the 
cerebral cortex permanently, while the relatively more resistant 
brainstem may continue to function.4
 
 
                                                 
1 H. A. H. van Till-d'Aulnis de Bourouill, "Diagnosis of Death in Comatose Patients under 
Resuscitation Treatment: A Critical Review of the Harvard Report," 2 Am. J. L. & Med. 1,21-
22 (1976). 
2 One exception to this general picture requires brief mention. Certain drugs or low body 
temperature (hypothermia) can place the neurons in "suspended animation." Under these 
conditions, the neurons may receive virtually no oxygen or glucose for a significant period of 
time without sustaining irreversible damage. This effect is being used to try to limit brain 
injury in patients by giving them barbiturates or reducing temperature; the use of such 
techniques will, of course, make neurological diagnoses slower or more complicated. 
3 Julius Korein, "Brain Death," in J. Cottrell and H. Turndorf (eds.) Anesthesia and 
Neurosurgery, C.V. Mosby & Co., St. Louis (1980) at 282, 284, 292-293. 
4 Cranford and Smith, op. cit. at 203.
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When brainstem functions remain, but the major components 
of the cerebrum are irreversibly destroyed, the patient is in what is 
usually called a "persistent vegetative state" or "persistent 
noncognitive state."1 Such persons may exhibit spontaneous, 
involuntary movements such as yawns or facial grimaces, their 
eyes may be open and they may be capable of breathing without 
assistance. Without higher brain functions, however, any apparent 
wakefulness does not represent awareness of self or environment 
(thus, the condition is often described as "awake but unaware"). 
The case of Karen Ann Quinlan has made this condition familiar 
to the general public. With necessary medical and nursing care—
including feeding through intravenous or nasogastric tubes, and 
antibiotics for recurrent pulmonary infections—such patients can 
survive months or years, often without a respirator. (The longest 
survival exceeded 37 years.2) 
Conclusion: The Need for Reliable Policy 
Medical interventions can often provide great benefit in 
avoiding irreversible harm to a patient's injured heart, lungs, or 
brain by carrying a patient through a period of acute need. These 
techniques have, however, thrown new light on the 
interrelationship of these crucial organ systems. This has created 
complex issues for public policy as well. 
For medical and legal purposes, partial brain impairment 
must be distinguished from complete and irreversible loss of brain 
functions or "whole brain death."3 The President's Commission, as 
subsequent chapters explain more fully, regards the cessation of 
the vital functions of the entire brain—and not merely portions 
thereof, such as those responsible for cognitive functions—as the 
only proper neurologic basis for declaring death. This conclusion 
accords with the overwhelming consensus of medical and legal 
experts and the public. 
Present attention to the "definition" of death is part of a 
process of development in social attitudes and legal rules 
stimulated by the unfolding of biomedical knowledge. In the 
nineteenth century increasing knowledge and practical skill made 
the public confident that death could be diagnosed reliably using 
cardiopulmonary criteria. The ques- 
 
                                                 
1 Bryan Jennett and Fred Plum, "The Persistent Vegetative State: A Syndrome in 
Search of a Name," 1 Lancet 734 (1972); Fred Plum and Jerome B. Posner, The 
Diagnosis of Stupor and Coma, F. A. David Co., Philadelphia (1980 3rd. ed.) at 6-7. 
2 See Norris McWhirter (ed.) The Guinness Book of World Records, Bantam Books, 
New York (1981) at 42, citing the case of Elaine Esposito who lapsed into coma 
following surgery on August 6, 1941 and died on November 25, 1978, 37 years and 
111 days later. 
3 Original has footnote indicated in text, but no footnote at bottom of page. 
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Figure 2. Anatomic Interrelationships of Heart, Lungs and Brain 
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tion now is whether, when medical intervention may be responsible 
for a patient's respiration and circulation, there are other equally 
reliable ways to diagnose death. 
The Commission recognizes that it is often difficult to 
determine the severity of a patient's injuries, especially in the first 
few days of intensive care following a cardiac arrest, head trauma, 
or other similar event. Responsible public policy in this area 
requires that physicians be able to distinguish reliably those patients 
who have died from those whose injuries are less severe or are 
reversible. In the next chapter, medical evidence on these points is 
examined. Ascertaining the medical facts is only a part of the 
process of framing a "definition," however. Therefore, the third 
chapter examines concepts of death at a more basic, albeit not 
technical level. 
The "State of the Art" 
in Medicine 
 
2 
Until the past few decades, comatose patients fairly rapidly 
either improved or died. If no other complication supervened and 
the patient did not improve, death followed from starvation and 
dehydration within days; pneumonia, apnea, or effects of the 
original disease typically brought on death even more quickly. 
Before such techniques as intravenous hydration, nasogastric 
feeding, bladder catheterization and respirators, no patient 
continued for long in deep coma. 
With the aid of modern medicine, some comatose patients can 
be kept from a rapid death. Many, however, become permanently 
and totally unresponsive. In other words, their appearance 
resembles that of the dead as traditionally perceived: they no longer 
respond to their environment by sensate and intellectual activity. 
But their appearance also differs from that traditionally associated 
with the dead because mechanical support generates breathing, 
heartbeat, and the associated physical characteristics (e.g., warm, 
moist skin) of life. 
The ever more sophisticated capabilities developed by 
biomedical practitioners during the past quarter century to support 
or supplant certain vital functions have thus created new problems 
in diagnosing death. If these diagnostic problems were the only 
consequence of medicine's new capabilities, those who developed 
and employed them might well be criticized for having opened a 
Pandora's Box of troubles for physicians and for society. But, as 
witnesses told the Commission, in a portion of the cases the 
armamentarium of resuscitative medicine brings comatose patients 
back from the brink of death by supporting their breathing and 
blood flow during a period of acute need. 
Since the witnesses and existing medical literature lacked 
information on the relative proportion of comatose, 
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respirator-assisted patients who survive versus those who die 
(as determined by either brain-based or heart/lung-based tests), 
the Commission sponsored a small study. This study was not 
intended to generate definitive data on the incidence of such 
outcomes but rather to provide a rough estimate of the extent 
of the various outcomes. The study examined the experience 
over a period ranging from two months to one year at seven 
hospitals serving major metropolitan areas. (A full description 
of the study and its results appears in Appendix B.) At the four 
acute care centers from which such data were available, 2-4 
cases of irreversible loss of all brain functions arose each 
month, a figure consistent with other data.1 These figures 
convey a useful, if limited, perspective on the frequency with 
which the medicolegal dilemma of determining death in 
comatose, respirator-assisted cases arises at such hospitals. 
The social and legal as well as medical consequences attached 
to a determination of death make it imperative that the 
diagnosis be incontrovertible. One must be certain that the 
functions of the entire brain are irreversibly lost and that 
respiration and circulation are, therefore, solely artifacts of 
mechanical intervention. Indeed, though suspicious that their 
interventions may be doing nothing more than masking what 
would otherwise manifestly be death by the traditional 
measures, physicians are concerned about doing anything—
such as removing a respirator—that would hinder the recovery 
of a patient whose loss of brain functioning might be only 
partial or reversible.2
Development of the Concept of "Brain Death" 
The concept of "brain death" and efforts to refine criteria to 
identify that condition have been developing during the last 
two decades, concomitant with the spread of life support 
systems in clinical medicine. In 1959, several French 
neurophysiologists published results of research they had 
conducted on patients in extremely deep coma receiving 
respirator assistance, a condition they termed "coma dépassé."3 
Multiple tests showed these patients 
 
 
                                                 
1 Ake Grenvik, David J. Powner, James V. Snyder, Michael S. Jastremski, Ralph 
A. Babcock and Michael G. Loughhead, "Cessation of Therapy in Terminal Illness 
and Brain Death," 6 Critical Care Med. 284 (1978). 
2Accordingly, in the procedures for diagnosing death set forth by the 
Commission's medical consultants in Appendix F infra, the test for apnea involves 
elevating the level of circulating oxygen before turning off the respirator and 
allowing the level of carbon dioxide to rise as a stimulus for spontaneous 
respiration. The high level of oxygen protects the brain cells (if any remain active) 
from further damage. 
3 P. Mollaret and M. Goulon, "Le Coma Depasse," 101 Rev. Neural. 3(1959). 
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lacked reflexes and electrophysiologic activity. The investigators 
concluded that the patients had suffered permanent loss of brain 
functions-they were, in other words, "beyond coma." Postmortem 
examinations of those patients revealed extensive destruction 
(necrosis and autolysis) of the brain—a phenomenon that has since 
been called the "respirator brain."1
With the advent of transplant surgery employing cadaver 
donors—first with kidney transplantation in the 1950's and later, 
and still more dramatically, with heart transplantation in the 
1960's—interest in "brain death" took on a new urgency.2 For such 
transplants to be successful, a viable, intact organ is needed. The 
suitability of organs for transplantation diminishes rapidly once the 
donor's respiration and circulation stop. The most desirable organ 
donors are otherwise healthy individuals who have died following 
traumatic head injuries and whose breathing and blood flow are 
being artifically maintained. Yet even with proper care, the organs 
of these potential donors will deteriorate. Thus, it became important 
for physicians to be able to determine when the brains of 
mechanically-supported patients irretrievably ceased functioning. 
Yet, the need for viable organs to transplant does not account 
fully for the interest in diagnosing irreversible loss of brain 
functions. The Commission's study illustrates this point; of 36 
comatose patients who were declared dead on the basis of 
irreversible loss of brain functions, only six were organ donors. 
Other studies also report that organs are procured in only a small 
percentage of cases in which brain-based criteria might be applied.3 
Thus, medical con- 
                                                 
1 A. Earl Walker, E. L. Diamond and John Moseley, "The Neuropathological Findings in 
Irreversible Coma; A Critique of the Respirator Brain," 34 J. Neuropath. Exp. Neurol. 
295 (1975); John 1. Moseley, Gaetano F. Molinari and A. Earl Walker, "Respirator Brain: 
Report of a Survey and Review of Current Concepts," 100 Arch. Pathol. Lab. Med. 61 
(1976). 
2 See, e.g., Renée C. Fox and Judith P. Swazey, The Courage to Fail: A Social View of 
Organ Transplantation and Dialysis, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, (1978); 
Francis D. Moore, Give and Take: The Biology of Tissue Transplantation, W.B. Sanders, 
Co., Philadelphia, Pa. (1964). 
3See e.g., Howard H. Kaufman, John D. Hutchton, Megan M. McBride, Carolyn A. 
Beardsley and Barry D. Kahan, "Kidney Donation: Needs and Possibilities," 5 
Neurosurg. 237 (1979); K. J. Bart, "The Prevalance of Cadaveric Organs for 
Transplantation" in S.W. Sell, U.P. Perry and M.M. Vincent (eds.) Proceedings of the 
1977 Annual Meeting of American Association Tissue Banks, American Association of 
Tissue Banks,. Rockville, Md. (1977) at 124-130; A. Earl Walker, "The Neurosurgeon's 
Responsibility for Organ Procurement," 44 J. Neurosurg. 1 (1976). 
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cern over the determination of death rests much less with any wish 
'to facilitate organ transplantation than with the  
the need both to render ap- 
propriate care to patients and to 
replace artificial support with 
more fitting and respectful 
behavior when a patient has 
become a dead body. Another 
incentive to update the criteria 
for determining death stems 
from the increasing realization 
that the dedication of .scarce 
and expensive intensive care 
facilities to bodies without 
brain functions may not only 
prolong the uncertainty and 
suffering of grieving families 
but also preclude access to the 
facilities for patients with 
reversible conditions.1
 
 
 
 
The Emergence of a Medical Consensus 
 Medical concern over making the proper diagnosis in 
respirator-supported patients led to the development of criteria 
which reliably establish permanent loss of brain functions. A 
landmark in this process was the publication in 1968 of a report by 
an ad hoc committee of the Harvard Medical School which became 
known as the "Harvard criteria."2 The Committee's report described 
the following characteristics of a permanently nonfunctioning brain, 
a condition it referred to as "irreversible coma": 
 
                                                 
1 B.D. Colen, "Medical Examiner's Solution to Life and Death Problem," January 28, 
1978, Wash Post §A at 8, col. 1, describing the attempts of Dr. Ron Wright, deputy chief 
medical examiner for Dade County Florida, to have medical interventions ceased for 
bodies declared dead on the basis of brain-oriented criteria. (Florida did not enact a statute 
on the subject until 1980.) "Wright was able to get a judge to hold a special Sunday 
morning hearing at the hospital-with reporters and photographers in attendance-at which 
he successfully argued that the family was being forced to pay $2,000 a day to keep a 
dead body in the intensive care unit." Patricia H. Butcher, "Management of the Relatives 
of Patients with Brain Death" in Ronald V. Trubuhovich (ed). Management of Acute 
Intracranial Disasters, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, Mass. (1979) at 327. 
2 Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain 
Death, "A Definition of Irreversible Coma," 205 J.A.M.A. 337 (1968). 
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1. Unreceptivity and unresponsitivity. The patient shows a total 
unawareness to externally applied stimuli and inner need, and 
complete unresponsiveness, even when intensely painful stimuli are 
applied. 
2. No movements or breathing. All spontaneous muscular 
movement, spontaneous respiration, and response to stimuli such as 
pain, touch, sound or light are absent. 
3. No reflexes. Among the indications of absent reflexes are: 
fixed, dilated, pupils; lack of eye movement even when the head is 
turned or ice water is placed in the ear; lack of response to noxious 
stimuli; and generally, unelicitable tendon reflexes. 
In addition to these three criteria, a flat electroencephalogram 
(EEG), which shows that there is no discernible electrical activity in 
the cerebral cortex, was recommended as a confirmatory test, when 
available. All tests were to be repeated at least 24 hours later 
without showing change. Drug intoxication (e.g., barbiturates) and 
hypothermia (body temperature below 90oF), which can cause a 
reversible loss of brain functions, also had to be excluded before the 
criteria could be used. 
The "Harvard criteria" have been found to be quite reliable. 
Indeed, no case has yet been found that met these criteria and 
regained any brain functions despite continuation of respirator 
support. Criticisms of the criteria have been of five kinds. First, the 
phrase "irreversible coma" is misleading as applied to the cases at 
hand. "Coma" is a condition of a living person, and a body without 
any brain functions is dead and thus beyond any coma. Second, the 
writers of these criteria did not realize that the spinal cord reflexes 
actually persist or return quite commonly after the brain has 
completely and permanently ceased functioning. Third, 
"unreceptivity" is not amenable to testing in an unresponsive body 
without consciousness. Next, the need adequately to test brainstem 
reflexes, especially apnea, and to exclude drug and metabolic 
intoxication as possible causes of the coma, are not made 
sufficiently explicit and precise. Finally, although all individuals 
that meet "Harvard criteria" are dead (irreversible cessation of all 
functions of the entire brain), there are many other individuals who 
are dead but do not maintain circulation long enough to have a 24-
hour observation period. Various other criteria have been proposed 
since 1968 that attempt to ameliorate these deficiencies.1
 
                                                 
1 David J. Pawner, James V. Snyder, and Ake Grenvik, "Brain Death Certification: A 
Review," 5 Crit. Care Med. 230 (1977); Julius Korein, "Brain Death," in J. Cottrell and 
H. Turndorf (eds.) Anesthesia and Neurosurgery (1980) at 282; Peter McL. Black, 
"Brain Death" 299 N.E.J.M. 338 & 393 (1978). 
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As the Harvard Committee noted, permanent loss of brain 
functions can also be confirmed by absence of circulation to the 
brain. The brain necessarily ceases functioning after a short period 
without intracranial circulation, unless it is protected by 
hypothermia or drug induced depression of neuronal metabolism. In 
recent years, several procedures have been developed to test for 
absence of intracranial blood flow, including radioisotope cerebral 
angiography by bolus or static imaging and four vessel intracranial 
contrast angiography.1
Clinical research has emphasized the development of 
procedures that can be performed reliably at a patient’s bedside, so 
as to interfere as little as possible with treatment and not to risk 
harming the patient when recovery may still be possible. The aim of 
the tests is to reduce mistaken diagnoses that a patient is still alive, 
without incurring risks of erroneous diagnoses that a patient lacks 
all brain functioning when such functions actually remain or could 
recur. This is achieved by establishing first that all brain functions 
have ceased and then ascertaining that the cessation is irreversible. 
To do this, the cause of coma must be established and this may 
require, in addition to history and physical examination, such tests 
as computerized axial tomography, electroencephalography and 
echoencephalography.2 The cause of the cessation of functions must 
be sufficient to explain the individual's clinical status and must be 
demonstrated to be permanent during a period of observation.3   
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Julius Korein (ed.), Brain Death: Interrelated Medical and Social Issues, 315 
Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 62-214 (1978); Julius Korein, Phillip Braunstein, Ajax George, 
Melvin Wichter, Irving Kricheff, Abraham Lieberman and John Pearson, "Brain Death: 
I. Angiographic Correlation with the Radioisotopic Bolus Technique for Evaluation of 
Critical Deficit of Cerebral Blood Flow," 2 Ann. Neural. 206 (1977); Andrew J.K. Smith 
and A. Earl Walker, "Cerebral Blood Flow and Brain Metabolism as Indicators of 
Cerebral Death: A Review," 133 Johns Hopkins Med. J. 107 (1973); Julius M. Goodman 
and Larry I. Heck, "Confirmation of Brain Death by Bedside Isotope Angiography," 238 
J.A.M.A. 966 (1977). 
2 See, e.g., Gian Emilio Chatrian, "Electrophysiologic Evaluation of Brain Death: A Critical 
Appraisal," in M. J. Aminoff (ed.) Electrodiagnosis in Clinical Neurology, Churchill 
Livingstone, New York (1980); Donald R. Bennett, Julius Korein, John R. Hughes, Jerome 
K. Merlis and Cary Suter, Atlas of Electroencephalography in Coma and Cerebral Death, 
Raven Press, New York (1976); Fred Plum and Jerome B. Posner, op. cit.; Stuart A. 
Schneck, "Brain Death and Prolonged State of Impaired Responsiveness," 58 Denver L. J. 
609, 612-613 (1981). 
3See, e.g., U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, The NINCDS Col1aborative 
Study of Brain Death, N.I.H. Publication No. 81-2286, U.S. Government Printing Office 
(1980), reported in, "An Appraisal of the Criteria of Cerebral Death. A Summary State-
ment. A Collaborative Study," 237 J.A.M.A. 982 (1977); Peter McL. Black, op. cit; 
Pamela F. Prior, "Brain Death" 1980(i) Lancet 1142. 
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The studies that document the adequacy of criteria have 
followed one of two general formats. Some define a group of 
subjects who have met the proposed criteria and demonstrate that in 
all such cases the heart soon stopped beating despite intensive 
therapy.1 Other studies identify a group of subjects who met the 
proposed criteria and demonstrate widespread brain necrosis at 
autopsy, providing the body has remained on a respirator for 
sufficient time for necrosis to occur.2 All the studies focus on 
patients with deep coma including absence of spontaneous 
breathing (apnea): in addition, some require known and sufficient 
cause for the absence of brain functions, isoelectric electroen-
cephalogram, dilated pupils, or absent circulation shown by 
angiography. The published criteria for determining cessation of 
brain functions have been uniformly successful in diagnosing death. 
The differences among criteria often arise from differing 
assessments of the technical skill and instrumentation available to 
the physician. Experts now generally agree that careful clinical 
assessment (including identification of a cause of the damage to the 
brain which is sufficient to explain the clinical findings) is the sine 
qua non of a diagnosis. 
The role of confirmatory tests such as electroencephalography 
or circulation tests beyond such bedside judgments in establishing 
either the cessation of brain functions or the irreversibility of such 
cessation has been the subject of considerable discussion.3 For 
example, the Conference of Royal Colleges and Faculties in Britain 
focused on the function of the brainstem alone to diagnose death.4 
Since the brainstem's retricular activating formation is essential to 
generating consciousness and its transmittal of motor and sensation 
impulses is essential to these functions, loss of brainstem functions 
precludes discernable functioning of the cerebral hemispheres. In 
addition, the brainstem is the locus of homeostatic control, cranial 
nerve reflexes, and control of respiration. Thus, if the brainstem 
 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Bryan Jennett, John Gleave and Peter Wilson, "Brain Death in Three 
Neurosurgical Units" 282 Brit. Med. J. 533 (1981). 
2 See, e.g., U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, The NINCDS Collaborative 
Study of Brain Death, op. cit. 
3 Peter McL. Black, op. cit. 
4 Conference of Royal Colleges and Faculties of the United Kingdom, "Memorandum on 
the Diagnosis of Death" (January 1979), in Working Party of the United Kingdom Health 
Departments, The Removal of Cadaveric Organs for Transplantation: A Code of Practice 
(1979) at 32-36. 
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completely lacks functions, the brain as a whole cannot function. 
American physicians, however, judge the reliability of brainstem 
testing to be incomplete. Therefore they endorse the appropriate 
use of cerebral blood flow testing or electroencephalography in 
order to confirm the completeness of injury and the irreversibility 
of conditions that have led to cessation of brain functions.1 The 
published data support the reliability of both approaches. 
The prevailing British viewpoint on the neurologic diagnosis 
of death is closer to a prognostic approach (that a "point of no 
return"2 has been reached in the process of dying), while the 
American approach is more diagnostic in seeking to determine 
that all functions of the brain have irreversibly ceased at the time 
of the declaration of death. Also, the British diagnose brain death 
almost entirely where irremediable structural injury has occured 
while the American concept has encompassed all etiologies that 
may lead to irreversible loss of brain functions in respirator--
maintained patients. 
The British criteria resemble the American, however, in 
holding that death has been established when "all functions of the 
brain have permanently and irreversibly ceased."3 In measuring 
functions, physicians are not concerned with mere activity in cells 
or groups of cells if such activity (metabolic, electrical, etc.) is not 
manifested in some way that has significance for the organism as a 
whole. The same is true of the cells of the heart and lungs; they 
too may continue to have metabolic and electrical activity after 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 See Appendix F, infra; Peter McL. Black op. cit; Julius Korein,"Brain Death" op. cit. 
2 Conference of Royal Colleges and Faculties, op. cit. at 35. "Medicine and the Media," 281 
Brit. Med. J 1064 (1980). See also A. Mohandas and Shelley Chou, "Brain death: A 
Clinical and pathological study," 35 J. Neurosurg. 211, 215 (1971) (authors of so-called 
"Minnesota criteria" hold that "the state of irreversible damage to the brain-stem... is the 
point of no return"). The more typical contrast between the American and British 
approaches is illustrated by the criteria employed at the University of Pittsburgh School of 
Medicine where "brain death" is defined as the "irreversible cessation of all brain function," 
as demonstrated by coma of established cause, absence of movements and brain stem re-
flexes, and an isoelectric EEG. David J. Powner and Ake Grenvik, "Triage in Patient Care: 
From Expected Recovery to Brain Death," 8 Heart & Lung 1103 (1979). The British rely 
instead on another observation, confirmed by the University of Pittsburgh, that "prognosis 
appears to be similarly hopeless for those patients who have clinical findings consistent 
with brain death but who have a nonisoelectric EEG." Id. at 1107 (emphasis added) (cited 
by British neurologist Christopher Pallis in lecture at Conference on Brain Death, Boston, 
Mass., April 4, 1981). 
3 Conference of Royal Colleges and Faculties, op. cit. at 36.
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death has been diagnosed by cardiopulmonary standards.1 Tests that 
measure cellular activity are thus relevant to the determination of 
death only when they forecast whether missing functions may 
reappear. 
Translating Medical Knowledge into Policy 
Knowledgeable physicians agree that, when used in ap-
propriate combinations, available procedures for diagnosing death 
by brain criteria are at least as accurate as the customary 
cardiopulmonary tests. Indeed, medical experts testified to the 
Commission that the risk of mistake in a competently performed 
examination was infinitesimal. Plainly, the results depend on the 
personal knowledge, judgment and care of the physicians who 
apply them. Expert witnesses before the Commission pointed out 
that many physicians (including some neurologists and 
neurosurgeons) are not sufficiently familiar with the criteria (much 
less the detailed tests) by which the cessation of total brain 
functions is assessed. As one step toward professional education, a 
group of physicians, working with the encouragement of the 
Commission, has developed a summary of currently accepted 
medical practices. (The statement appears as Appendix F to this 
Report.) Such criteria—particularly as they relate to diagnosing 
death on neurological grounds will be continually revised by the 
biomedical community in light of clinical experience and new 
scientific knowledge. 
At present, the accepted norm is that the tests will be employed 
by a physician who has specialized knowledge of 
 
                                                 
1 See also pp. 75-76 infra. 
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their use. Consultation with another appropriately trained physician is 
typically undertaken to confirm a brain-based diagnosis in an 
artificially supported individual before any decisions are made on 
whether to discontinue support. 
Particular care must be exercised to establish the cause of the 
patient's condition and especially to rule out conditions (such as drug 
intoxication or treatable brain lesions) that can give the misleading 
appearance that brain functions have stopped irreversibly. (Research 
is currently underway to test whether hypothermia and large doses of 
barbiturates might be used to reduce brain injury after trauma or 
surgery. This will complicate the diagnosis of death in these patients.) 
The Commission concludes that reliable means of diagnosis are 
essential for determinations of death and that the medical community 
has developed such means. Insistence that determinations of death 
accord with "accepted medical standards" would thus, in the opinion 
of the Commission, bring to bear all the usual stimuli for assuring 
accuracy in medical diagnosis: the testing of practices through bio-
medical research and the dissemination of the results of such 
research; the continuing education of physicians and other health care 
personnel; the conscientious application of professional skills and 
knowledge; and the encouragement of due care provided by 
professional standards and by state civil and criminal laws. In the 
Commission's view, it is not necessary—indeed, it would be a 
mistake—to enshrine any particular medical criteria, or any 
requirements for procedure or review, as part of a statute. 
 
Understanding the 
"Meaning" of Death 
 
3 
It now seems clear that a medical consensus about clinical 
practices and their scientific basis has emerged: certain states of 
brain activity and inactivity, together with their neurophysiological 
consequences, can be reliably detected and used to diagnose death. 
To the medical community, a sound basis exists for declaring death 
even in the presence of mechanically assisted "vital signs." Yet 
before recommending that public policy reflect this medical 
consensus, the Commission wished to know whether the scientific 
viewpoint was consistent with the concepts of "being dead" or 
"death" as they are commonly understood in our society. These 
questions have been addressed by philosophers and theologians, 
who have provided several formulations.1
The Commission believes that its policy conclusions, including 
the statute recommended in Chapter 5, must accurately reflect the 
social meaning of death and not constitute a mere legal fiction. The 
Commission has not found it necessary to resolve all of the 
differences among the leading concepts of death because these 
views all yield interpretations consistent with the recommended 
statute. 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Robert M. Veatch, Death Dying and the Biological Revolution: Our Last 
Quest for Responsibility, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., (1977) at 21-76; 
Douglas N. Walton, Defining Death: An Analytic Study of the Concept of Death in 
Philosophy and Medical Ethics, McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, Que. 
(1979); William C. Charron, "Death: A Philosophical Perspective on the Legal 
Definitions," 4 Wash. U.L.Q. 797 (1975); Dallas M. High, "Death: Its Conceptual 
Elusiveness," 55 Soundings 438 (1972); Paul Ramsey, The Patient as Person: 
Explorations in Medical Ethics, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn. (1971) at 59-
112; Stanley Hauerwas, "Religious Concepts of Brain Death and Associated Problems," 
315 Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 329 (1978). 
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Three major formulations of the meaning of death were presented to 
the Commission: one focused upon the functions of the whole brain, one 
upon the functions of the cerebral hemispheres, and one upon non-brain 
functions. Each of these formulations (and its variants) is presented and 
evaluated. 
The "Whole Brain" Formulations 
One characteristic of living things which is absent in the dead is the 
body's capacity to organize and regulate itself. In animals, the neural 
apparatus is the dominant locus of these functions. In higher animals and 
man, regulation of both maintenance of the internal environment (homeo-
stasis) and interaction with the external environment occurs primarily 
within the cranium. 
External threats, such as heat or infection, or internal ones, such as 
liver failure or endogenous lung disease, can stress the body enough to 
overwhelm its ability to maintain organization and regulation. If the stress 
passes a certain level, the organism as a whole is defeated and death 
occurs. 
This process and its denouement are understood in two major ways. 
Although they are sometimes stated as alternative formulations of a 
"whole brain definition" of death, they are actually mirror images of each 
other. The Commission has found them to be complementary; together 
they enrich one's understanding of the "definition." The first focuses on 
the integrated functioning of the body's major organ systems, while 
recognizing the centrality of the whole brain, since it is neither revivable 
nor replaceable. The other identifies the functioning of the whole brain as 
the hallmark of life because the brain is the regulator of the body's 
integration. The two conceptions are subject to similar criticisms and have 
similar implications for policy. 
The concepts: The functioning of many organs—such as the liver, 
kidneys, and skin—and their integration are "vital" to individual health in 
the sense that if any one ceases and that function is not restored or 
artificially re-placed, the organism as a whole cannot long survive. All 
elements in the system are mutually interdependent, so that the loss of any 
part leads to the breakdown of the whole and, eventually, to the cessation 
of functions in every part.2
                                                 
2 Germain Grisez & Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Life and Death with Liberty and Justice: 
A Contribution to the Euthanasia Debate, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre 
Dame, Ind. (1979) at 59- 61. 
    If death is understood in theoretical terms as the permanent termination of the 
integrated functioning characteristic of a living body as a whole, then one can see 
why death of higher animals is usually grasped in factual terms by the cessation of 
the vital functions of respiration and circulation, which correlates so well with 
bodily decomposition.  Breathing is the minimum in "social interaction." 
However, considering the role of the brain in the maintenance of the dynamic 
equilibrium of any system which includes a brain, there is a compelling reason for 
defining death in factual terms as that state of affairs in which there is complete 
and irreversible loss of the functioning of the entire brain. To accept this definition 
is not to make a choice based on one's evaluation of various human characteristics, 
but is to assent to a theory which fits the facts.   
Id. at 77. 
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Three organs—the heart, lungs and brain—assume special 
significance, however, because their interrelationship is very close 
and the irreversible cessation of anyone very quickly stops the other 
two and consequently halts the integrated functioning of the 
organism as a whole. Because they were easily measured, 
circulation and respiration were traditionally the basic "vital signs." 
But breathing and heartbeat are not life itself. They are simply used 
as signs-as one window for viewing a deeper and more complex 
reality: a triangle of interrelated systems with the brain at its apex. 
As the biomedical scientists who appeared before the Commission 
made clear, the traditional means of diagnosing death actually 
detected an irreversible cessation of integrated functioning among 
the interdependent bodily systems. When artifical means of support 
mask this loss of integration as measured by the old methods, brain-
oriented criteria and tests provide a new window on the same phe-
nomenon. 
On this view, death is that moment at which the body's 
physiological system ceases to constitute an integrated whole. Even 
if life continues in individual cells or organs, life of the organism as 
a whole requires complex integration, and without the latter, a 
person cannot properly be regarded as alive. 
This distinction between systemic, integrated functioning and 
physiological activity in cells or individual organs is important for 
two reasons. First, a person is considered dead under this concept 
even if oxygenation and metabolism persist in some cells or organs. 
There would be no need to wait until all metabolism had ceased in 
every body part before recognizing that death has occurred. 
More importantly, this concept would reduce the significance 
of continued respiration and heartbeat for the definition of death. 
This view holds that continued breathing and circulation are not in 
themselves tantamount to life. Since life is a matter of integrating 
the functioning of major organ systems, breathing and circulation 
are necessary but not sufficient to establish that an individual is 
alive. When an individual's breathing and circulation lack 
neurologic integration, he or she is dead. 
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The alternative "whole brain" explanation of death differs from 
the one just described primarily in the vigor of its insistence that the 
traditional "vital signs" of heartbeat and respiration were merely 
surrogate signs with no significance in themselves. On this view, 
the heart and lungs are not important as basic prerequisites to 
continued life but rather because the irreversible cessation of their 
functions shows that the brain had ceased functioning. Other signs 
customarily employed by physicians in diagnosing death, such as 
unresponsiveness and absence of pupillary light response, are also 
indicative of loss of the functions of the whole brain. 
 
 
 
 
This view gives the brain primacy not merely as the sponsor of 
consciousness (since even unconscious persons may be alive), but 
also as the complex organizer and regulator of bodily functions. 
(Indeed, the "regulatory" role of the brain in the organism can be 
understood in terms of thermodynamics and information theory.3) 
Only the brain can direct the entire organism. Artificial support for 
the heart and lungs, which is required only when the brain can no 
longer control them, cannot maintain the usual synchronized 
integration of the body. Now that other traditional indicators of 
cessation of brain functions (i.e., absence of breathing), can be 
obscured by medical interventions, one needs, according to this 
view, new standards for determining death-that is, more reliable 
tests for the complete cessation of brain functions. 
Critique: Both of these "whole brain" formulations—the 
"integrated functions" and the "primary organ" views—are subject 
to several criticisms. Since both of these conceptions of death give 
an important place to the integrating or regulating capacity of the 
whole brain, it can be asked whether that characteristic is as 
distinctive as they would suggest. Other organ systems are also 
required for life to continue—for example, the skin to conserve 
fluid, the liver to detoxify the blood. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Julius Korein, "The Problem of Brain Death: Development and History," 315 Ann. N.Y. 
Acad. Sci. 19 (1978). 
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The view that the brain's functions are more central to "life" 
than those of the skin, the liver, and so on, is admittedly arbitrary in 
the sense of representing a choice. The view is not, however, 
arbitrary in the sense of lacking reasons. As discussed previously, 
the centrality accorded the brain reflects both its overarching role as 
"regulator" or "integrator" of other bodily systems and the 
immediate and devastating consequences of its loss for the organism 
as a whole. Furthermore, the Commission believes that this choice 
overwhelmingly reflects the views of experts and the lay public 
alike. 
A more significant criticism shares the view that life consists of 
the coordinated functioning of the various bodily systems, in which 
process the whole brain plays a crucial role. At the same time, it 
notes that in some adult patients lacking all brain functions it is 
possible through intensive support to achieve constant temperature, 
metabolism, waste disposal, blood pressure, and other conditions 
typical of living organisms and not found in dead ones. Even with 
extraordinary medical care, these functions cannot be sustained 
indefinitely—typically, no longer than several days—but it is 
argued that this shows only that patients with nonfunctional brains 
are dying, not that they are dead. In this view, the respirator, drugs, 
and other resources of the modern intensive-care unit collectively 
substitutes for the lower brain, just as a pump used in cardiac 
surgery takes over the heart's function. 
This criticism rests, however, on a premise about the role of 
artificial support vis-a-vis the brainstem which the Commission 
believes is mistaken or at best incomplete. While the respirator and 
its associated medical techniques do substitute for the functions of 
the intercostal muscles and the diaphragm, which without neuronal 
stimulation from the brain cannot function spontaneously, they 
cannot replace the myriad functions of the brainstem or of the rest 
of the brain. The startling contrast between bodies lacking all brain 
functions and patients with intact brainstems (despite severe 
neocortical damage) manifests this. The former lie with fixed 
pupils, motionless except for the chest movements produced by 
their respirators. The latter can not only breathe, metabolize, 
maintain temperature and blood pressure, and so forth, on their own 
but also sigh, yawn, track light with their eyes, and react to pain or 
reflex stimulation. 
It is not easy to discern precisely what it is about patients in 
this latter group that makes them alive while those in the other 
category are not. It is in part that in the case of the first category 
(i.e., absence of all brain functions) when the mask created by the 
artificial medical support is stripped away what remains is not an 
integrated organism but "merely a group of artificially maintained 
sub- 
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systems."4 Sometimes, of course, an artificial substitute can forge 
the link that restores the organism as a whole to unified functioning. 
Heart or kidney transplants, kidney dialysis, or an iron lung used to 
replace physically-impaired breathing ability in a polio victim, for 
example, restore the integrated functioning of the organism as they 
replace the failed function of a part. Contrast such situations, 
however, with the hypothetical of a decapitated body treated so as to 
prevent the outpouring of blood and to generate respiration: 
continuation of bodily functions in that case would not have restored 
the requisites of human life. 
The living differ from the dead in many ways. The dead do not 
think, interact, autoregulate or maintain organic identity through 
time, for example. Not all the living can always do all of these 
activities, however; nor is there one single characteristic (e.g., 
breathing, yawning, etc.) the loss of which signifies death. Rather, 
what is missing in the dead is a cluster of attributes, all of which 
form part of an organism's responsiveness to its internal and external 
environment. 
While it is valuable to test public policies against basic 
conceptions of death, philosophical refinement beyond a certain 
point may not be necessary. The task undertaken in this Report, as 
stated at the outset, is to provide and defend a statutory standard for 
determining that a human being has died. In setting forth the 
standards recommended in this Report, the Commission has used 
"whole brain" terms to clarify the understanding of death that enjoys 
near universal acceptance in our society. The Commission finds that 
the "whole brain" formulations give resonance and depth to the 
biomedical and epidemiological data presented in Chapter Two. 
Further effort to search for a conceptual "definition" of death is not 
required for the purpose of public policy because, separately or 
together, the "whole brain" formulations provide a theory that is 
sufficiently precise, concise and widely acceptable. 
 
                                                 
4 James L. Bernat, Charles M. Culver and Bernard Gert, "On the Definition and Criterion 
of Death," 94 Ann. Int. Med. 389, 391 ( 1981). 
…When the respirator maintains the organism, it is questionable whether 
there is complete and irreversible loss of the functioning of the entire brain. 
But this is a question to be settled by empirical inquiry, not by philosophy. 
Philosophically, we answer the objection by saying that if the functioning of 
the brain is the factor which principally integrates any organism which has a 
brain, then if that function is lost, what is left is no longer as a whole an 
organic unity. If the dynamic equilibrium of the remaining parts of the 
system is maintained, it nevertheless as a whole is a mechanical, not an 
organic system. 
Grisez & Boyle, op. cit. .at 77 
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Policy Consequences: Those holding to the "whole brain" 
view—and this view seems at least implicit in most of the testimony 
and writing reviewed by the Commission—believe that when 
respirators are in use, respiration and circulation lose significance 
for the diagnosis of death. In a body without a functioning brain 
these two functions, it is argued, become mere artifacts of the 
mechanical life supports. The lungs breathe and the heart circulates 
blood only because the respirator (and attendant medical 
interventions) cause them to do so, not because of any compre-
hensive integrated functioning. This is "breathing" and "circulation" 
only in an analogous sense: the function and its results are similar, 
but the source, cause, and purpose are different between those 
individuals with and those without functioning brains. 
For patients who are not artificially maintained, breathing and 
heartbeat were, and are, reliable signs either of systemic integration 
and/or of continued brain functioning (depending on which 
approach one takes to the "whole brain" concept). To regard 
breathing and respiration as having diagnostic significance when the 
brain of a respirator-supported patient has ceased functioning, 
however, is to forget the basic reasoning behind their use in 
individuals who are not artificially maintained. 
Although similar in most respects, the two approaches to 
"whole brain death" could have slightly different policy 
consequences. The "primary organ" view would be satisfied with a 
statute that contained only a single standard—the irreversible 
cessation of all functions of the entire brain. Nevertheless, as a 
practical matter, the view is also compatible with a statute 
establishing irreversible cessation of respiration and circulation as 
an alternative standard, since it is inherent in this view that the loss 
of spontaneous breathing and heartbeat are surrogates for the loss of 
brain functions. 
The "integrated functions" view would lead one to a 
"definition" of death recognizing that collapse of the organism as a 
whole can be diagnosed through the loss of brain functions as well 
as through loss of cardiopulmonary functions. The latter functions 
would remain an explicit part of the policy statement because their 
irreversible loss will continue to provide an independent and wholly 
reliable basis for determining that death has occurred when res-
pirators and related means of support are not employed. 
The two "whole brain" formulations thus differ only modestly. 
And even conceptual disagreements have a context; the context of 
the present one is the need to clarify and update the "definition" of 
death in order to allow principled decisions to be made about the 
status of comatose respirator-supported patients. The explicit 
recognition of 
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both standards-cardiopulmonary and whole brain-solves that 
problem fully. In addition, since it requires only a modest 
reformulation of the generally-accepted view, it accounts for the 
importance traditionally accorded to heartbeat and respiration, the 
"vital signs" which will continue to be the grounds for determining 
death in the overwhelming majority of cases for the foreseeable 
future. Hence the Commission, drawing on the aspects that the two 
formulations share and on the ways in which they each add to an 
understanding of the "meaning" of death, concludes that public 
policy should recognize both cardiopulmonary and brain-based 
standards for declaring death. 
The "Higher Brain" Formulations 
When all brain processes cease, the patient loses two 
important sets of functions. One set encompasses the integrating 
and coordinating functions, carried out principally but not 
exclusively by the cerebellum and brainstem. The other set includes 
the psychological functions which make consciousness, thought, 
and feeling possible. These latter functions are located primarily but 
not exclusively in the cerebrum, especially the neocortex. The two 
"higher brain" formulations of brain-oriented definitions of death 
discussed here are premised on the fact that loss of cerebral 
functions strips the patient of his psychological capacities and 
properties. 
A patient whose brain has permanently stopped functioning 
will, by definition, have lost those brain functions which sponsor 
consciousness, feeling, and thought. Thus the higher brain 
rationales support classifying as dead bodies which meet "whole 
brain" standards, as discussed in the preceding section. The 
converse is not true, however. If there are parts of the brain which 
have no role in sponsoring consciousness, the higher brain 
formulation would regard their continued functioning as compatible 
with death. 
The Concepts: Philosophers and theologians have attempted 
to describe the attributes a living being must have to be a person.5 
"Personhood" consists of the complex of activities (or of capacities 
to engage in them) such as thinking, reasoning, feeling, human 
intercourse which make the human different from, or superior to, 
animals or things. One higher brain formulation would define death 
as the loss of what is essential to a person. Those advocating the 
personhood definition often relate these characteristics to 
 
                                                 
5 H. Tristram Englehardt, Jr., "Defining Death: A Philosophical Problem for Medicine 
and Law," 112 Ann. Rev. Respiratory Dis. 587 (1975); Robert M. Veatch, "The Whole-
Brain Oriented Concept of Death: An Outmoded Philosophical Formulation," 3 J. 
Thanatology 13 (1975). 
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brain functioning. Without brain activity, people are incapable of 
these essential activities. A breathing body, the argument goes, is 
not in itself a person; and, without functioning brains, patients are 
merely breathing bodies. Hence personhood ends when the brain 
suffers irreversible loss of function. 
For other philosophers, a certain concept of "personal identity" 
supports a brain-oriented definition of death.6 According to this 
argument, a patient literally ceases to exist as an individual when 
his or her brain ceases functioning, even if the patient's body is 
biologically alive. Actual decapitation creates a similar situation: 
the body might continue to function for a short time, but it would no 
longer be the "same" person. The persistent identity of a person as 
an individual from one moment to the next is taken to be dependent 
on the continuation of certain mental processes which arise from 
brain functioning. When the brain processes cease (whether due to 
 decapitation or to "brain 
death") the person's identity 
also lapses. The mere 
continuation of biological 
activity in the body is irrel-
evant to the determination of 
death, it is argued, because 
after the brain has ceased 
functioning the body is no 
longer identical with the 
person. 
 
Critique: Theoretical and practical objections to these 
arguments led the Commission to rely on them only as confirmatory 
of other views in formulating a definition of death. First, crucial to 
the personhood argument is acceptance of one particular concept of 
those things that are essential to being a person, while there is no 
general agreement on this very fundamental point among 
philosophers, much less physicians or the general public. Opinions 
about what is essential to personhood vary greatly from person to 
person in our society—to say nothing of intercultural variations. 
The argument from personal identity does not rely on any 
particular conception of personhood, but it does require assent to a 
single solution to the philosophical prob- 
                                                 
6 Michael B. Green and Daniel Wikler, "Brain Death and Personal Identity," 9 Phil. and 
Pub. Affairs 105 (1980); Bernard Gert, "Personal Identity and the Body," Dialogue 458 
(1971); Roland Puccetti, "The Conquest of Death" 59 The Monist 252 (1976); Azriel 
Rosenfeld, "The Heart, the Head and the Halakhah, N.Y. State J. Med. 2615 (1970). 
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lem of identity. Again, this problem has persisted for centuries 
despite the best attempts by philosophers to solve it. Regardless of 
the scholarly merits of the various philosophical solutions, their 
abstract technicality makes them less useful to public policy. 
Further, applying either of these arguments in practice would 
give rise to additional important problems. Severely senile patients, 
for example, might not clearly be persons, let alone ones with 
continuing personal identities; the same might be true of the 
severely retarded. Any argument that classified these individuals as 
dead would not meet with public acceptance. 
Equally problematic for the "higher brain" formulations, 
patients in whom only the neocortex or subcortical areas have been 
damaged may retain or regain spontaneous respiration and 
circulation. Karen Quinlan is a well-known example of a person 
who apparently suffered permanent damage to the higher centers of 
the brain but whose lower brain continues to function. Five years 
after being removed from the respirator that supported her breathing 
for nearly a year, she remains in a persistent vegetative state but 
with heart and lungs that function without mechanical assistance.7 
Yet the implication of the personhood and personal identity 
arguments is that Karen Quinlan, who retains brainstem function 
and breathes spontaneously, is just as dead as a corpse in the 
traditional sense. The Commission rejects this conclusion and the 
further implication that such patients could be buried or otherwise 
treated as dead persons. 
Policy Consequences. In order to be incorporated in public 
policy, a conceptual formulation of death has to be amenable to 
clear articulation. At present, neither basic neurophysiology nor 
medical technique suffices to translate the "higher brain" 
formulation into policy. First, as was discussed in Chapter One, it is 
not known which portions of the brain are responsible for cognition 
and consciousness; what little is known points to substantial 
interconnections among the brainstem, subcortical structures and 
the neocortex. Thus, the "higher brain" may well exist only as a 
metaphorical concept, not in reality. Second, even when the sites of 
certain aspects of consciousness can be found, their cessation often 
cannot be assessed with the certainty that would be required in 
applying a statutory definition. 
Even were these difficulties to be overcome, the adoption of a 
higher brain "definition" would depart radically from the traditional 
standards. As already observed, the new standard would assign no 
significance to spontaneous 
                                                 
7 "Karen Ann Quinlan: A Family's Fate," May 26, 1981, Wash. Post, A at 1, col. 1. 
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breathing and heartbeat. Indeed, it would imply that the existing 
cardiopulmonary definition had been in error all along, even before 
the advent of respirators and other life-sustaining technology. 
In contrast, the position taken by the Commission is de-
liberately conservative. The statutory proposal presented in Chapter 
Five offers legal recognition for new diagnostic measures of death, 
but does not ask for acceptance of a wholly new concept of death. 
On a matter so fundamental to a society's sense of itself—touching 
deeply held personal and religious beliefs—and so final for the 
individuals involved, one would desire much greater consensus than 
now exists before taking the major step of radically revising the 
concept of death. 
Finally, patients declared dead pursuant to the statute 
recommended by the Commission would be also considered dead 
by those who believe that a body without higher brain functions is 
dead. Thus, all the arguments reviewed thus far are in agreement 
that irreversible cessation of all brain functioning is sufficient to 
determine death of the organism. 
 
The Non-Brain Formulations 
The Concepts: The various physiological concepts of death so far 
discussed rely in some fashion on brain functioning. By contrast, a literal 
reading of the traditional cardiopulmonary criteria would require 
cessation of the flow of bodily "fluids," including air and blood, for death 
to be declared. This standard is meant to apply whether or not these flows 
coincide with any other bodily processes, neurological or otherwise. Its 
support derives from interpretations of religious literature and cultural 
practices of certain religious and ethnic groups, including some Orthodox 
Jews8 and Native Americans.9
Another theological formulation of death is, by contrast, not 
necessarily related to any physiologic phenomenon. The view is 
traditional in many faiths that death occurs the moment the soul 
leaves the body.10 Whether this 
                                                 
8 J. David Bleich, "Neurological Criteria of Death and Time of Death Statutes," in Fred 
Rosner and J. David Bleich (eds.) Jewish Bioethics. Hebrew Publishing Co., New York 
(1979) at 303-316. 
9 Telephone conversation with Richard E. Grant, Assistant Professor of Nursing, Arizona 
State University, July 17, 1981. 
10 Milton McC. Gatch, "Death: Post-Biblical Christian Thought" in Warren T. Reich 
(ed.), Encyclopedia of Bioethics (v.l), MacMillan Publishing Co., N. Y., N.Y. (1976) at 
249, 250; Saint Augustine, The City of God, Vernon H. Bourke (ed.) Image Books, 
Garden City, N. Y. (1958) at 269, 277; J. David Bleich, "Establishing Criteria of Death," 
in Fred Rosner and J. David Bleich (eds.),Jewish Bioethics, Hebrew Publishing Co., 
New York (1979) at 285. 
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happens when the patient loses psychological capacities, loses all 
brain functions, or at some other point, varies according to the 
teachings of each faith and according to particular interpretations 
of the scriptures recognized as authoritative. 
Critique. The conclusions of the "bodily fluids" view lack a 
physiologic basis in modern biomedicine. While this view 
accords with the traditional criteria of death, as noted above, it 
does not necessarily carryover to the new conditions of the 
intensive care unit—which are what prompts the reexamination 
of the definition of death. The flow of bodily fluids could 
conceivably be maintained by machines in the absence of almost 
all other life processes; the result would be viewed by most as a 
perfused corpse, totally unresponsive to its environment. 
Although the argument concerning the soul could be 
interpreted as providing a standard for secular action, those who 
adhere to the concept today apparently acknowledge the need for 
a more public and verifiable standard of death. Indeed, a statute 
incorporating a brain-based standard is accepted by theologians 
of all backgrounds.11
Policy Consequences: The Commission does not regard 
itself as a competent or appropriate forum for theological 
interpretation. Nevertheless, it has sought to propose policies 
consistent with as many as possible of the diverse religious tenets 
and practices in our society. 
The statute set forth in Chapter Five does not appear to 
conflict with the view that the soul leaves the body at death. It 
provides standards by which death can be determined to have 
occurred, but it does not prevent a person from believing on 
religious grounds that the soul leaves the body at a point other 
than that established as marking death for legal and medical 
purposes. 
The concept of death based upon the flow of bodily fluids 
cannot be completely reconciled with the proposed statute. The 
statute is partially consistent with the "fluids" formulation in that 
both would regard as dead a body with no respiration and 
circulation. As noted previously, the overwhelming majority of 
patients, now and for the foreseeable 
 
 
                                                 
11 Bernard Haring, Medical Ethics, Fides Publishers, Inc., Notre Dame, Ind. (1973) 
at 136; Charles J. McFadden, "The Dignity of Life: Moral Values in a Changing 
Society, Our Sunday Visitor, Inc. Huntington, Ind. (1976) at 202; Paul Ramsey, op. 
cit. at 59-112; Seymour Siegel, "Updating the Criteria of Death," 30 Conservative 
Judaism 23 (1976); Moses D. Tendler, "Cessation of Brain Function: Ethical 
Implications In Terminal Care and Organ Transplant," 315 Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 394 
(1978). See also pp. 13-14 supra and accompanying notes for a summary of the 
religious views presented to the Commission. 
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future, will be diagnosed on such basis. Under the statute, 
however, physicians would declare dead those bodies in which 
respiration and circulation continued solely as a result of artificial 
maintenance, in the absence of all brain functions. Nonetheless, 
people who believe that the continued flow of fluids in such 
patients means they are alive would not be forced by the statute to 
abandon those beliefs nor to change their religious conduct. While 
the recommended statute may cause changes in medical and legal 
behavior, the Commission urges those acting under the statute to 
apply it with sensitivity to the emotional and religious needs of 
those for whom the new standards mark a departure from 
traditional practice. Determinations of death must be made in a 
consistent and evenhanded fashion, but the statute does not 
preclude flexibility in responding to individual circumstances after 
determination has been made. A fuller discussion of the 
implications of the proposed statute for decisions about the dead is 
presented in Chapter Five.12
 
                                                 
12 See pp. 80-84 infra. 

Who Ought to 
"Redefine" Death? 4 
The developments in medical technology that permit 
maintenance of respiration and circulation have engendered broad 
social concern over unnecessary or inappropriate use of that 
technology. This, in turn, has provoked the call for new standards 
by which to determine that death has occurred. To respond, we must 
ask two questions: What sort of standards, and by whom devised 
and promulgated? The first question is easier to answer than the 
second. 
As described in the preceding chapter and elaborated in 
Appendix F, the medical profession has generally accepted the new 
brain-based critieria as one means for diagnosing death. Yet 
medical criteria alone cannot meet the public concern, which arose 
not only because of advances that complicated the decisions of 
physicians, but also because the public perceived a departure from 
long-accepted social standards for differentiating life and death. 
This departure seemed to have momentous implications for many 
social practices and institutions. Criminal prosecution, inheritance, 
taxation, treatment of the cadaver, and mourning are all affected by 
the way society draws the dividing line between life and death.1
That the definition of death can touch social life so profoundly, 
explains why the need for law is perceived. Legal standards for 
determining when death occurs evolved over the years. They 
sanctioned the "all bodily functions" view traditionally accepted by 
the public and practiced by physicians. Any newly formulated 
standard should attain equal recognition by the public and 
physicians before being adopted. One must turn, then, to the second 
question: Who ought to devise and announce the law "defining" 
death? 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Harold L. Hirsh, "Brain Death" 12 Med. Tri. Tech. Q. 377, 391 
(1975); Kathleen Price, "Defining Death and Dying: A Bibliographic 
Overview," 71 L. Library J. 49, 59-63 (1978). 
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The Scope of Medical Authority 
Traditionally, great deference has been paid to medical 
expertise in the making of diagnoses of death. As long as the 
standards employed by the profession were stable and basically 
congruent with opinion in the community at large, there was little 
reason for public scrutiny. The law simply reflected the common 
opinion about death and largely let the physicians—once their 
techniques and skills had risen to the necessary level of reliability—
formulate and apply the tests to measure vital human functions. Yet 
the movement toward ever more sophisticated medical science, 
which produced treatments that interfered with the efficacy of the 
accepted tests, led medicine to new tests that were less 
comprehensible to the public. This made clear that a choice about 
the "definition" of death was at issue, a choice that ought to involve 
people beyond the biomedical community. 
Furthermore, even the customary deference of the common 
law—which regarded the moment of a person's death as a "question 
of fact" for determination at trial largely on the basis of expert 
testimony2 should not obscure the public choices that have been, 
and must be, made. For despite that deference, the standards applied 
to give legal effect to the testimony about death (medical as well as 
lay) were established by the courts "as a matter of law."3
Biomedical knowledge ought to continue to inform public 
policy in revising the legal standards concerning death. Physicians 
have taken the lead in reconsidering the criteria used in diagnosis. 
They now know what evidence is needed to attest the cessation of 
brain functions to be complete and irreversible. Furthermore, they 
can explain what this irreversible cessation means for various 
human capabilities and biological activities. But, in the end, the 
society as a whole must judge that these technical standards and the 
opinions they reflect conform to the society's settled values and 
accepted conceptions of human existence and personal rights.4 This 
judgment will be most clearly ex- 
 
 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., Thomas v. Anderson, 96 Cal. App. 2d 371, 375, 215 
P.2d 478, 482 (1950). 
3 See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 229 Ark. 579, 587, 317 S.W.2d 275, 279 (1958); In re Estate 
of Schmidt, 261 Cal. App. 2d 262, 273, 67 Cal. Rptr. 847,854 (1968). 
4 In light of the challenges that have been mounted to any professional prerogative in 
establishing the standards for determining that a human being has died, it may seem 
surprising that the traditional role of physicians in applying the standards has not been 
challenged. The difference in the tasks probably explains the lack of controversy in the 
latter situation. Application of an agreedupon standard is a matter for technical 
expertise, and it is not doubted that competent physicans (among others) possess the 
necessary proficiency in diagnosis. 
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pressed through the medium of the law of the land. 
Judicial Revision of the Common Law 
The medical profession itself has come to recognize the 
need for official action on the definition of death.5 Litigation 
involving physicians as defendants or as key witnesses has been 
largely responsible for this recognition. These cases made it clear 
that, surface appearances notwithstanding, the standards by 
which death is declared are not left to medical discretion alone. 
There may have been no statutes on death, but the "common 
law", which is to be found in the decisions of judges in prior 
cases, had established a legal standard. 
It might appear simplest to change the common law on 
death—if change is needed—the same way it was made. 
Confronted with new biomedical developments—in the form of 
respirators that make comatose patients without brain functions 
appear "alive" and tests that show that they are really "dead"—
judges might be expected to bring the judicially established 
standards into line. Predictably, how-ever, while some courts 
adhered to existing law, others cautiously moved away from it.6 
No clear pattern emerged. This is one of several reasons for 
doubting that judicial revision of the common law presents a 
promising route to death policy reform, although it does not 
counsel against appropriate rulings by judges as cases are 
presented in which the need to "update" the "definition" arises. 
A judge's unwillingness to alter the common law on death 
does not necessarily mean that the judge adheres unthinkingly to 
tradition or unreasonably resists new knowledge. Anglo-
American jurisprudence is based on precedents. It places great 
value on evenhandedness among litigants and on assuring 
everyone that the rules by which they conduct themselves will 
"not be changed in the middle of the game.7 Allowing judges to 
decide every rule of law anew in every case would jeopardize 
the impartiality of the judicial process and place an impossible 
burden on the courts. 
Nonetheless, precedents must be rethought; such rethinking 
may occasionally lead to bold statements of new rules of law, 
rather than the incremental (indeed, often imperceptible) 
modifications favored in judge-made law. Some judges have 
made sweeping changes regarding the "redefinition" of death 
(these are discussed in detail in 
                                                 
5 Frank J. Veith, Jack M. Fein, Moses D. Tendler, Robert M. Veatch, Marc A. Kleiman 
and George Kalkines, "Brain Death: II. A Status Report of the Legal Considerations" 238 
I.A.M.A. 1744 (1977). 
6 The judicial rulings on the "definition" of death appear in Appendix D. 
7 Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 354, 102 N.E. 2d 691, 695 (1951). 
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Chapter Five). More can be expected over time. Additional reasons 
militate, however, against relying on common law revision as the 
primary route to revising the standards for declaring that a person 
has died. 
 
 
First, the judicial route 
would extend the period of 
uncertainty. This could be 
unfortunate since the ap-
plication of some standards 
could cause unwarranted 
prolongation of treatment (for 
bodies that have died) while 
the application of others could 
cause premature termination of 
useful treatment (for patients 
still alive by "whole brain" cri-
teria). A period of legal un-
certainty arises because courts 
cannot simply "declare" law 
whenever they decide to do so; 
revision of the common law 
awaits litigation in which the 
parties contend over a particu-
lar rule of law in the context of 
a factual dispute. The parties 
usually identify the issues, 
articulate the scope and nature 
of the dispute, provide the le- 
 
gal reasoning and expert testimony, and propose outcomes. The 
parties to a dispute may present differing views of an issue without 
presenting all views or even the true polar positions. A judge may 
not know enough about a field to recognize the need for expert 
witnesses to supplement the litigants' positions. Anglo-American 
courts have neither authority nor personnel to conduct independent 
investigations. 
Furthermore, even when courts rule on cases, they do not 
always "make law." The outcome of a jury trial, for example, is the 
verdict, usually a simple conclusion to an often complex and secret 
process. Unless appeal is taken to a higher court, that part of the 
trial process which is public—namely, the judge's rulings on 
evidence and instructions to the jury—will not emerge in a form 
that would give them value as a precedent. In most states the 
appellate process has multiple levels; proceeding through the court 
system to the highest court involves much time and expense. Only 
the latter court can promulgate law binding on 
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all the lower courts in the jurisdiction. Finally, even when a case has 
been decided by the highest court, the "holding" which the case 
establishes is, strictly speaking, limited to the facts of that case. 
Courts sometimes state their conclusions in broad terms, of course. 
But the "obiter dicta"—that is, the court's comments incidental 
rather than necessary to its decision—are often disregarded. 
Moreover, the standard declared in a homicide case involving the 
victim's having been disconnected from the respirator that the 
defense maintains was keeping him "alive" might be disregarded in 
a later inheritance case involving the time of death.8 Also, if the 
facts of two cases—even those in the same field of law—are 
sufficiently distinguishable, the ruling of one might not be applied in 
the second. 
Beyond differences in the resulting rules supposedly rooted in 
the particular (and perhaps peculiar) facts of each case, other 
variations are likely to arise from the difficulties judges have in 
stating their conclusions about a specialized field that is probably 
unfamiliar to them. Further, judges may be quite tempted to 
"improve" on the decisions of courts that have dealt previously with 
the subject. Thus, although general rules may emerge from judicial 
decisions, they emerge slowly and somewhat roughly—despite the 
pains taken. 
In some areas of the law, piecemeal modification of rules is 
rightly seen as a great strength of the common law. A federal 
system, such as that of the United States, magnifies this process by 
greatly increasing the number of appellate courts ruling on an issue 
in a "binding" fashion. As desirable as this step-by-step process may 
seem, a persistent diversity of standards on a matter as fundamental 
as the "definition" of death does not seem desirable. There is nothing 
to applaud in the prospect that small, and perhaps inadvertent, 
differences in the opinions of the highest courts in two neighboring 
states might make a "live" patient "dead" as the ambulance carrying 
him or her crosses their border. 
Legislative Reform 
Judicial revision of the common law is too dilatory to dispel 
public confusion and professionals' doubts. Its tardiness and 
conservatism may fail to capture the movement of public values, 
frustrating the norms of participation and pluralism that are 
important in our society. 
Legislative modification—the adoption of a statute to 
supplement or supplant the common law on death—could include 
public hearings through which members of the general public would 
both become more familiar with the issue 
 
                                                 
8 See Chapter 5, n.42 and accompanying text, and Appendix D at 137 -38. infra 
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and have their views taken into account in the framing of policy. 
Legislators, acting directly through legislative committees or with 
the aid of special purpose study commissions, can investigate both 
public views and the full range of expert opinion. The views of 
many groups—representing patients, religious bodies, professional 
groups, and the general public—should be heard on the "definition" 
of death. The legislative process easily accommodates the full range 
of views, unlike the more closed and formal judicial process. (The 
Commission, in considering the statute recommended in this 
Report, was likewise able to hear a wide range of professional and 
lay opinion.) 
Legislative reform also has its risks, one of the most prominent 
being poor drafting. This is a particular danger when issues appear 
highly technical, uninteresting to legislators, and unlikely to 
generate passionate feelings. None of these factors should 
characterize the process of "defining" death, accurately assessed. 
Though the question has technical aspects, the task of the legislature 
is not to do the work of physicians in developing medical criteria for 
diagnosis but to establish the general standards to which society will 
give legal significance. Similarly, although the attention of the 
legislature is not likely to be focused on the task of "defining" death 
the way it is on issues involving economic and political matters that 
provoke powerful interest groups, there is no question that the 
subject is one of basic importance to any society: who is alive and 
who is dead? Finally, the subject is most likely to engender passion 
when misunderstood, particularly when it becomes confused with 
the distinct but related question of terminating treatment of 
respirator-supported patients who still have brain functions although 
they may not be conscious. With a little care, discussion can be 
confined to the topic at hand—the recognition of a new formulation 
of the standards for determining death—standards on which there 
appears to be general professional and public consensus. 
A statute on death ought to guide physicians and others in 
decision-making about respirator-maintained patients; it ought also 
to educate those who must make legal and policy decisions. 
"Legislation will not remove the need for reasoned interpretation—
first by physicians and perhaps then by judges—but it can restrict 
the compass within which they make their choices to one which has 
been found acceptable by the public."9 Furthermore, if legislators 
are guided by a single model bill the likelihood of statutory law that 
is uniform in language and intent is greatly increased. 
 
                                                 
9Alexander M. Capron and Leon R. Kass, "A Statutory Definition of the Standards for 
Determining Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal," 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 87, 101 
(1972). 
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In sum, while the Commission believes that courts should 
update the standards for declaring death as the issue arises in 
litigation, it does not think the formulation of new standards should 
have to await judicial decision. Besides the uncertainty engendered, 
litigation (civil or criminal) involves time, expense and 
psychological trauma; it would be unfortunate for society to have to 
rely on retrospective determination of the basic rules concerning 
such a fundamental problem as the "definition" of death. The 
legislative alternative may have drawbacks; still the Commission 
concludes that (subject to the guidance provided in the next chapter) 
it is the better course. 
The Federal Role 
The articulation of standards for determining that a human 
being has died has traditionally been a matter for state rather than 
federal law. Necessarily, this allocation of lawmaking responsibility 
gives rise to the possibility of variations among the laws of the 
several states. In the field of concern here, just such variation has 
come about over the past decade, as some states have made statutory 
or judicial changes in their "definition" of death and others have not. 
For reasons set forth more fully in the next chapter, the 
Commission believes that uniformity on this matter is a desirable 
goal. One would expect the same basic rule about who is dead, and 
who is not, to apply everywhere in the United States. Moreover, 
since certainty and clarity are 
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highly valuable in this area, uniformity of statutory language would 
be preferable lest differences in words seem to open the door to 
differences in substance. 
The federal government could respond to the harm that is risked 
by diversity in the states' legal rules for determining death by 
passing a statute intended to preempt the field. The Commission 
believes that such action would be premature, before seeing whether 
the states all adopt the Uniform Determination of Death Act and 
secure uniformity that way. Until this is tried, there is no justification 
for disturbing the traditional allocation of state and federal 
responsibilities on this subject. 
The federal government may have two constructive (and non-
coercive) roles to play in defining death, however. First, the federal 
government can usefully bring together experts and representatives 
of different streams of thought on the matter, seek to clarify the 
issues at stake, and facilitate cooperative formulation of a statute and 
medical criteria. The Commission has attempted to perform 
precisely this role through its hearings, its participation in law 
reform efforts, its encouragement of medical groups to examine the 
reliability of criteria for diagnosing death, and its publication and 
distribution of this Report. 
Second, the federal government should "define death" for 
matters under direct federal jurisdiction. When legal disputes arise in 
such places—for example, military installations (including military 
hospitals), Indian reservations, and other federal preserves10—
governing law may be either that of the state within which the place 
is located or special federal law applicable to such places. 
Federal law arises in some instances from Congressional 
enactment and in others from the decisions of federal judges, who 
have on occasion created a "federal common law" rule different 
from existing state law.11 A federal judge faced with an issue turning 
on the "definition" of 
                                                 
10U .S. CONST. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 17, "The Congress shall have Power. . . . To exercise exclusive 
Legislation in all Cases whatsoever. . . over all Places purchased by the Consent of the 
Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, 
Aresenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings," U.S. CONST, Art. 4, § 3, cl. 2, "The 
Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting 
the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,"; 18 U.S.C. 7 (statute defining 
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States for the purpose of federal 
criminal law.)  
11 The "international rule" of Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542 
(1885), under which the rules of state law existing at the time the federal enclave was acquired 
continue to apply until the federal government imposes a new rule has been substantially 
weakened by Howard v. Commissioners, 344 U.S. !4 (1953) and its progeny, which accept 
coexisting state authority over federal enclaves provided that state law does not interfere with 
federal jurisdiction. Some relief from the problems faced by individuals who reside on federally 
owned land which "are especially acute where the litigation arises from acts occurring upon the 
enclave itself," Richard T. Altieri, "Federal Enclaves: The Impact of Exclusive Legislative 
Jurisdiction upon Civil Litigation," 72 Military L. Rev. 55 (1976), is provided by federal statutes 
making state law governing, for example, wrongful death, 16 U.S.C. 457 (1970), and criminal 
law, 18 U.S.C., 14 (1970), applicable to federal enclaves. See generally U.S. Attorney General, 
Report of the Interdepartmental Committee for the Study of Jurisdiction over Federal Areas 
Within the States (1957); Note, "The Federal Common Law," 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1512 (1969).   
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death applicable in a federal preserve would probably rely upon the 
standard for determining death in force in the state where the federal 
land was located. If that state has failed to update its legal standard to 
reflect the developments discussed in this Report, the Commission 
believes that it would be appropriate for the court to take account of 
the material discussed in this Report and to employ a legal standard 
that includes irreversible cessation of total brain functions as well as 
irreversible cessation of heart and lung functions. To promote 
uniformity, the court ought to establish the more inclusive standard as 
a matter of federal common law. 
It would be both simpler and more certain, however, 
were the federal rule to follow the route the Commission as endorsed 
for state law, namely the adoption of a statute. Accordingly, the 
Commission recommends that the Congress adopt the Uniform 
Determination of Death Act proposed in this Report as the governing 
rule in instances falling within federal jurisdiction. (The statute should 
be enacted as a definitional provision of general application, probably 
as an amendment to Title 1 of the United States ode.) 
The Commission believes that federal adoption of the 
statute recommended herein for use in only these matters already 
under direct federal jurisdiction would be salutary in its own right. 
Furthermore, without in any way coercing the States, federal adoption 
w  offer useful encouragement to the States to place this matter on 
t gislative agendas. 
ould
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What "Definition" 
Ought to be 
Adopted? 5
The Commission has concluded that legislatures ought to set 
the rules for determining human death and that those rules should 
recognize brain-oriented techniques of establishing death because 
traditional standards often cannot be employed with patients whose 
respiration and circulation are artificially maintained. This chapter 
asks: by what principles should the drafting of a statute on death be 
guided, how does the law stand at present, and what would a good 
statute provide? 
The Specificity of Public Policy 
A statute on death should guide those who will decide whether 
(and if so, when) a person has passed from being alive to being 
dead. Such guidance can be general or specific. An initial question 
for legislative drafters is what level of detail should be incorporated 
within a statute and what supporting concepts or details can be 
drawn from other sources. Four levels of generality for such a 
"definition" have been suggested:1  
The basic concept of death is fundamentally a philosophical 
matter. Examples of possible "definitions" of death at this 
level include "permanent cessation of the integrated 
functioning of the organism as a whole," "departure of the 
animating or vital principle," or "irreversible loss of 
personhood." These abstract definitions offer little concrete 
help in the practical task of 
                                                 
1 Alexander M. Capron and Leon R. Kass, "A Statutory Definition of the Standards for 
Determining Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal," 121 U. Po. 1. Rev. 87, 102-
104 (1972); See also Robert M. Veatch, Death, Dying and the Biological Revolution: 
Our Last Quest for Responsibility, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn. (1977) at 
68; Task Force on Death and Dying of the Institute of Society, Ethics and the Life 
Sciences, "Refinements for the Determination of Death: An Appraisal," 221 J.A.M.A. 
48, 52 (1972). 
 
 56 Defining Death: 
Chapter 5 
 
determining whether a person has died but they may 
very well influence how one goes about devising 
standards and criteria. 
In setting forth the general physiological standard(s) 
for recognizing death, the definition moves to a level 
which is more medico-technical, but not wholly so. 
Philosophical issues persist in the choice to define 
death in terms of organ systems, physiological 
functions, or recognizable human activities, 
capacities, and conditions. Examples of possible 
general standards include "irreversible cessation of 
spontaneous respiratory and/or circulatory functions," 
"irreversible loss of spontaneous brain functions," 
"irreversible loss of the ability to respond or 
communicate," or some combination of these. 
Operational criteria further define what is meant by 
the general physiological standards. The absence of 
cardiac contraction and lack of movement of the 
blood are examples of traditional criteria for 
"cessation of spontaneous circulatory functions," 
whereas deep coma, the absence of reflexes, and the 
lack of spontaneous muscular movements and 
spontaneous respiration are among criteria proposed 
for "cessation of spontaneous brain functions" by the 
Harvard Committee. 
Fourth, there are the specific tests and procedures to 
see if the criteria are fulfilled. [Measurement of] 
pulse, heart beat, and blood pressure, 
electrocardiogram, and examination of blood flow in 
the retinal vessels are among the specific tests of 
cardiac contraction and movement of the blood. 
Reaction to painful stimuli, appearance of the pupils 
and their responsiveness to light, and observation of 
movement and breathing over a specified time period 
are among specific tests of the "brain function" 
criteria enumerated above. 
 
The Commission has concluded that legislation should be 
formulated at the second level, that of general standards. Broader 
formulations would lead down arcane philosophical paths which are 
at best somewhat removed from practical application in the 
formulation of law. To truly redefine the very concepts of life and 
death, such a course might be necessary; but that is not the 
Commission's objective. Physicians, applying the traditional 
procedures that corresponded to societal expectations, were not 
maintaining that death is the irreversible loss of heart and lung 
functions. They were affirming only that the loss of those functions 
indicated that a person had died. Modern treatments that interfere 
with these indicators do not necessitate a change in concepts, 
provided that alternative indicators of the current 
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concept are available. As discussed in Chapters Two and Three, the 
brain-oriented indicators provide such an alternative. Thus, it seems 
proper to proceed on the assumption that the widespread agreement 
in traditional understanding of death (i.e., that it is manifested by 
cessation of spontaneous cardiopulmonary functioning) would 
apply equally for alternative procedures congruent with the 
traditional concept. 
The third and fourth levels of specificity have problems 
opposite to those of the first. Agreement might be reached about the 
details, but this agreement would be fleeting, since new criteria and 
tests—unlike new concepts—will be repeatedly generated by 
changes in biomedical knowledge and clinical abilities. It would 
seem more realistic to leave the technical details to physicians and 
other biomedical scientists. Once the public has set its goal, 
specialists in the field can be delegated the responsibility of 
elaborating the means toward it. 
The distinction between general standards (which a statute 
ought to articulate) and operational criteria (which are better left to 
medical bodies to establish) is not always recognized. The term 
"criteria" reflects the usage of the ad hoc Harvard committee whose 
1968 report on "the definition of irreversible coma" brought the 
issue to the fore.2 In the years since that group made its 
recommendations, the criteria by which an irreversible cessation of 
total brain functioning is detected have been repeatedly revised.3 
Were a statute to incorporate such criteria, its inflexibility might 
chill the development of more accurate criteria and of faster, more 
precise, and more economical tests. By remaining at a slightly 
greater level of generality—e.g., "irreversible cessation of all 
functions of the entire brain"—a statute may be able to remain valid 
indefinitely and not to require repeated amendments. 
The Objectives to be Sought 
General principles of drafting—such as clarity and brevity—
apply as well to a statute on the standards for death determination 
as to any legislation. But there are also certain objectives particular 
to the subject at hand. 
Death is a Single Phenomenon: The statute must address the 
right question. The Commission conceives the question to be, "how, 
given medical advances in cardiopulmonary support, can the 
evidence that death has 
 
 
                                                 
2 Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain 
Death, "A Definition of Irreversible Coma," 205 I.A.M.A. 337 (1968). 
3 Black, op. cit.: Ronald E. Cranford, "Minnesota Medical Association Criteria: Brain 
Death: Concept and Criteria," 61 Minn. Med. 600 (1978). 
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occurred be obtained and recognized 1" When the presence of a 
mechanical ventilator precludes the use of traditional vital signs (i.e., 
respiration and heartbeat) to ascertain whether a person is alive, the 
use of brain-based criteria provides another means of making such a 
determination. Thus, brain-based criteria do not introduce a new 
"kind of death", but rather reinforce the concept of death as a single 
phenomenon—the collapse of psycho-physical integrity. The statute 
merely allows new ways to recognize that this phenomenon has 
occurred. 
 
 
 
Death of the Organism as a Whole: The death of a human 
being—not the "death" of cells, tissues or organs—is the matter at 
issue. The cessation of vital bodily systems provides the basis for 
broad standards by which death can be judged to have occurred. But 
such functional cessation is not of interest in and for itself, but for 
what it reveals about the status of the person. What was formerly a 
person is now a dead body and can be socially and legally treated as 
such. Although absence of breathing and heartbeat may often have 
been spoken of as "defining" death, review of history and of current 
medical and popular understanding makes clear that these were 
merely evidence for the disintegration of the organism as a whole, as 
discussed in Chapter Three. 
Incremental (Not Radical) Change: Two advantages of the 
traditional vital signs were their accessibility to measurement (not 
only by the medically-trained) and their obvious connection to the 
reality of death as perceived in everyday life. Although fewer and 
fewer people actually witness death (how many children, for 
example, today are gathered with their families around the death bed 
of an elderly relative?), most Americans still feel they recognize the 
manifest signs of death, at least through the arts and the 
communications media, if not first-hand. The "whole brain" signs of 
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life and death are less well comprehended by nonspecialists, and 
they measure functions that are less clearly manifest. The heart and 
the lungs move when they work; the brain does not. Thus, since any 
incorporation of brain-oriented standards into the law necessarily 
changes the type of measures permitted somewhat,  a statute will be 
more acceptable the less it otherwise changes legal rules. 
Conservatism seems justified in articulating a rule that will not 
only be applied within the legal system but will also guide the 
beliefs and behavior of physicians and the public. People's attitudes 
toward death evolve, and changes in medical capabilities certainly 
come to be reflected in public as well as professional circles: heart 
transplantation, for example, cannot help but alter the romantic 
notion of the heart as the seat of soul or personality. Change does 
not occur overnight, however, and there seems to be no reason to 
force it by statute when wrenching change is not necessary. Any 
statute on death should, therefore, supplement rather than supplant 
the existing legal concept. 
The conservative nature of the reform here proposed will be 
more apparent if the statute refers explicitly to the existing 
cardiopulmonary standard for determination of death. The brain-
based standard is, after all, merely supplementary to the older 
standard, which will continue to be adequate in the overwhelming 
majority of cases in the foreseeable future. Indeed, of all hospital 
deaths at four acute hospitals in the Commission's survey, only 
about 8 percent could have been declared dead by neurologic 
criteria prior to cardiac arrest. The study clearly illustrates that the 
use of cardiopulmonary criteria predominates. In the first place, the 
brain-based criteria are relevant only to a limited patient population 
(i.e., comatose patients on respirators). Even among this population, 
only one-fourth of those who died at the four acute care centers in 
the Commission's study met brain-based criteria before meeting the 
cardiopulmonary standard. Moreover, among those in that 
population who are likely to meet the criteria, cardiac standstill 
sometimes intervenes (i.e. cardiopulmonary criteria are met) prior 
to completion of the waiting period necessary to confirm the 
irreversibility of the loss of brain functions. In addition, as the 
Commission's study illustrates, physicians who conclude that still 
living patients have no chance for recovery sometimes forego 
extraordinary treatment; as a result, patients who might have met 
brain-based criteria if placed on respirators die instead from cardiac 
standstill or collapse. Thus, although brain-based criteria are needed 
in those cases where traditional criteria cannot be applied, these 
instances at present represent, and will in all probability continue to 
represent, a small percentage of all determinations of death. 
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Uniformity Among People and Situations: Besides 
moving slowly, the law ought to move evenhandedly. The 
statute, ought not to reinforce the misimpression that there are 
different "kinds" of death, defined for different purposes, and 
hence that some people are "more dead" than others. 
In many contexts, definitions are handmaidens to other 
purposes lawmakers are seeking to achieve. Rather than asking 
"what is death"? one might ask, "what difference does it make 
whether somebody is dead"?4 That question has many answers, 
most of them familiar to everyone. Criminal law (murder v. 
aggravated assault), tort law (wrongful death), family law (the 
status of spouse and children), property and estate law, 
insurance law (payment of life insurance benefits and 
termination of health insurance payments), and tax law, as well 
as some actions and culturally determined behaviors of family 
members, physicians, clerics and undertakers are all initiated by 
the determination that a death has occurred. Were there good 
reason for one branch or another of the law or one or another 
cultural institution to employ a different "definition" of death, 
logic would not preclude such a step. But in fact, society has 
found it desirable to employ a single standard for declaring 
death in all these circumstances and no special-purpose 
definitions have been seriously advanced. Calling the same 
person "dead" for one purpose and "alive" for another would 
engender nothing but confusion.5 Thus, in setting forth the law 
in statutory form, the wisest and most cautious course 
(furthering the principle of incrementalism as well) would be to 
adopt a rule recognizing the unity of the concept of death. Such 
a "definition" of death can be applied in all appropriate 
circumstances; if a special need is identified for acting on a 
different basis, a separate status—other than that of being 
"dead"—could be defined for that purpose.6
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Roger B. Dworkin, "Death in Context," 48 Ind. L. J. 623, 629 
(1973). 
5 See, e.g. Fred Fabro, "Bacchiochi vs. Johnson Memorial Hospital" 45 Conn. Med. 
267 (1981) chronicling the troublesome case of Melanie Bacchiochi. On February 
11, 1981 after repeated clinical examinations confirmed by electroencephalography, 
physicians found she had suffered irreversible loss of total brain function. Her 
physician was unwilling to remove her from the respirator because of legal 
uncertainty since Connecticut's statute on "brain death" applies only to organ 
transplantation. "It is ironic that if the patient had been a donor, she could have been 
pronounced dead on February 11 and the respirator could have been withdrawn. 
Dead for transplantation, but not dead otherwise!" Id. at 268. 
6 Alexander M. Capron, "The Purpose of Death: A Reply to Professor Dworkin," 48 
Ind. L.J. 640, 643-45 (1973); Capron and Kass, op cit. at 107-08. 
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Adaptability to Advances in Technique: Some, particularly 
in the medical community, have voiced a fear of statutory 
"inflexibility". A statute should apply uniformly at anyone time, but 
it need not fix at the current level of scientific sophistication or 
biomedical technology the means by which it is to be implemented. 
In the terms used earlier, a statute should be confined to the 
standards by which death is to be determined and leave to experts in 
biomedicine the continuing development of criteria and specific 
tests that fulfill them. 
 
The Legal Changes That Have Occurred 
The gap between the common law definition of death and the 
skills of modern medicine has not gone unnoticed by lawmakers. 
Spurred initially by the interest in trans plantation,7 later by the 
widely publicized tragedy of Karen Ann Quinlan,8 and finally by a 
recognition of the perplexities in the civil and criminal law 
processes, legislators in twenty-seven states9 have enacted statutes 
that permit reliance on brain-oriented criteria for determining death. 
Moreover, in several states where legislators had not yet acted, 
judges have given some recognition to similar standards.10 
(Statutory and common law developments are discussed at greater length 
in Appendices C and D of this Report; the international trends are 
surveyed in Appendix E.) 
 
 
                                                 
7 David Sanders and Jesse Dukeminier, Jr., "Medical Advance and Legal Lag: Hemodialysis 
and Kidney Transplantation," 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 357,410 (1968). 
8 Although the Quinlan case focused public attention on the capabilities of intensive medical 
care to resuscitate comatose individuals, legislation of the type recommended in this Report 
and already adopted in some states would not hold Karen Quinlan to be dead. As this Report 
has repeatedly emphasized, situations like Ms. Quinlan's do not involve determinations of 
death but rather decisions about whether to cease treatment of patients with no prospect of 
recovery to consciousness. This is a distinct bioethical and legal issue receiving separate 
attention from the President's Commission. Joseph Quinlan and Julia Quinlan (with Phyllis 
Battelle), Karen Ann: The Quinlans Tell Their Story, Doubleday and Co., Garden City, N. Y. 
(1977); In the Matter of Karen Ann Quinlan: The Complete Briefs, Oral Arguments and the 
Opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court, Washington, D.C., University Publications of 
America, Inc. (1975) (2v.); In Re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10 (1976). 
9See Appendix C, Parts I and III, infra.   
10 See Appendix D, infra.   
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Legislative Developments: The statutes proposed or adopted fall 
into seven basic groups (see Figure 3). 
The Kansas-Inspired Statutes: In 1970 the Kansas legislature 
took the first legal action in an American jurisdiction recognizing 
brain-based criteria for the determination of death. The Kansas 
Supreme Court had shortly before then reiterated its adherence to the 
common law standard of "complete cessation of all vital functions... 
even if artifically maintained."11 The statute, proposed by a physician-
legislator and adopted without substantial debate, provides alternative 
"definitions" of death, one based upon traditional heart-lung functions 
and the other upon brain functions. 
 
A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in 
the opinion of a physician, based on ordinary standards of 
medical practice, there is the absence of spontaneous 
respiratory and cardiac function and, because of the disease or 
condition which caused, directly or indirectly, these functions 
to cease, or because of the passage of time since these functions 
ceased, attempts at resuscitation are considered hopeless; and, 
in this event, death will have occurred at the time these 
functions ceased; or 
 
A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in 
the opinion of a physician, based on ordinary standards of 
medical practice, there is the absence of spontaneous brain 
functions; and if based on ordinary standards of medical 
practice, during reasonable attempts to either maintain or 
restore spontaneous circulatory or respiratory function in the 
absence of aforesaid brain function, it appears that further 
attempts at resuscitation or supportive maintenance will not 
succeed, death will have occurred at the time when these 
conditions first coincide. Death is to be pronounced before 
artificial means of supporting respiratory and circulatory 
function are terminated and before any vital organ is removed 
for purposes of transplantation. 
These alternative definitions of death are to be utilized for all 
purposes in this state, including the trials of civil and criminal 
cases, any laws to the contrary notwithstanding.12
With slight variations, in 1972 Maryland,13 and in 1973 
 
                                                 
11 United Trust Co. v. Pyke 199 Kan. 1,4,427 P.2d 67,71 (1967). 
12 Kan. Stat. Ann. §77-202 (Supp. 1971). 
13 Md. Code Ann., Art. 43, §54F (1972). 
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New Mexico14 and Virginia,15 enacted statutes patterned on the 
Kansas model. (In 1975 Oklahoma adopted a statute drawn solely 
from the second "alternative definition" of the Kansas prototype.16) 
The dual nature of the Kansas statute is its most troublesome 
feature. The alternative standards are set forth in two separate, 
complex paragraphs without a description of how they were to be 
related to the single phenomenon, death. When the statute was 
enacted, transplantation was very much in the news. The two-
pronged statute seems to create one definition of death for most 
people and another, apparently more lenient standard for 
"harvesting" organs from potential donors. 
The Capron-Kass Proposal: To overcome the confusion of the 
"two deaths" problem, Professor Alexander Morgan Capron and Dr. 
Leon R. Kass proposed a model statute in a 1972 law review 
article.17 Substantially shorter than the Kansas version, it spelled out 
how the two standards for death were related. It also avoided 
language in the Kansas statute about "hopeless" treatment that may 
have implied that the statute had to do with terminating treatment 
for dying patients rather than defining when death occurs. As 
subsequently revised by Professor Capron, it states: 
 
A person will be considered dead if in the announced opinion 
of a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical 
practice, he has experienced an irreversible cessation of 
respiratory and circulatory functions, or in the event that 
artificial means of support preclude a determination that these 
functions have ceased, he has experienced an irreversible 
cessation of total brain functions. Death will have occurred at 
the time when the relevant functions ceased.18
Seven states have adopted versions of the Capron-Kass model. 
Alaska, Iowa, Louisiana and Michgan enacted the statute with only 
minor modifications,19 while other states 
 
                                                 
14 N. M. Stat. Ann. §12-2-4 (1978). 
15 Va. Code §54.325.7 (1979). 
16 0kla. Stat. Ann. tit. 63,§1-301(g) (West 1975). 
17 Capron and Kass, op. cit at 111. 
18 Alexander M. Capron, "Legal Definition of Death," 315 Ann. 
N.Y. Acad. Sci. 349,356 (1978). 
19 Alaska Stat. §09. 65. 120 (Cum. Supp. 1979); Iowa Code Ann. 
§702.8 (West 1979); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §9:111 (West Cum. Supp. 1980); Mich. Stat. Ann. 
§§14.15 (1021) to (1024) (1979). 
 
 
64 Defining Death: Chapter 5 
 
have made more substantial modifications,20 which are discussed at 
length in Appendix C. 
 
The American Bar Association Proposal: The ABA proposed 
its own model statute in 1975. It resembled a California law enacted 
in the previous year.21 The ABA statute states: 
For all legal purposes, a human body, with irreversible 
cessation of total brain function, according to usual and 
customary standards of medical practice, shall 
 be considered dead.22
Some version of the ABA model statute can be found on the books 
of five states.23 Montana and Tennessee adopted the proposal 
verbatim.24 Illinois employed largely the same language but, 
regrettably, inserted it as an amendment to the state's Uniform 
Anatomical Gift Act, thus creating the impression that it applies 
only to organ donors.25 Because it ignores determinations of death 
based on the traditional cardiopulmonary criteria, a "single 
standard" statute of the ABA-type might appear to be irrelevant to 
most patients. To avoid this problem, several states, including 
California, amended the statute to permit determinations to be made 
based on "other usual and customary procedures"—unfortunately, 
without explicating these terms or their relationship to the brain-
based standards. The inclusion of this second undefined alternative 
resurrects—indeed, magnifies—the "two (unrelated) deaths" 
problem of the Kansas statute. 
 
                                                 
20 Ala. Code § §22-31-1 to 22-31-4 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (accepts other, unspecified 
procedures; provides for "independent confirmation of death" by a second doctor when 
brain criteria are used or transplantation is planned; excludes liability for actions in 
accordance with statute); Hawaii Rev. Stat. §327 C-1 (Supp. 1979) (requires opinion of a 
consulting physician for brain-based determinations; provides for biennial review of 
subject by committee appointed by director of health); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 
4447t (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1980) (adds "no liability" provisions of AMA model bill). 
21Cal. Health and Safety Code §7180 (West 1975).  
22 100 A.B.A. Ann. Rprt. 231-232 (1978) (February 1975 Midyear Meeting). 
23 In addition to the states mentioned in the text, Ga. Code Ann. 
§88-1715.1 (1979) requires "independent confirmation," provides "no liability" for good 
faith actions in accordance with the statute, and permits use of "other medically 
recognized criteria" which are not specified. 
24 Mont. Rev. Code Ann. § 50-22-101 (1977); Tenn. Code Ann. §53-459 (1976).  
25 Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 3, §552(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975). 
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The Uniform Brain Death Act: A third model statute received 
the approval in 1978 of the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws.26 The Uniform Brain Death Act, adopted 
verbatim by Nevada,27 and in part by West Virginia,28 provides: 
For legal and medical purposes, an individual who has 
sustained irreversible cessation of all functioning of the brain, 
including the brain stem, is dead. A determination under this 
section must be made in accordance with reasonable medical 
standards. 
 
The American Medical Association Proposal: Most recently, 
the American Medical Association proposed a model bill, which no 
jurisdiction has yet adopted. As amended at the December 1979 
Interim Meeting of the AMA, the proposal incorporated 
cardiopulmonary and brain-based alternatives for declaring death. 
Unlike most other statutes, it contained extensive provisions to 
limit liability for people making or taking actions pursuant to 
declarations as authorized by the state. 
 
Individual State Statutes: Seven states have adopted statutes 
that do not closely track any of the model proposals. In 1975, 
Oklahoma adopted the "brain death" half of the Kansas statute, as 
mentioned previously, and Oregon enacted a law with alternative 
definitions that is much shorter than the Kansas statute.29
In recent years, states have turned increasingly to nonstandard 
statutes. North Carolina originally adopted a rather confusing 
statute in 1977 incorporating both "braindeath" and "living wills" 
provisions.30 It recently substituted a somewhat clearer statute, an 
amalgam of the American Bar Association and Capron-Kass 
approaches. Its central provision reads: "Brain death may be used as 
the sole basis for the determination that a person has died, 
particularly when brain death occurs in the presence of artificially 
maintained respiratory and circulatory functions."31
 
 
                                                 
26 12 Uniform Laws Ann. 15 (Supp. 1981). 
27 Nev. Rev. Stat. §451, as amended by S.B. 5 (Laws 1979). 
28 W. Va. Code §16-19-1 (Supp. 1980). The West Virginia provision came as a partial 
amendment to an earlier statute on the Capron-Kass model, see W. Va. Code §16-19-1(c) 
(Cum. Supp. 1977) (adopted March 9, 1975). 
29 0kla. Stat. Ann. tit. 63 §1-301(g) (West 1975); Or. Rev. Stat. 
§146.087 (1977). 
30 N.C. Adv. Legis. Servo Ch. 815, § 90-320 (1977).   
31 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-323, as amended by S.B. 771 (1979).  
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In 1979, three states enacted idiosyncratic statutes. The 
provisions in Arkansas32 and Connecticut33 essentially elaborate a 
brain-only standard. Connecticut, like Illinois, placed its law as an 
amendment to the state's Uniform Anatomical Gift Act. Wyoming's 
law amalgamates the basic structure of the ABA model with several 
features of the Uniform Brain Death Act, specifically the inclusion 
of explicit reference to the brainstem and the replacement of "shall 
be considered dead" by "is dead."34 Most unusually, Wyoming drew 
on the NCCUSL's "Comment" for additional statutory language 
defining brain functions as "purposeful activity of the brain as 
distinguished from random activity." 
Finally, Florida in 1980 became the twenty-sixth state with a 
statutory "definition" of death.35 Its statute also draws on the ABA 
model and Uniform Brain Death Act in only explicitly recognizing 
"irreversible cessation of the functioning of the entire brain," but 
draws on the Capron-Kass approach by implicitly acknowledging 
the cardiopulmonary standard. It provides that the brain-based 
standard is to be used' 'where respiratory and circulatory functions 
are maintained by artifical means of support so as to preclude a 
determination that these functions have ceased." The Florida statute 
also specifically requires that determinations of death be made by 
two physicians, including one specialist, and that the family be 
notified of the procedures used to determine death; the statute also 
draws on Sections 2 and 3 of the AMA model in insulating from 
liability those acting in accordance with its terms. 
Uniform Determination of Death Act: Legislative response to 
the statute recommended in this Report began shortly after the 
President's Commission, the Uniform Law Commissioners and 
other sponsors of the proposal had officially acted. While this 
Report was being prepared, Colorado36 and Idaho37 (the latter in 
place of its existing statute) became the first states to enact the 
Uniform Determination of Death Act, bringing to 27 the states with 
statutory "definitions" of death. 
 
                                                 
32 Ark. Stat. Ann. § §82-537 and 538 (Cum. Supp. 1979). 
33 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §19-139i (West Cum. Supp. 1980). 
34 Wyo. Stat. §35-19-101 (Cum. Supp. 1979). 
35 Fla. Stat. §382.085 (1980). 
36 Colo. Rev. Stat. §12-36-136 (1981). In a 1979 decision accepting "brain death" in a 
criminal case, the Colorado Supreme Court had encouraged the legislature to enact a 
statute. Lovato v. District Court, 601 P.2d. 1072 (Col. 1979) (en banc). 
37 ldaho Code §54-1819 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (defines "accepted medical standards" as "the 
usual and customary procedures of the community") 
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Judicial Developments: Over the past decade, courts as well 
as legislatures have attempted to "redefine" death. While courts 
adhered for a time to the traditional cardiopulmonary standards, the 
recent trend has been to recognize the brain-based standard, even in 
the absence of an explicit statute. Nonetheless, as described more 
fully in Appendix D, the courts have not all been willing to 
"update" the common law nor have their rulings established 
consistent standards of universal application. More fundamentally, 
the court cases that persistently arise hint at the uncertainty about 
legal standards that pervades the medical community in states 
without statutes. 
Cases have also arisen in jurisdictions having a statute on 
death. The cases have mostly involved after-the-fact rulings 
concerning determinations of death. Generally, the statutes have 
been upheld by the courts, although in one case the ambiguity of the 
statutory language led to a "hung jury" and in another the judge 
refused to apply an "organ donor" statute in a nontransplant case.38
The court cases have arisen in a variety of legal contexts. 
Some defendants charged with murder have argued that they could 
not be guilty of homicide because their victims were alive when 
physicians—who should bear the responsibility for the deaths—
removed them from the respirators.39 Doctors have also been sued 
for removing organs for transplantation from a patient declared 
dead on the basis of brain-oriented criteria.40 A third category of 
cases has involved petitioning a court for permission to terminate 
life-support systems for bodies without functioning brains.41
While the courts have generally recognized brain-oriented 
criteria, they have often limited their rulings to the context of the 
particular type of case before the court, (e.g., 
 
                                                 
38 See Saundra Saperstein, "Maryland Law on Brain Death Was Unclear to Jurors," March 
21, 1979, Wash. Post, §C at 1, col. 1; Saundra Saperstein, "Md. Nurse to be Freed of 
Charges: Law Defining Death Held Too Ambiguous," Mar. 29, 1979, Wash. Post,§B at 1, 
col. 6; Bacchiochi v. Johnson Memorial Hospital, No. 256126 (Hartford/New Britain, Conn., 
Super. Ct., March 13, 1981). 
39 See, e.g., People v. Saldana 47 Cal. App. 3d 954, 121 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1975); State v. 
Brown, 8 Ore. App. 72,491 P.2d 1193 (1971). 
40 Tucker v. Lower, No. 2231 (Richmond, Va. L. & Eq. Ct., May 23, 1972). 
41 41Bacchiochi v. Johnson Memorial Hospital, No., 256126 
(Hartford/New Britian, Conn., Super. Ct., March 13, 1981) (judge declined officially to 
"update" common law "definition" of death but provided informal assurances to physicians 
that no liability will follow discontinuation of treatment in patient without brain functions). 
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explicitly stating that the precedential value of a decision is limited 
to criminal cases).42 Moreover, some of the most widely discussed 
cases did not reach the appellate level, limiting their actual impact 
to the particular court that decided them.43
One case involving the question of whether a respirator-
supported patient lacking all brain functions is dead or alive which 
reached the highest court of a state warrants particular mention 
because of the relationship of the court's ruling to the policy 
proposed in this Report. In the case of In Re Bowman, the 
Washington Supreme Court late in 1980 affirmed a lower court 
ruling that a person without any brain function is dead.44 The trial 
court in Bowman had ruled that five-year-old Matthew Bowman 
was dead, having suffered massive physical injuries. The court 
enjoined the removal of the "extraordinary measures" sustaining 
respiration and heartbeat, however, pending an appeal. The case 
was set for argument before the state's highest court a week later, 
but the day before the argument was scheduled, all of Matthew's 
bodily functions ceased irretrievably. Although this event made the 
case moot, the court decided to rule upon the case nonetheless. The 
Washington Supreme Court observed in its ruling: 
An electroencephalogram (EEG) gave no reading and a 
radionucleide scan, which shows whether blood is getting to 
and through the brain, found a total absence of blood flow. 
No cornea reflex was present and Matthew's pupils were 
dilated and nonreactive to any stimuli. There were also no 
deep tendon reflexes or other signs of brain stem action, nor 
responses to deep pain or signs of spontaneous breathing. 
Body temperature and drug intake had been controlled to 
avoid adverse influence on these tests. The testifying 
physician indicated that he believed Matthew's brain was 
dead under the most rigid criteria available, called the 
"Harvard criteria," and that his cardiovascular system would, 
despite the life support systems, fail in 14 to 60 days. [The 
physician] ... recommended that he be removed from the 
ventilator, a recommendation consented to by his mother.45
The Washington Supreme Court was able to consider the 
model statute recommended in this Report (it had been 
 
                                                 
42 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249, 366 N.E. 2d 744 (1977); State 
v..Johnson, 395 N.E.2d 368 (Ohio 1977). 
43 Tucker v. Lower, No. 2831 (Richmond, Va. L. & Eq. Ct., May 23, 1972, New York Health 
& Hospitals Corp. v. Sulsona, 81 Misc.2d 1002 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975).  
44 In re Bowman, 94 Wash: 2d 407,617 P.2d 731 (1980). 
45 Id. at 733. 
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approved by the Uniform Law Commissioners in August of 1980, in 
place of the Uniform Brain Death Act discussed above). The court 
"adopted" the provisions of the new uniform bill, while explicitly 
leaving to the medical profession the definition of "acceptable 
diagnostic tests and medical procedures... taking into account new 
knowledge of brain function and new diagnostic procedures."46
International Developments: The interference of increasingly 
sophisticated medical technology with determining death by 
traditional heart-lung criteria is also a matter of concern outside the 
United States as well. Indeed, an international body broached the 
issue as early as 1968 when, a few days after the publication of the 
seminal Harvard criteria, the 22nd Congress of the World Medical 
Assembly (WMA) adopted its "Declaration of Sydney."47 This 
statement, framed in general terms, recognized that, although 
physicians will usually be able to meet their legal responsibility in 
diagnosing death by relying on classical heart-lung criteria, artificial 
respirators and transplantation of cadaver organs posed problems 
for which these criteria seem insufficient. The WMA concluded that 
"no single technological criterion is entirely satisfactory in the 
present state of medicine nor can anyone technological procedure 
be substituted for the overall judgment of the physician." A 
determination of death should, the WMA declared, "be based on 
clinical judgment supplemented if necessary by a number of 
diagnostic aids of which the electroencephalograph is currently the 
most helpful. "48
 
The Declaration of 
Sydney went on to recommend 
that, where transplantation is 
involved, the determination of 
death should be made by two 
or more physicians, who must 
not be "immediately concerned 
with the performance of 
transplantation." This 
recommendation remains the 
most frequent common 
denominator in statutes found 
in other countries, as death is 
most often defined in the 
context of rules relating to 
organ transplantation. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46 Id. at 738. 
47 Reprinted in "Declaration of Sydney," 2 Med. J. Aust. Supp. 58 (1973). 
48 Id. 
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Questions raised by the new resuscitative technology have also 
received some, albeit not entirely satisfactory, attention in 
international legal bodies. In 1976 the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe issued a "Report on the Rights of the Sick 
and Dying" which included a recommendation on the prolongation 
of life.49 Unfortunately, the report seems to confuse patient 
participation in decisions about medical care with legal rules on the 
irreversible cessation of brain function. 
In model legislation on transplantation in 1978, the Council of 
Europe dealt obliquely with the "definition" of death. Like the 
model American statute on transplantation (the Uniform Anatomical 
Gift Act), the European proposal did not state the basis on which 
death could be declared in so many words. It went somewhat further 
than the American provision, however, implying that cessation of 
brain functions is a ground for pronouncing death, at least when 
organs are to be removed. The 1978 Council of Europe proposal 
stated that "[d]eath having occurred, a removal [of organs or tissues 
for transplantation] may be effected even if the function of some 
organ other than the brain may be artificially preserved."50
A number of countries have taken up these issues through 
national medical societies or law reform commissions. As a result 
at least 13 countries have statutes of national force and effect that 
allow for the determination of death based on brain-oriented 
criteria. At least ten countries require specific tests (usually 
electroencephalography and/or cerebral angiography) as part of 
their statutes or regulations promulgated pursuant to statutory 
authority. 
Two countries, Canada and Australia, have a legal situation 
that parallels the United States; a few provinces have enacted 
statutes, while the others have not. In 1977 the Law Reform 
Commission of Australia recommended, in the context of human 
tissue transplants, a statute declaring death to occur upon 
"irreversible cessation of all functions of the brain" or "irreversible 
cessation of circulation of blood in the body."51  The Law Reform 
Commission of Canada recently proposed amending the federal 
"Interpretation Act" to add a brain-based "definition" to the law "for 
all pur- 
                                                 
49 Parl. Ass.. 27th Sess. Resolution 613, adopted Jan. 29, 1976. ParI. Ass. 27th Sess. 
Recommendation 779, adopted Jan. 29, 1976.  
50 Council of Europe, On Harmonisation of Legislations of Member States Pertaining to 
Removal, Grafting and Transplantation of Human Substances, Resolution of the Committee 
of Ministers, 287th Sess., No. 29 (May 11, 1978) at ch. 1, art. 11, § 1. 
51 Law Reform Commission of Australia, Human Tissue Transplants (Report No.7) 
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra (1977) at 63. 
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poses within the jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada."52 Other 
countries, such as Great Britain, rely on codes of medical practice 
drafted by nationally recognized bodies with quasi-legal status and 
accepted by the relevant executive branch departments.53 A recently 
published survey a the international situation identifies fifteen 
countries where the medical profession has officially recognized 
brain-based criteria in determining death in the absence of statutory 
or case law, and five countries where it has not, although physicians 
in some of these countries may in fact employ the criteria in 
declaring death in appropriate cases.54
 
The Proposal For a Uniform Statute 
The Language and Its History: The array of "model laws" 
and state variations reveals two major problems: first, their 
diversity, and second, the overly complex or inexact wording that 
characterizes many of them. Diversity is a problem for several 
reasons. In the case of enacted statutes, diversity means 
nonuniformity among jurisdictions. In most areas of the law, 
provisions that diverge from one state to the next create, at worst, 
inconvenience and the occasional failure of a finely honed business 
or personal plan to achieve its intended result. But on the subject of 
death, nonuniformity has a jarring effect. Of course, the diversity is 
really only superficial; all the enacted statutes appear to have the 
same intent. Yet even small differences raise the question: if the 
statutes all mean the same thing, why are they so varied? And it is 
possible to think of medical situations—and, even more freely, of 
legal cases that would be unlikely but not bizarre—in which the 
differences in statutory language could lead to different outcomes.55
 
                                                 
52 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Criteria for the Determination of Death, Report, 
No. 15), Minister of Supply and Service, Canada (1981). 
53 Working Party of the United Kingdom Health Departments, The Removal of Cadaveric 
Organs for Transplantation: A Code of Practice 11 (1979), accepting the views of the 
Conference of Royal Colleges and Faculties of the United Kingdom, "Diagnosis of Death," 
1979(i) Lancet 261, and "Diagnosis of Brain Death," 1976 (ii) Lancet 1069-70. 
54 Frank P. Stuart, Frank J. Veith and Ronald E. Cranford, "Brain Death Laws and Patterns 
of Consent to Remove Organs for Transplantation from Cadavers in the United States and 
28 Other Countries," 31 Transplantation 238 (1981). 
55 For example, the Kansas statute might be (mis)applied to declare dead a patient who still 
has some brain functions but who is experiencing repeated and apparently terminal 
respiratory difficulties, because the first paragraph of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 777-02 states that a 
person is dead when "Attempts at resuscitation [of respiratory and cardiac function] are 
considered hopeless." Disputes could arise under the Oregon statute over the properiety of a 
physician declaring a person dead after a severe trauma to the heart and lungs without 
attempting resuscitation; Or. Rev. Stat. §146.087 treats a person as alive only if 
"spontaneous respiration and circulatory function" can be restored. 
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More fundamental is the obstacle that diversity presents for the 
process of statutory enactment. Legislators, presented with a variety 
of proposals and no clear explanation of the significance of their 
differences, are (not surprisingly) wary of all the choices. 
Proponents of each of the models (and other critics) compounded 
this difficulty by objecting to the language of the other statutes 
along the lines discussed in the preceeding section of this Chapter. 
A uniform proposal that is broadly acceptable would 
significantly ease the enactment of good law on death throughout 
the United States. To that end, the Commission's Executive Director 
met in May 1980 with representatives of the American Bar 
Association, the American Medical Association and the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Through a 
comparison of the then existing "models" with the objectives that a 
statute ought to serve, they arrived at a proposed Uniform 
Determination of Death Act: 
§ 1. [Determination of Death.] An individual who has 
sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and 
respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all 
functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. 
A determination of death must be made in accordance with 
accepted medical standards. 
§ 2. [Uniformity of Construction and Application.] This act 
shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general 
purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject 
of this Act among states enacting it. 
This model law has now been approved by the Uniform Law 
Commissioners, the ABA, and the AMA as a substitute for their 
previous proposals. It has also been endorsed by the American 
Academy of Neurology and the American Electroencephalographic 
Society. 
 
Construction of the Statute: As recommended at the outset of 
this Chapter, the proposed statute addresses the matter of "defining" 
death at the level of general physiological standards rather than at 
the level of more abstract concepts or the level of more precise 
criteria and tests. The proposed statute articulates alternative 
standards, since in the vast majority of cases irreversible circulatory 
and respir- 
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atory cessation will be the obvious and sufficient basis fo~ 
diagnosing death. When a patient is not supported on a ref 
pirator, the need to evaluate brain functions does not arise. The 
basic statute in this area should acknowledge that fact by setting 
forth the basis on which death is determined in such cases (namely, 
that breathing and blood flow have ceased and cannot be restored or 
replaced). 
It would be possible, as in the statute drafted by the Law 
Reform Commission of Canada, to propound the irreversible 
cessation of brain functions as the "definition" and then to permit 
that standard to be met not only by direct measures of brain activity 
but also "by the prolonged absence of spontaneous cardiac and 
respiratory functions."56 Although conceptually acceptable (and 
vastly superior to the adoption of brain cessation as a primary 
standard conjoined with a nonspecific reference to other, apparently 
unrelated "usual and customary procedures"57), the Canadian 
proposal breaks with tradition in a manner that appears to be 
unnecessary. For most lay people—and in all probability for most 
physicians as well—the permanent loss of heart and lung function 
(for example, in an elderly person who has died in his or her sleep) 
clearly manifests death. As previous chapters in this Report recount, 
biomedical scientists can explain the brain's particularly important-
and vulnerable-role in the organism as a whole and show how 
temporary loss of blood flow (ischemia) becomes a permanent 
cessation because of the damage it inflicts on the brain. 
Nonetheless, most of the time people do not, and need not, go 
through this two-step process. Irreversible loss of circulation is 
recognized as death because—setting aside any mythical 
connotations of the heart—a person without blood flow simply 
cannot live. Thus, the Commission prefers to employ language 
which would reflect the continuity of the traditional standard and 
the newer, brain-based standard. 
 
"Individual": Other aspects of the statutory language, as well 
as several phrases that were intentionally omitted, deserve special 
mention. First, the word "individual" is employed here to conform 
to the standard designation of a human being in the language of the 
uniform acts. The term "person" was not used here because it is 
sometimes used by the law to include a corporation. Although that 
particular confusion would be unlikely to arise here, the narrower 
term "individual" is more precise and thus avoids the possibility of 
confusion. 
 
                                                 
56 Law Reform Commission of Canada, op. cit. at 7-20. 
57 See, e.g., Cal. Health and Safety Code §7180 (West 1975). 
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"Irreversible Cessation of Functions": Second, the statute 
emphasizes the degree of damage to the brain required for a 
determination of death by stating “all functions of the entire brain, 
including the brain stem" (emphasis added). This may be thought 
doubly redundant, but at least it should make plain the intent to 
exclude from application under the "definition" any patient who has 
lost only "higher" brain functions or, conversely, who maintains 
those functions but has suffered solely a direct injury to the brain 
stem which interferes with the vegetative functions of the body. 
The phrase "cessation of functions" reflects an important 
choice. It stands in contrast to two other terms that have been 
discussed in this field: (a) "loss of activity" and (b) "destruction of 
the organ." 
Bodily parts, and the subparts that make them up, are 
important for the functions they perform. Thus, detecting a loss of 
the ability to function is the central aim of diagnosis in this field. 
After an organ has lost the ability to function within the organism, 
electrical and metabolic activity at the level of individual cells or 
even groups of cells may continue for a period of time. Unless this 
cellular activity is organized and directed, however, it cannot 
contribute to the operation of the organism as a whole. Thus, 
cellular activity alone is irrelevant in judging whether the organism, 
as opposed to its components, is "dead." 
 
At the other pole, several commentators have argued that 
organic destruction rather than cessation of functions should be the 
basis for declaring death.58 They assert that until an organ has been 
destroyed there is always the possibility that it might resume 
functioning. The Commission 
                                                 
58 Paul A. Byrne, Sean O'Reilly and Paul M. Quay, "Brain Death: An Opposing 
Viewpoint," 242 J.A.M.A. 1985 (1979). 
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has rejected this position for several reasons. Once brain cells have 
permanently ceased metabolizing, the body cannot regenerate them. 
The loss of the brain's functions precedes the destruction of the cells 
and liquefaction of the tissues. 
Theoretically, even destruction of an organ does not prevent its 
functions from being restored. Any decision to recognize "the end" 
is inevitably restricted by the limits of available medical knowledge 
and techniques.59 Since "irreversibility" adjusts to the times, the 
proposed statute can incorporate new clinical capabilities. Many 
patients declared dead fifty years ago because of heart failure would 
have not experienced an "irreversible cessation of circulatory and 
respiratory functions" in the hands of a modern hospital. 
Finally, the argument for using "brain destruction" echoes the 
proposal about "putrefaction" made two centuries ago and 
overcome by advances in diagnostic techniques. The traditional 
cardiopulmonary standard relies on the vital signs as a measure of 
heart-lung function; the declaration of death does not await 
evidence of destruction. Since the evidence reviewed by the 
Commission indicates that brain criteria, properly applied, diagnose 
death as reliably as cardiopulmonary criteria, the Commission sees 
no reason not to use the same standards of cessation for both. The 
requirement of "irreversible cessation of functions" should apply to 
both cardiopulmonary and brain-based determinations. 
 
"Is Dead": Most of the model statutes previously proposed 
state that a person meeting the statutory standards "will [or shall] be 
considered dead." This formulation, although probably effective in 
achieving the desired clarification of the place of "brain death" in 
the law, is somewhat disconcerting since it might be read to 
indicate that the law will consider someone dead who by some 
other, perhaps wiser, standard is not dead. The President's 
Commission does not endorse this view. It favors stating more 
directly (as had the Uniform State Law Commissioners in their 
1978 proposal) that a person "is dead" when he or she meets one of 
the standards set forth in the statute. 
                                                 
59 Already, a hand "destroyed" in an accident can be reconstructed using advanced 
surgical methods. The functions of the kidney can be artificially restored through 
extracorporeal devices; an implantable artificial heart has been tested in animals and is 
now proposed for human trials. It is impossible to predict what other "miracles" 
biomedical science may some day produce in the restoration of natural functions or their 
substitution through artificial means. 
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In declaring that an individual "is dead," physicians imply that 
at some moment prior to the diagnosis the individual moved from 
the status of "being alive" to "being dead." The Commission 
concurs in the view that "death should be viewed not as a process 
but as the event that separates the process of dying from the process 
of disintegration."60 Although it assumes that each dead person 
became dead at some moment prior to the time of diagnosis, the 
statute does not specify that moment. Rather, this calculation is left 
to "accepted medical practices" and the law of each jurisdiction. 
Determining the time of passage from living to dead can be 
troublesome in certain situations; like all aspects of assessing 
whether a body is dead, it relies heavily on the clinical skills and 
judgment of the person making the determination. In most cases, it 
appears to be the custom simply to record the time when a diagnosis 
of death is made as the time of death. When precision is important 
for legal purposes, the scientific basis for determining the time of 
death may be reexamined and resolved through legal proceedings. 
A determination of death immediately changes the attitudes 
and behavior of the living toward the body that has gone from being 
a person to being a corpse. Discontinuation of medical care, 
mourning and burial are examples of customary behavior; people 
usually provide intimate care for living patients and identify with 
them, while withdrawing from contact with the dead. In ordinary 
circumstances, the time at which medical diagnosis causes a change 
in legal status should be synchronous with the time that social 
behaviors naturally change. 
In some cases of death determined by neurologic criteria, 
however, it is necessary to allow for repeated testing, observation, 
or metabolism of drugs. This may interpose hours or even days 
between the actual time of death and its confirmation. Procedures 
for certifying time of death, like those for determining the status of 
being dead, will be a matter for locally "accepted medical 
standards," hospital rules and custom, community mores and state 
death certificate law. Present practice in most localities now 
parallels 
                                                 
60 James L. Bernat, Charles M. Culver and Bernard Gert. "On the Definition and 
riterion of Death," 94 Ann. Int. Med. 389 (1981): C 
If we regard death as a process then either the process starts when the person 
is still living, which confuses the "process of death" with the process of dying, for 
we all regard someone who is dying as not yet dead, or the "process of death" 
starts when the person is no longer alive, which confuses death with the process of 
disintegration. 
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the determination of death by cardiopulmonary criteria: death by
brain criteria is certified at the time that the fact of death is
established, that is, after all tests and confirmatory observation
periods are complete. 
When the time of "brain death" has legal importance, a best
medical estimate of the actual time when all brain functions
irreversibly ceased will probably be appropriate. Where this is a
matter of controversy, it becomes a point to be resolved by the law
of the jurisdiction. Typically, judges decide this on the basis of
expert testimony—as they do with a contested determination of
unwitnessed cessation of cardiopulmonary functions.
"Accepted Medical Standards": The proposed statutes 
variously describe the basis on which the criteria and tests actually 
used to diagnose death are to be selected and employed. The
variations were: 
"based on ordinary standards of 
medical practice" 
"according to usual and customary 
standards of medical practice"  
"in accordance with reasonable 
medical standards"  
"in accordance with accepted 
medical standards" 
Despite their linguistic differences, the Capron/Kass, ABA and
AMA models apparently intend the same result: to require the use of
diagnostic measures and procedures that have passed the normal test 
of scrutiny and adoption by the biomedical community. In contrast,
the 1978 Uniform proposal sounded a different note by proposing
"reasonableness" as the standard. The problem is: whose
reasonableness? Might lay jurors conclude that a medical practice, 
although generally adopted, was "unreasonable"? It would be unfair
to subject a physician (and others acting pursuant to his or her
instructions) to liability on the basis of an after-the-fact 
determination of standards if he or she had been acting in good faith 
and according to the norms of professional practice and belief. Even
the prospect of this liability would unnecessarily disrupt orderly
decision-making in this field.
Capron-Kass (1972): 
ABA (1975): 
NCCUSL 1978):  
AMA (1979): 
The process by which a norm of medical practice becomes
"accepted" varies according to the field and the type of procedure at
issue. The statutory language should eliminate wholly idiosyncratic
standards or the use of experimental means of diagnosis l except in 
conjunction with ade- 
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quate customary procedures). 
On the other hand, the statute 
does not require a procedure to 
be universally adopted; it is 
enough if, like any medical 
practice which is later 
challenged, it has been 
accepted by a substantial and 
reputable body of medical men 
and women as safe and 
efficacious for the purpose for 
which it is being employed.61
 
 
The Commission has also concluded that the statute need not 
elaborate the legal consequences of following accepted practices. 
The model statute proposed earlier by the AMA contained separate 
sections precluding criminal and civil prosecution or liability for 
determinations of death made in accordance with the statute or 
actions taken "in good faith in reliance on a determination of 
death.62 It is not necessary to address this issue in a statute because 
the existing common law already eliminates such liability. 
Scope of Application: The Kansas statute specified that it 
established when a person is considered "medically and legally 
dead."63 Although this unnecessary language was deleted in the 
1972 model statute, it partially resurfaced in the 1975 ABA 
proposal which begins "for all legal purposes."64  Three years later it 
was back in full flower in the Uniform Brain Death Act, whose 
scope includes all "legal and medical purposes."65
Besides being unnecessary, the broader provisions are 
misleading. A law setting a general standard without explicit 
limitations would be assumed to apply for all legal purposes; to say 
so in the statute, however, only raises needless questions (e.g., what 
does "all legal purposes" leave out? For example, proceedings in 
equity?). 
By mentioning "medical purposes," the Kansas act and 1978 
Uniform proposal compounded the confusion. Without this 
language, a statute would certainly reach the prac- 
 
 
                                                 
61 Edwards v. United States, 519 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1975); Price v. Neyland, 320 F.2d 674 
(D.C. Cir. 1963). 
62 243 J.A.M.A. 420 (1980) (editorial). 
63 Kan. Stat. Ann. §77-202 (Supp. 1971). 
64 100 A.B.A. Ann. Rpt. 231-232 (1978) (February 1975 Midyear Meeting). 
65 Uniform Brain Death Act §1. 12 Uniform Laws Annot. 15 (Supp. 1980). 
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tice of medicine and its consequences for patients. The only 
additional area that might be encompassed by the phrase "medical 
purposes" is medical theory, a plane which a statute cannot reach 
whatever it may proclaim. Society cannot legislate the laws of 
nature, nor is there any reason to think that in this case it should 
want to try to do so. Thus, the language proclaiming a "definition" 
of death "for all medical purposes" is at best unnecessary and at 
worst foolish. 
Finally, since the proposed statute is intended to apply in all 
situations, it ought not to be incorporated into a state's Uniform 
Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA). Placing it there would create the 
mistaken impression that a special "definition" of death needs to be 
applied to organ transplantation, which is not the case. (As a matter 
of fact, most of the respirator-supported cases in which the 
brainoriented standard would be applicable are not potential donors, 
as noted in Chapter 2.) Section 7(b) of the UAGA makes the time of 
death a matter to be determined by the attending physician; the 
proposed Uniform Determination of Death Act specifies the 
grounds on which such a determination are made. Some people 
have expressed concern that a determination of death in a potential 
organ donor might be made by a physician with a conflict of 
interest, but the UAGA specifies that the physician who determines 
that death has occurred "shall not participate in the procedures for 
removing or transplanting a part."66
Personal Beliefs: Should a statute include a "conscience 
clause" permitting an individual (or family members, where the 
individual is incompetent) to specify the standard to be used for 
determining his or her death based upon personal or religious 
beliefs?67 While sympathetic to the concerns and values that prompt 
this suggestion, the Commission has concluded that such a 
provision has no place in a statute on the determination of death. 
Were a non-uniform standard permitted, unfortunate and 
mischievous results are easily imaginable.68
 
If the question were what actions (e.g., termination of 
treatment, autopsy, removal of organs, etc.) could be taken, there 
might be room for such a conscience clause. Yet, as the question is 
one of legal status, on which turn the rights and interests not only 
of the one individual but also the 
 
                                                 
66 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act § 7(b), 8 Uniform Laws Annot. 608 (1972). 
67 Veatch, Death, Dying and the Biological Revolution, op. cit. at 72-76; Michael T. 
Sullivan, "The Dying Person-His Plight and His Right," 8 New Eng. L. Rev. 197, 216 
(1973). 
68 Capron,"Legal Definition of Death," op. cit. at 356-357. 
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other people and of the state itself, the subject is not one for 
personal (or familial) self-determination.69
The statute specifies that death has occurred if either 
cardiopulmonary or brain criteria are met. Although, as a legal 
matter, there is no personal discretion as to the fact of death when 
either criteria is met, room remains for reasonable accommodation 
of personal beliefs regarding the actions to be taken once a 
determination of death has been made. Such actions, whether 
medical (e.g., maintaining a dead body on a respirator until organs 
are removed for transplantation) or religious (e.g., withholding 
religious pronouncement of death until the blood has ceased 
flowing), can vary with the circumstances. Some subjects in the 
Commission's hospital survey, for example, were maintained on 
ventilators for several hours after they were dead, in deference to 
family wishes or in order for the family to decide whether to donate 
the deceased's organs. 
 
Ethical Aspects of the Proposal 
In addition to the issues discussed earlier, particularly in 
Chapter Three, two further ethical issues deserve mention: (a) 
concerns about the certainty of diagnosis and (b) concerns about the 
medical steps that may be taken after death is pronounced. 
Certainty of Diagnosis: Part of the public concern over 
employing a brain-based standard to determine death seems to arise 
from fear that this may cause medical treatment to be withdrawn 
from some patients who might have "recovered," that is, regained 
consciousness or at least the ability to breathe without the aid of a 
respirator. This fear is ex- 
                                                 
69 Physicians have recognized the need for sensitivity and good communication on this 
point: 
Before and during the diagnostic evaluation of brain death, the patient's 
family is informed not only of the patient's medical condition but also of the 
concept of brain death, its diagnosis, and the consequences of death certification in 
these cases. Because the declaration of death is the legal responsibility of the 
medical practitioner, the family's permission for this procedure is not sought but 
their questions and concerns must be answered honestly and with the necessary 
education and communication regarding the events following discontinuation of 
cardiopulmonary support.... When transplantation is not planned, family members 
may request to be at the bedside when the ventilator is removed. This is permitted 
but the family is advised that peripheral muscle movements may be observed 
during the ensuing anoxia and that these are not dependent on remaining brain 
function. 
David J. Pawner & Ake Grenvik, "Triage in Patient Care: From Expected Recovery to Brain 
Death," 8 Heart & Lung 1103, 1107 (1979). 
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pressed in anecdotes about patients who have resumed normal lives 
after long periods of coma or even after having been pronounced 
dead.70 The ethical question is whether a new, brain-oriented 
definition of death would lead to abandonment of patients who 
might have responded to continued medical care. Those who press 
this objection to "redefinition" of death insist that death should not 
be pronounced until it is certain that recovery is impossible.71
The moral gravity of the concern over premature cessation of 
care cannot be questioned. It is important, however, to be clear on 
the relation of this Concern to the proposed brain-oriented standard. 
Under that standard, death will be pronounced in cases in which 
there is an irreversible loss of brain functions while respiration is 
artificially supplied. Such bodies might have been regarded as alive 
if only heart-lung tests for death were permissible. Yet ethical 
concern over the accuracy of the criteria used to establish a standard 
and the certainty of the resulting diagnosis can be expressed about 
both standards—brain or heart-lung—or indeed about any standard. 
The certainty issue, then, is not peculiar to a brain-oriented 
standard. 
It is true that public attention has not recently focused on the 
certainty of the diagnosis of death under the heart-lung formulation. 
But this has not always been so. From time to time in centuries past, 
the public questioned the ability of doctors to determine when a 
person had suffered irreversible cessation of life functions. Writers 
were able to excite the public imagination with tales of buried 
people awakening and escaping from coffins.72 The prospect of 
premature burial has been eliminated by the practice of embalming. 
Increased public confidence in the diagnostic ability of physicians 
has laid the remaining fears largely to rest, although reports of 
occasional "mistakes" (for example, by paramedics in battle) 
continue to circulate. 
The ethical concern over certainty, then, is addressed to a 
relatively narrow and technical question: with what assurance can a 
physician state that the relevant organs will 
 
                                                 
70 Bethia S. Currie, "The Redefinition of Death," in S.F. Spieker (ed.) Organism, 
Medicine, and Metaphysics, D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland (1978) at 177, 
184-191. Review of the cases cited established that in none was a patient who 
subsequently recovered spontaneous functioning ever dead according to the standard of 
"irreversible cessation of all functions of the brain" or by the detailed medical guidelines 
set forth in Appendix F to this Report. 
71 Bryne, O'Reilly & Quay, op. cit. 
72 See pp. 13-15 supra; Edgar Allan Poe, "Fall of the House of Usher," David Galloway 
(ed.) Edgar Allan Poe: Selected Writings, Penguin Books, New York (1979) at 138. 
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not resume functioning in a person diagnosed to have lost certain 
vital functions? This question cannot be answered by any moral or 
philosophical argument; it requires empirical evidence. Since experts 
testified before the Commission that determinations of death based 
on the irrversible cessation of total brain functioning are today no 
more, and perhaps less, subject to error than those based on 
irreversible cessation of heart and lung functions, this ethical 
question can be satisfactorily answered: a statute establishing a 
whole-brain standard for determining death would not lead to an 
increase in the number of patients declared dead who actually 
possessed the capacity for recovery. Both standards contained in the 
proposed statute provide the basis for accurate and reliable 
determinations, when proper criteria and tests are used with due care 
by qualified people. 
Terminating Medical Interventions on Dead Bodies: A 
patient correctly diagnosed as having lost brain functions 
permanently and totally will never regain consciousness. He or she 
will experience no pleasure or pain, enjoy no social interaction, and 
be unable to pursue or complete his or her life's projects. Why, then, 
is there an ethical issue over discontinuing medical interventions? 
For many, there will be none. As with all dead bodies, it is 
appropriate to discontinue interventions—indeed, it is usually 
inappropriate, on both practical and moral grounds, to continuue to 
intervene,73 except under closely circumscribed conditions (as when 
a dead person's organs are kept functioning briefly while 
preparations for organ removal and transplantation are completed.) 
For some people, however, the withdrawal of treatment from a 
mechanically respirated patient diagnosed as dead because of loss of 
all brain functions is difficult and perhaps ethically questionable. 
Such corpses after all, typically have some appearance of life, such 
as a moving chest, pulsing blood vessels, and bodily warmth. It is 
these factors, of course, that make the status of such bodies 
ambiguous and present the issues for biomedical professionals and 
the public discussed in this Report. 
Ceasing to intervene medically in such cases should be 
compared with the appropriate behavior in regard to other dead 
bodies. For example, medical personnel may labor vigorously over a 
patient with a cardiac arrest. If they are 
                                                 
73 Cf. Markku Kaste, Matti Hillbom & Jorma Palo, "Diagnosis and Management of Brain 
Death," 1 Brit, Med J. 525, 527 (1979): "As soon as it is obvious that the patient cannot 
recover, lifesupporting measures should perhaps be withdrawn, since continued support 
may increase reluctance to embark on resuscitative measures generally. " 
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not able to restore spontaneous circulation, they know that the 
patient is dead and treatment ceases. 
The use of the respirator—and the decision to withdraw it from 
a patient who has been declared dead on the basis of an irreversible 
cessation of all brain functions—only appears to be different. The 
superficial difference arises because of differences in the clinical 
situations. An attempt at cardiac resuscitation is acute and dramatic 
(typically involving numerous people who labor vigorously, 
shouting orders and employing ever more Draconian measures). By 
comparison, an attempt at brain resuscitation is chronic (taking 
hours or days, not minutes) and typically peaceful (the loudest 
noise may be the quiet "woosh" of air from a mechanical respirator 
and the rhythmic beeping of a cardiac monitor). At the moment of 
cardiac failure, one can almost see the life pass from a patient, 
while from the other it has slipped away so stealthily that its image 
lingers on. Although undeniably disconcerting for many people, the 
confusion created in personal perception by a determination of 
"brain death" does not, in the Commission's view, provide a basis 
for an ethical objection to discontinuing medical measures on these 
dead bodies any more than on other dead bodies. 
Indeed, it is quite important to be clear on this matter because 
of the attention paid in recent years to the ethical issues in decisions 
to forego treatment of dying—but still living—patients. That is a 
separate issue, and one which the Commission will address in a 
subsequent report. Mechanical respirators and associated treatments 
are applied to two groups of patients: those whom they are helping 
to keep alive and those who have died despite such treatment. 
Failure to recognize the distinctness of those two situations will only 
obscure and exaggerate the difficulties of framing policy. The statute 
recommended in this Report aids in that process of recognition by 
providing a legal standard to distinguish the dead from the dying. 
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These documents are attachments to the Report and were not formally 
adopted by the Commission. Appendices A B E were prepared by the staff 
and Appendix F is a statement endorsed by a group of medical consultants 
to the Commission. 

 Glossary of Terms A 
Anoxia is the absence of oxygen supply to the tissues.  
Apnea denotes an absence of the impulse to breathe which leads 
to an inability to breathe spontaneously. 
Asystole is the absence of contraction (systole) of the heart. 
Cephalic reflexes require some intact brainstem. Most important in 
the discussion of "brain death" issues are the light reflex 
(constricting the pupils when a light is shined in the eyes), the 
corneal reflex (blinking when the cornea is touched), the 
oculocephalic reflex or doll's head reflex (maintaining the position 
of the eyes when the head is turned), and the vestibular reflex 
(turning of the eyes when an ear is irrigated with cold liquid). 
Hypoxia is the reduction of oxygen supply to the tissues below 
physiologic levels. 
Infarction is a localized area of necrosis in response to ischemia. 
Irreversible coma has been used by some authors as a synonym 
for persistent vegetative state and by others as a synonym for 
brain death. Although a patient without any brain functions on 
respirator support may still appear to be in a deep sleep, by 
generally accepted medical criteria such a patient would not be in 
a coma or any other living state. Nevertheless, the term is used as 
an umbrella term for a variety of comatose states including brain 
death, persistent vegetative state, and locked-in state 
(consciousness without movement). 
Ischemia denotes a loss of blood supply to a tissue, and thus 
includes not only hypoxia or anoxia but deprivation of nutrients 
and waste accumulation. 
Necrosis is the mortification of cells or tissue. 
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Persistent vegetative state or persistent noncognitive state 
describes a syndrome of diverse etiologies including cerebral, 
cortical, or brainstem lesions. Patients in this condition are often 
described as awake but not aware: they often can breathe, chew, 
swallow and even groan but show no signs of consciousness, 
perception, cognition, or other higher functions.  
Spinal reflexes, which include the knee jerk, ankle jerk, and so 
forth, require an intact spinal cord segment but not an intact 
brainstem. A person in deep coma and a person whose entire brain is 
dead may both have spinal reflexes. 
Systolic blood pressure is the force of the blood in a major artery at 
the time of maximum force, resulting from cardiac contraction 
(systole). 
Studies of Outcome 
in Comatose, 
Artificially- 
Respirated Patients 
    B 
The mechanical respirator is a life-saving technology, facilitating 
the recovery of patients whose capacity for spontaneous 
respiration is temporarily lost or seriously impaired. But not all 
patients receiving respirator support recover; the technology also 
generates medico-legal dilemmas. 
The Commission was unable to locate any data on the 
number of patients who have permanently lost all brain functions, 
despite ventilator-maintained respiration and circulation, or on the 
relative proportion of this and other outcomes among comatose 
patients receiving respirator support. Although time and budget 
constraints prevented the Commission from embarking on a large-
scale study which would yield national statistics or widely 
generalizable data, several small hospital surveys were 
commenced in the fall of 1980 to shed some light on the 
implications of respirator use. 
Methodology 
 
The Commission's work had two components: in part I, the 
Commission arranged for a retrospective review of medical 
records at four hospitals; in part II, the Commission made use of 
three existing computerized data bases collected for purposes 
independent of the Commission's work. The data bases in Part II 
included four hospitals, none of which were included in Part I. In 
both parts of the Commission's study, the same entrance criteria 
were applied, namely coma1 for at least six hours and 
simultaneous respirator 
                                                           
1Coma was defined as inability to 1) open the eyes, 2) obey verbal 
commands and 3) utter recognizable words, (i.e., maximum scores of 1-5-1 
on the Glascow Coma Scale). G. Teasdale and B. Jennett "Assessment of 
Coma and Impaired Consciousness. A Practical Scale," 2 Lancet 81 (1974). 
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support. A detailed description of the methodology for each portion 
of the study follows. 
Part I: Record Review 
 
The Commission arranged for investigators at four acute care 
hospitals2 (hereafter referred to as Centers 1-4) to review the medical 
records of comatose patients who received respirator assistance during 
a two-month period in 1980. The centers were not selected randomly 
and are not "representative" of the range of hospitals in the United 
States. On the contrary, they were chosen because there were likely to 
be more cases of coma with respirator support at this type of hospital 
and, therefore, the attendant medico-legal issues were especially 
likely to arise. Among the reasons for selecting the particular hospitals 
were: a reasonable number of cases could be expected because these 
centers were acute care facilities in large metropolitan areas; the 
medical records were likely to contain information which the 
Commission sought; participating neurologists at the institutions were 
knowledgeable about the use of brain-based criteria for diagnosing 
death; and the centers were geographically dispersed. Table 1 presents 
an overview of Centers 1 B 4. 
Table 1: 
Overview of Centers in Part I (Record Review) 
    
N umber of Patients 
 
N umber of  
  
 
Approximate 
 
Receiving Respirator 
 
Patients Meeting  
 Center 
 
Number Beds Support 4/1/80.5/31/80 Study Criteria  
 1 
 
350 
 
99 
 
30 
 
 2 
 
425 
 
121 
 
35 
 
 3 
 
900 
 
242 
 
36  
 4 
 
850 
 
152 
 
32 
 
Medical records were reviewed in the following way: Each 
investigator obtained a list of patients over one year of age who had 
received respirator assistance at his or her center between April 1, 
1980 and May 31, 1980. The patient records were then screened to 
determine which patients met the entrance criteria, namely coma for 
at least six hours and simultaneous respirator assistance during the 
two-month period. The record of each subject who met the entrance 
criteria was then reviewed to determine whether 30 days after 
meeting the criteria the subject had died, was discharged or remained 
in the hospital. The condition of patients who remained in the hospital 
30 days after onset of coma and respirator support was abstracted 
from the chart, 
                                                           
 
2 0ne of the four hospitals actually includes two facilities: a center primarily 
serving adults and an associated children's hospital. 
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as was the discharge diagnosis of those who left the hospital within 
the month. Any subject who died after having been discharged was to 
be included as a discharge, not a death. Additional information about 
the neurological status and medical management of those who died 
and their organ donor status was also obtained. The questionnaire 
used in the study is reprinted at pages 102-05 of this appendix. 
The research review committee at each of the participating 
centers gave prior approval to the study. Confidentiality of the 
subjects was preserved. 
Part II: Computerized Data Bases 
The second part of the Commission's empirical work involved 
secondary analysis on the following existing computerized data bases 
on critically ill patients: (1) all patients with severe head trauma 
between April 1979 and March 1980 at an acute care center in a large 
metropolitan area (hereafter Center A); (2) all patients in deep coma 
of nontraumatic origin between April 1976 and March 1977 at Center 
A and at a university-based tertiary care facility (hereafter Center B); 
(3) all patients admitted to the Intensive Care Unit between April 
1979 and March 1980 at a second university-based hospital that 
provides both acute and tertiary care (hereafter Center C). Center C is 
not the primary trauma center in its locale and thus the majority of its 
coma cases are of nontraumatic origin. 
Investigators responsible for the data bases determined which of 
their patients met the criteria of coma and simultaneous respirator 
assistance during the year indicated. The type of data solicited about 
subjects at Centers A, Band C is shown on the forms at pages 106 -07 
of this appendix. The information requested was not uniformly 
available from each of these centers. 
The data available on head trauma subjects at Center A included: 
the one-month and six-month status of subjects; the number and 
management of patients who met neurologic criteria for death 
(irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including 
the brainstem); and whether those declared dead on the basis of such 
criteria were organ donors.3
Less complete information was available on subjects in coma of 
nontraumatic origin at Centers A and B. The one-month and six-
month status of subjects in this data base was provided to the 
Commission. No data on the number of subjects meeting neurologic 
(i.e. brain-based) criteria were available. 
At Center C, the one-month outcome of subjects meeting 
the Commission study criteria was available. The 
 
                                                           
3 Some of these data were obtained by also reviewing medical records 
of subjects identified in the computerized data base. 
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neurologic status, medical management and organ donor status 
of subjects was available on about two-thirds of the subjects who 
died; the charts on the remaining dead subjects were not 
available. 
Because some data from Centers A, Band C were not 
available, not all centers are represented in each of the analyses 
presented. 
RESULTS 
 
Hospitals 1 B 4 in the record review ranged in size from 350 
to 900 beds, and the total number of patients receiving respirator 
support (both comatose and not comatose patients) varied with 
the size of the facility. The number meeting the study criteria of 
coma and simultaneous respirator support was very similar at 
each of the four centers, however, ranging from 30 to 36 patients 
(Table 1). The results from the four centers are aggregated in 
some of the analyses that follow. 
A description of the subjects in Parts I and II of the study is 
provided in Table 2. A total of 133 subjects met the study 
criteria at Centers 1 B 4 in Part I of the study, 93 of these with 
coma of nontraumatic origin and 40 with a traumatic coma. In 
Part II, there were 79 patients in the severe head injury data base 
at Center A who were entered in the study; 57 subjects in the 
nontraumatic data base from Centers A & B; and 47 subjects at 
Center C who met the study criteria. 
1. Status of subjects one and six months after entering study 
Table 3 presents the functional categories of the 133 patients 
at Centers 1 B 4 one month after being entered in the study. About 
two-thirds (89/133) of all subjects at Centers 1 B 4 were dead 
within one month of the onset of coma with respirator support. 
Among the 40 survivors4 were eight subjects in a persistent 
vegetative state (PVS) and 16 who suffered severe disability at 
the end of the month. The remaining 16 survivorsC12 percent of 
all subjectsCachieved a good to moderate recovery within 30 
days. Those who achieved a good outcome were usually in a 
coma due to drug intoxication. The overall rates convey the 
experience with comatose respirator-assisted patients at the acute 
care hospitals. The mortality rate of a population of comatose, 
respirator-supported patients depends, in part, however, on the 
relative proportion of patients with various types of nontraumatic 
causes of coma and those in coma resulting from a severe head 
injury. The results from Centers 1 B 4 broken down by type of 
coma (nontraumatic/traumatic) and the data from the specialized 
data bases in Part II of the 
                                                           
4 The one-month outcome of four subjects discharged within three weeks 
of entering the study is not known. 
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Table 3: 
Functional Status of Subjects at Centers 1 B 4 One Month After Entering Studya/
 
 
  
 
Trauma 
 
Nontrauma 
 
All Cases 
 
  
 
(40) 
 
(93) 
 
(133) 
 
 Dead 
 
17 (42.5%) 
 
72 (77.4%) 
 
89 (66.9%) 
 
 Persistent Vegetative State 
 
4 (10.0) 
 
4 (4.3) 
 
8 (6.0) 
 
 Severe Disability 
 
9 (22.5) 
 
7 (7.5) 
 
16 (12.0) 
 
 Moderate Disability 
 
2 (5.0) 
 
1 (1.0) 
 
3 (2.2) 
 
 Mild Disability 
 
4 (10.0) 
 
0 
 
4 (3.0) 
 
 Good Recovery 
 
2 (5.0) 
 
7 (7.5) 
 
9 (6.7)  
 Unknown 
 
2 (5.0)b/
 
2 (2.1)c/
 
4 (3.0) 
 
a/   Table includes patients who died in hospital, remained hospitalized at the end of the 30-day follow-
up period and who were discharged within 30 days. This latter group are reported as follows: 
discharge diagnosis was used if patient was discharged between day 22 and day 30 of the follow-
up period; patients discharged within the 30 day period with normal function are included under 
"good recovery", 1 patient discharged with mild disability 
12 days after entry (had mild disability 3 months later) is included as mild disability; all other 
discharges are called "unknown" outcome and additional information, when available, is provided 
in the footnotes. 
 
b/   One patient discharged to another hospital in a PVS. considered "terminal" 8 days after meeting 
criteria; one patient with moderate disability 16 days after entry (had mild disability 7 months later). 
c/   One patient discharged to another hospital "in coma, no response to pain," 6 days after meeting 
criteria; one patient discharged with moderate disability 1 week after meeting criteria. 
 
study provide more detailed information about the relative proportion of 
comatose patients who recovered and who died following respiratory 
support. 
a. Nontraumatic 
About 75 percent of subjects in coma of nontraumatic 
origin at Centers 1 B 4 and at Centers A & B died within a month (Table 
2). Centers A & B, however, exclude comas caused by drugs. Eliminating 
drug cases-which tended to recover-from analysis of the data from 
Centers 1 B 4, the mortality rate was about 80%. The one-month mortality 
among the 35 nontraumatic coma patients exclusive of drug-induced 
comas at Center C was 94'percent (Table 2). 
The functional status at six months of the 15 subjects who were alive one 
month after onset of a coma of nontraumatic origin and respirator support 
at Centers A & Bare shown in Table 4. In six months almost all subjects 
in a persistent vegetative state or severely disabled had died, while those 
with better one-month outcomes generally stayed the same or improved. 
The six-month status of only one of the 
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two nontraumatic coma survivors at Center C is known; a PVS patient 
at one month remained in that state at six months. 
b. Traumatic 
About 40 percent of trauma patients at Centers 1 B 4 died within a 
month (Table 3). Mortality among traumatic coma patients at Center A 
was higherC58 percent at one month and 63 percent at six months 
(Table 2). Age is a significant factor in the outcome of coma resulting 
from a head injury and the older age of patients at Center A may well 
explain the increased mortality. Table 5 shows the functional status at 
six months of the 33 subjects at Center A who were alive one month 
after onset of traumatic coma and artificial respiration. Most subjects 
remained in the same functional category or improved slightly at six 
months. One-month and six-month mortality rates of traumatic coma 
subjects at Center C were not calculated separately since there were 
only six such subjects and data about them were limited. 
2. Neurologic deaths and declarations of death 
In the Part I record review, between five and seven subjects each 
center met brain-based criteria of death over the two-month period.5 
The total of 23 such subjects at the four centers represents one-quarter 
of the 89 subjects who died, and 17 percent of the 133 comatose, 
respirator- supported subjects in Part I of the study. During April, May 
and June of the year under study, the total number of hospital deaths in 
the four centers was 453, or an estimated 299 per two-month period. 
The ratio of patients with irreversible cessation of total brain functions 
within 30 days of onset of respirator-assisted coma to total hospital 
deaths is thus 23/299 or eight percent. 
Centers 1 B 4 differed markedly in the extent to which brain-
based criteria were used to declare death (Table 6). Every time a 
subject at Center 2 suffered irreversible cessation of brain functions, 
death was declared on that basis. In contrast, at Center 4 such subjects 
were never declared dead until the cardiopulmonary standard was met. 
In Part II (Table 2), records from Center A on the 46 traumatic 
coma subjects who died showed that 11 (24 percent) fulfilled brain-
based criteria prior to cardiac standstill. In all but one case, death was 
declared on that basis and support of the body was discontinued. Data 
were avail- 
                                                           
5 A chart review of this sort is dependent on the notes in the medical record being 
sufficiently complete to document a retrospective diagnosis. The neurologists 
abstracting data for the study at each center categorized a subject as having been 
"brain dead," if 1) the chart specifically stated that "brain death" had occurred, 
and/or 2) on the basis of the chart notes the neurologist concluded that an irreversible 
loss of all brain functions had occurred. 
 
 
96 Defining Death: Appendix B 
 
 
 
Cases on the dashed line showed no change; 
 those above improved, below worsened. 
 
able on 26 of the 42 subjects at Center C who died. Fourteen of these 26 
subjects met brain-based criteria and in all cases death was declared on 
that basis and support discontinued. Data on the number of nontraumatic 
coma subjects at Centers A & B who suffered irreversible cessation of 
all brain functions were unavailable. All subjects in the Commission's 
study who met brain-based criteria, but were maintained on respirators 
and not declared dead by these criteria, subsequently met 
cardiopulmonary criteria of death. 
The determination that a subject had suffered a permanent loss of all 
brain functions did not alwaysCor even usuallyCtrigger immediate 
termination of support and declaration of death. The amount of time 
support was continued after a diagnosis of irreversible loss of all brain 
functions varied considerably among, and in some cases within, centers. 
At Center A, for example, where ICU beds are scarce, respirators were 
consistently disconnected from dead bodies as soon as the family was 
apprised of the determination. This often occurred in less than an hour 
and, with one exception, within a few hours after the determination had 
been made, which itself followed a period of vigorous medical support 
of hours or even days. In the one ex- 
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ceptional case, respirator support was continued for 12 hours after death 
occurred while the family attempted to decide whether to donate the 
deceased's organs. After 12 hours the family had still not reached a decision 
and the need for the ICU bed led the physicians to discontinue support. In 
contrast, at Center C, several dead bodies were maintained on respirators for 
24, 48, and in one case 72 hours, before death was declared on the basis of 
brain criteria. As a general practice, families at participating centers were 
consulted before death was declared and support terminated. 
 
 
3. Organ donation and use of brain-based criteria 
 The use of neurologic criteria has been linked in popular 
understanding with organ transplantation.6 Data were obtained from centers 
in the Commission's study, to ascertain whether organ donation was the 
primary reason for use of brain criteria. Of the 36 subjects found by the study 
to have been declared dead on the basis of neurologic criteria, only six were 
organ donors; in the vast majority of cases brain criteria were applied 
independently of organ donation considerations.
                                                           
6 Peter McL. Black, "Brain Death II" 299 J.A.M.A. 393, 396 (1978); "Are Some 
Patients Being Done In?" 116 Time 54 (1980). 
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Table 6: 
Use of Brain-Based Criteria at Centers 1 B 4 
 
 
   
   
   
   
 Center 
  
Number  
of  
subjects 
 
Number  
who died  
in hospital  
within 30 days 
  
Number who met  
brain-based  
criteria a
 
Number who  
met criteria  
who were  
declared dead  
on that basis  
  
  
 1  
  
 
30  
 
 
16 (53.3%)  
 
 
6 (20% of sample)  
(37.5% of dead)  
 
 
5 (83.3% of those  
who met brain-  
based criteria) 
 
 2  
  
 
35  
 
 
25 (71.4)  
 
 
   5 (14.3)  
       (20.) 
 
5 (100)  
 
 
 3  
  
 
36  
 
 
23 (63.9)  
 
 
    5 (13.9)  
    (21.7) 
 
2 (40)  
 
 
 4  
  
 
32  
 
 
25 (78.1)  
 
 
     7 (21.9)  
        (28.) 
 
0 (0)  
  
 total all  
 centers 
 
   133  
 
 
89 (66.9)  
 
 
   23 (17.3)  
        (25.8) 
 
12 (52.2)  
 
 
a.  Either as reported in chart or on basis of abstractors' review of notes. 
At centers 2 B 4 official criteria at that hospital was applied; at center 1 where no 
official criteria exist the neurologist reviewing charts made the determination. 
 
Discussion 
 
The Commmission's study provides data on several questions 
relating to the role of respirators and the incidence and medical 
management of respirator-supported comatose patients who 
irreversibly lose all brain functions. Discussion of the Commission's 
findings are organized around the following questions: 
1) What are the relative proportions of comatose, respirator-
supported patients who survive and who die? 
2) What proportion of comatose, respirated patients experience an 
irreversible cessation of all brain functions? 
3) What actions are taken when a patient is found tohave 
permanently lost all brain functions? 
4) What proportion of patients declared dead by brain-based 
criteria are organ donors? 
1. What are the relative proportions of comatose, respirator-
supported patients who survive and who die? 
Death, and specifically death determined by brain-based criteria, 
is a common outcome among comatose, respirator-supported patients. 
In some cases in which respirator support is provided to comatose 
patients, however, the patient survives, sometimes in a persistent 
vegetative 
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state or with another severe disability and other times with less serious 
or no residual damage. In the Commission's study, about two-thirds of 
the 133 subjects (in traumatic and nontraumatic coma) at Centers 1 B 4 
died within a month. At the other end of the spectrum, about 12 percent 
of the subjects achieved a good to moderate recovery.7
The cause of coma, early clinical signs and, at least in the case of 
traumatic coma, the age of the victim affect the patient's prognosis. 
About 20 percent of subjects in coma due to nontraumatic causes 
survived one month after onset of coma and respiratory support. The 
progress reported at one month appears to be a meaningful indicator of 
longer tern outcome. Levy et a1. found that patients in coma of 
nontraumatic origin who survived for one year made most of their 
improvement during the first month.8 Most patients in their series of 
500 nontraumatic coma patients who were alive one year after onset of 
coma were in the same functional category as at one month; some 
improved slightly. 
Unlike nontraumatic coma, in which one-month status is a strong 
predictor of longer term outcome, the six month status of traumatic 
coma patients is a much better indicator of longer term outcome. 
Heiden et a1. report that of 184 patients who survived for a year, 90 
percent achieved their best outcome by six months.9 At Center A about 
40 percent of the comatose respirator-assisted subjects survived six 
months; however, 12 of those 29 survivors were in a persistent 
vegetative state or severely disabled. 
2. What proportion of comatose, respirated patients experience an 
irreversible cessation of all brain functions? 
At each of the four acute care hospitals in Part I of the 
Commission's study, 2 B 4 cases of permanent loss of all brain 
functions occurred each month among patients receiving aggressive 
medical support (including artificial respiration) for comas of 
traumatic and nontraumatic origin. It is interesting to note that the 
proportion of 
 
                                                           
7 Although the study was not designed to test the accuracy of the brain-based 
criteria for determining deathCbut rather to assess the outcome of respirator support 
for a range of comatose patientsCit bears noting that none of the subjects who 
survived ever met those criteria. 
8 David E. Levy, David Bates, John J. Caronna, Niall E.F. Cartlidge, Robin P. Knill-
Jones, Robert H. Lapinski, Burton H. Singer, David A. Shaw and Fred Plum, 
"Prognosis in Nontraumatic Coma," 94 Ann. Int. Med. 293 (1981). This series 
includes 57 subjects in the Commission's study.  
9 James S. Heiden, Richard Small, William Caton, Martin H. Weiss and Theodore 
Kurze, "Severe Head Injury and Outcome: A Prospective Study," in A.J. Popp et al. 
(ed.) Neural Trauma Raven Press, New York (1979). 
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respirator-supported comatose patients who suffered neurologic death 
was similar (about 15 percent) at each center. The incidence of 2 B 4 
cases per month is consistent with a report by Grenvik et al. of 48 
cases of "brain death" over a two-year period at Presbyterian-
University Hospital in Pittsburgh.10 Although the data available on the 
incidence of "brain death" are from only five hospitals, the recurring 
finding of 2 B 4 cases per month is suggestive of the frequency with 
which these cases may be expected to arise at acute care centers in 
major metropolitan areas. 
The Commission's investigations focused on respirator-assisted 
comatose patientsCthe population in which it is possible to meet 
brain-based criteria prior to fulfilling cardiopulmonary criteria of 
death. Even among this population, most fulfilled the 
cardiopulmonary standard for declaring death before a diagnosis of 
irreversible loss of all brain functions was or could have been made. 
The 23 cases of neurologic death at Centers 1 B 4 comprised only one-
fourth of the 89 deaths among respirator-supported comatose patients. 
Similarly, among subjects with traumatic injury at Center A, brain-
based criteria were met in only one-fourth of the deaths. Clearly, 
cardiopulmonary criteria remain the predominant basis for 
determining that death has occurred, even in patients on respirators. 
The number of deaths diagnosed by neurologic as compared to 
cardiopulmonary criteria can reflect medical management decisions. 
For example, a patient who might have met brain-based criteria while 
on a mechanical respirator will instead be declared dead on 
cardiopulmonary grounds if artificial support is not initiated or 
maintained. A few such instances occurred in the Commission's study. 
Another factor affecting the relative proportion of deaths 
declared by cardiopulmonary criteria and neurologic criteria is the 
systemic condition of the subjects receiving support. Older patients, 
for example, are more likely to succumb to cardiac standstill before 
suffering an irreversible loss of all brain functions because, in general, 
their systems are weaker and more difficult to maintain. In some cases 
in the study an initial diagnosis of loss of brain functions was made, 
but before that determination could be confirmed, cardiac standstill 
intervened, despite mechanical respiration. 
 
 
 
                                                           
10 Ake Grenvik, David J. Pawner, James V. Snyder, Michael S. Jastremski, Ralph 
A. Babcock and Micheal Loughhead, "Cessation of Therapy in Terminal Illness 
and Brain Death," 6 Critical Care Med. 284 (1978). 
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3. What actions are taken when a patient is found to have 
permanently lost all brain functions? 
The Commission's data illustrate the wide variation in the extent to 
which brain-based criteria are used to declare death when irreversible 
loss of all brain functions occurs. One center declared all subjects who 
met brain-based criteria dead and discontinued support, while another 
always supported such bodies until cardiac arrest. Practice at other 
centers fell between these extremes: Sometimes a body without brain 
functions was supported and sometimes such a body was declared dead 
and support discontinued. 
Some of the disparities in use of neurologic criteria within and 
among centers may reflect variations in knowledge about and/or 
acceptance of the brain-based standard by physicians and the public. 
Since the practical consequence of failing to cease treatment and 
pronounce death when brain functions cease irreversibly is support of a 
dead body for a brief period (usually less than a week) until cardiac 
standstill occurs, evaluation of whether such continued treatment is a 
major problem or, on the other hand, not a matter of concern at all 
probably varies from individual to individual. 
Incentives to make an appropriate diagnosis and declare death do 
not always seem compelling when professional or public understanding 
is lacking. A climate of public acceptance of the neurologic basis for 
determining death, general legal adoption of that standard, and medical 
recognition of the social and legal acceptance as well as of a unified set 
of reliable medical criteria should result in more consistent 
management of dead bodies. 
4. What proportion of patients declared dead by brain-based 
criteria are organ donors? 
Clearly, advances in organ transplantation were a major impetus in the 
early development of brain-based criteria for death. Nevertheless, the 
Commission's findings that only six of 36 subjects in the Commission's 
surveys who were declared dead by neurologic criteria were organ 
donors illustrates that the criteria are being applied primarily outside 
the context of organ donation. Indeed, considerations such as respect 
for the dead and a desire to make scarce resources available to those 
whom they might benefit are today more important incentives for the 
use of brain-based criteria when traditional criteria for determining 
death cannot be applied. 
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Format for Data Transmission—From  
Computerized Data Sets at Centers A-C 
Simultaneous Criteria for Inclusion: 
Motor response no better than localizing (i.e., less than or equal to 5) 
and Eye opening of none to any stimulus (i.e. score of 1) 
and on ventilator. 
 
Provide the Following in this Order:
Columns Information Codes 
1-4    
 
Ident. 
Number    
5 Hospital 1= 2= 3= 
6-7 Age    
8 Sex 1=Male, 2=Female 
9-14 Date qualifies 
  
Month (2 digits), Day * (2 digits), Year 
   (2 digits) 
15 Period after coma onset for qualification t
  Period * *  
16    Qualifying motor score   
  
  
l=none, 2=extensor, 3=flexor, 
4=withdrawal, 5=localizing 
17     Corresponding verbal score  
  
  
l=none, 2=sounds, 3=words, 
4=phrases, 5=oriented, 9=intubated 
18 Actual 1 month outcome  
  
  
l=dead, 2=vegetative, 3=severe disab, 
4=mob disab, 5=gd rec 
19 Actual 6 month outcome  
  as for 18  
20    Cause of coma 
  
  
l=hyp-isch, 2=subarach, 3=other 
cerebrovasc, 4=hepatic, 5=misc, 
6=drug, 7=trauma 
21 Best pupillary reactivity at time of qualification 
  l=absent, 2=present, 9=unk 
22 Best corneal reflex at time of qualification 
  l=absent, 2=present, 9=unk 
23    Best oculovestibular response at time of qualification 
  l=absent, 2=present, 9=unk 
24 Best oculocephalic response at time of qualification 
  l=absent, 2=present, 9=unk 
25    Spontaneous eye movements at time of qualification 
  l=absent, 2=present, 9=unk 
26-29 
 
 
Best pupils, corneals, oculocephalics, spontaneous 
eye movements, and motor responses all unreactive or 
any reactive at onset, 1, 3, 7 days * * * 
  1 = all absent, 2=any present, 9=unk 
30-33 Oculovestibulars at onset, 1, 3, 7 days 
  1 =absent, 2=present, 9=unk 
34 Time to death Period * *  
35-38 Ventilator used at adm, 1, 3, 7 days 
  l=no, 2=yes, 9=unk 
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39-42 Steroid used at adm, I, 3, 7 days 
   l=no, 2=yes, 9=unk 
43 Brain dead in chart 
   l=no, 2=yes, 9=unk 
44 Kidney donor l=no, 2=yes, 9=unk 
45 EEG l=isoelectric, 2=abnormal, 3=normal, 
   9=unk 
Columns Information Codes 
46-50 
  
Worst pupils, corneals, oculocephalics, spontaneous eye
movements and motor responses all unreactive or any
  reactive at onset, I, 3, 7 days * * * 
   l=all absent, 2=any present, 9=unk 
51 Outcome at discharge from hospital 
   l=vegetative, 2=severe disability, 
   3=moderate disability, 
   4=good recovery 
52 
  Time from onset until discharge from rcu (specify categories you have) 
53 
  Time from onset until discharge from hospital (specify categories you have) 
54 Death declared by 
   1 = brain-based criteria 
   2 = cardiopulmonary criteria 
   3=unknown,9=not dead 
*Omit if unknown  
t"qualifies" refers to meeting entrance criteria 
**O=adm, 1=0-24 hrs, 2=1-3 days, 3=3-7 days, 4=7-14 days, 
5=14d-1m, 6=1-3 m, 7=3-6ni, 8=6-12m 
* * *This reflects best/worst reactivity during intervals: onset-1 day; 1-3 days; 3-7 days. 
 

Statutes on the  
Determination of Death   C 
I. ANALYSIS OF STATUTES 
 
A. Degree of Uniformity 
 
Prior to the recommendation of the Uniform Determination of Death 
Act, five prototype statutes were employed by legislatures: The Kansas 
law adopted in 1970,11the model statute prepared by A.M. Capron and 
L.R. Kass in 1972,12 the proposal put forward in 1975 by the American 
Bar Association,13 the Uniform Brain Death Act, recommended in 1978 
by the National Conference on Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,14 
and the American Medical Association's 1979 proposal.15 Of the 25 
statutes adopted prior to 1981 that are still on the books,16 18 were based 
on the first four models (no state having directly followed the AMA 
proposal). But in many instances the statutes as enacted depart in 
significant ways from the prototypes; in addition to the seven states with 
original legislation not cut to any of the model patterns, almost all of the 
other 18 contain some verbal variations (from minor to major). Thus, if 
anything, the patch- 
                                                           
11 Kan. Stat. Ann. ' 77-202 (Cum. Supp. 1979).  
12 Alexander M. Capron and Leon R. Kass, "A Statutory Definition of the 
Standards for Determining Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal," 121 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 87 (1972), as modified in Alexander M. Capron, "Legal Definition of 
Death," 315 Ann. N.Y.Acad. Sci. 349, 356 (1978). 
13 100 A.B.A. Ann. Report 231-232 (February 1975 Midyear Meeting). 
14 12 Uniform Laws 5 (Supp. 1980). 
15 243 J.A.M.A. 420 (1980) (editorial). 
16 More than 25 statutes were actually adopted prior to 1981 on the determination 
of death, since several states (e.g., Idaho, North Carolina and West Virginia) have 
replaced one statute with another. 
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work appearance of the map in the Report (Figure 3 at page 65) 
overstates the degree of uniformity achieved thus far. 
The prospects for true uniformity are not as bleak as this picture 
might suggest, however. In the first place, the state adoptions seem to 
come in groups. For several years immediately after the first statute 
was adopted in Kansas in 1970,17 other legislatures used that law as 
their starting point: Maryland in 1972,18 and New Mexico and Virginia 
in 1973.19 Similarly, four of the five states that now have on their 
books a statute resembling the ABA proposal acted between 1974 and 
1976; the fifth, Wyoming, adopted its law in 1979.20 The two 
adoptions of the Uniform Brain Death Act came in 1979 and 1980,21 
and both states that have thus far accepted the Uniform Determination 
of Death Act did so within a few months time in 1981.22 Second, 
several states that had enacted statutes, then amended those statutes 
when "uniform" proposals were put forward.23 It is reasonable to 
expect that legislators in the twenty-five states that have accepted the 
brain-based standard as at least one basis for declaring death would be 
amenable to adopting the Uniform Determination of Death Act, which 
recognizes the brain-based standard in the context of a uniform law 
that also incorporates the cardiopulmonary standard. 
Finally, the greatest impediment to uniformity has been the 
multiplicity of proposals. Nonstandard laws accounted for nearly a 
third of the total number of 25 state statutes prior to the recent 
adoption by two states of the new law recommended in the 
Commission's Report. The increasing number of "models" seems to 
have caused a flood rather than an ebb in the tide of idiosyncratic bills. 
Five of the seven nonstandard statutes were enacted since 1977. 
Moreover, in the absence of a single, uniform proposal, the states 
turned increasingly to nonstandard statutes; the five adopted in 1977-
80 represent nearly half of all the statutes adopted (other than 
"Uniform" proposals) during this period. 
B. Scope of Statutes 
1. Single or Multiple Bases for Diagnosis: All of the enacted 
statutes depart from the common law rule that death 
  
  
                                                           
17 Kan. Stat. Ann. ' 77-202 (Cum. Supp. 1979). 
18 Md. Code Ann., Art. 43, ' 54F (1972). 
19 N.M. Stat. Ann. ' 12-2-4 (1978); Va. Code ' 54.325.7 (1979).  
20 Wyo. Stat. ' 35-19-101 (Cum. Supp. 1979). 
21 Nev. Rev. Stat. ' 451.007 (1979); W. Va. Code ' 16.10-1 (Supp. 1980). 
22 Colo. Rev. Stat. ' 12-36-136 (1981); Idaho Code ' 54-1819 (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
23 Idaho Code ' 54-1819 (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
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occurs only when blood flow and breathing have ceased. The statutes 
divide, however, into several groups regarding the grounds for 
determining death that they do recognize. One third of the 27 laws 
presently in force articulate a single, brain-based standard for 
determining death; they are silent on the relationship between this 
statutory, neurological "definition" and the common law, 
cardiopulmonary "definition. " 
In contrast are the laws of 13 states which explicitly provide for 
determinations of death by either the newer, neurological standards or 
the traditional, cardiopulmonary standards. (In some instances the 
statute spells out the relationships between the two standards, in 
others it is left to readers to deduce the relationship.) 
Halfway between these poles are the statutes in four states that 
specify cessation of brain functions as a standard for determining 
death but also accept other, unspecified criteria. Rather than being a 
happy medium, this approach contains the worst of both worlds. On 
the one hand, it seems intended to recognize that the diagnosis of 
death in most cases will not be made by physicians directly measuring 
brain functions. But the means chosen by these statutory drafters to go 
beyond the single, neurological standard creates an impression that 
there may be any number of phenomena called death, of which "brain 
death" is only one. The statutes open up the grounds for determining 
death to an unspecified range of medical (or even nonmedical) 
criteria; the Connecticut statute, for example, recognizes brain-based 
criteria "[w]ithout limiting any other method of determining death."24 
On the other hand, these statutes lack the elegance of the single-
standard statutes. The additional, vaguer language was plainly added 
(sometimes, as in the first of these statutes to be adopted, in 
California,25 through legislative amendment to a bill containing only 
the single, brain-based standard) out of a recognition that death is 
diagnosed in most cases through cardiopulmonary tests rather than 
those that are typically thought of as tests of brain functions. But it 
replaces the elegance of a "brain only" standard (which rests on the 
equation of an absence of spontaneous respiratory and circulatory 
functions with a lack of brain functions) with an open-ended 
recognition of standards of no specified relationship to "brain death." 
Finally, the statute adopted in Oregon26 carries the process of 
expansion one step further. It recognizes irreversible cessation both of 
respiratory/circulatory functions 
                                                           
24 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. ' 19-139i (West. Cum. Supp. 1981). 
25 Cal. Health & Safety Code ' ' 7180-7182 (Deering Supp. 1980). 
26 Or. Rev. Stat. ' 146.087 (1977). 
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and of brain function. But, in addition, it also accepts without 
limitation "criteria customarily used by a person to determine death." 
The proposed Uniform Determination of Death Act specifies both 
cardiopulmonary and brain standards as alternative bases for declaring 
death. These standards exhaust the grounds for such a determination 
and no unspecified, open-ended language is needed or employed. 
2. "Whole" versus "Higher" Brain: The statutes' diversity in 
accepting one or more standards is matched by the range of wording 
used to describe the brain standard. All the laws were apparently 
intended to cover only loss of functioning in the whole brain, not 
merely in a part. This is clearly expressed in about half the states, in 
terms that vary somewhat, including "total and irreversible cessation of 
brain function" (2 states), "irreversible cessation of total brain 
function" (6 states), "irreversible cessation of all functioning of the 
brain" (1 state), and "irreversible cessation of the functioning of the 
entire brain, including the brain stem" (2 states). Some of the statutes 
state merely "no spontaneous brain function" or "an irreversible 
cessation of brain function," which by their failure explicitly to 
exclude some parts of the brain imply cessation of functioning in the 
entire organ. A few of these statutes make this requirement more 
explicit by linking loss of brain functioning with other signs. Virginia's 
statute, for example, speaks of "the absence of spontaneous brain 
functions and spontaneous respiratory functions."27 Spontaneous 
respiration does not occur in the absence of a functioning brain stem. 
The Uniform Determination of Death Act is explicit on this point: 
it requires irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, 
including the brain stem. 
3. Functions: Despite these elements of diversity in their explicit 
scope, the enacted statutes have one important point in common: they 
all provide standards for determining whether death has occurred, not 
the medical criteria or tests for diagnosing whether such standards 
have been met, and they do so by speaking of the "functions" (or 
"functioning") of organ systems, not in terms of any cellular activity 
occurring within those organs. The Uniform Determination of Death 
Act continues this pattern. 
C. Applicability 
1. Purpose: About half the statutes include some language intended to 
frame their purpose: for example, "a person is considered medically 
and legally dead" (4 states), or "for legal and medical purposes" (3 
states), or simply "for all legal purposes" (4 states). None of these 
except for the 
                                                           
27 Va. Code § 54.325.7 (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
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two statutes that are amendments to the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 
those of Florida28  ("for purposes of the Act") and Connecticut (which 
speaks only of potential organ "donors" and not of general 
"individuals"), seems intended to limit the normal application of the 
statute.29
The other states avoided possible confusion by not stating a 
"purpose" for a law intended to be generally applied. The Uniform 
Determination of Death Act likewise contains no such statement of 
"purposes" or range of application. It applies to all determinations of 
death. 
2. Definition versus Permission: Only a few of the statutes are 
actually written as "definitions" in the usual sense. The Oklahoma 
statute is perhaps the best example. It begins straightforwardly: "The 
term 'dead body' means a human body in which there is irreversible 
total cessation of brain function."30 Most of the other 
statutesCincluding a few, such as those of New Mexico31 and Iowa32 
that have the.appearance of a "definition"Care actually statements of 
conditions which, when found upon physical examination to be met, 
establish that an individual has died. 
It is important to note, however, that with only a few exceptions the 
statutes are declaratory and not merely permissive. That is, they 
establish that an individual who has lost X functions irreversibly 
(alternatively, one who has lost X or Y functions irreversibly) has died. 
Several of the nonstandard statutes, however, announce that "a person 
may be pronounced dead" (Georgia),33 that "brain death. . . may be used 
as a sole basis for the determination that a person has died" (North 
Carolina),34 or that "a physician... may make such a determination 'if 
[X] exists" (Oregon).35 These statutes are responsive to medical needs. 
They provide a way out of the dilemma created for physicians and 
families who wish to use vigorous resuscitative measures while also 
seeing the need to be able to pronounce death when these artificial 
means produce breathing and blood flow but the individual has lost all 
brain functions and hence all ability to regain spontaneous respiration. 
But the statutes do not fulfill the need for legal certainty about an 
individual's status, since they make the determination of death 
permissive. 
                                                           
28 Fla. Stat. ' 382.085 (1980). 
29 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. ' 19-139i (West Cum. Supp. 1981). 
30 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, ' 1-301(g) (West Cum. Supp. 1981). 
31 N.M. Stat. Ann. '' 12-2-4 and 5 (1978). 
32 Iowa Code Ann. ' 702.8 (West 1980). 
33 Ga. Code Ann. ' 88.1715.1 (Cum. Supp. 1980) (emphasis added). 
34 N.C. Gen. Stat. ' 90-323 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (emphasis added). 
35 Or. Rev. Stat. ' 146.087 (1977) (emphasis added). 
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The Uniform Determination of Death Act avoids this pitfall. It 
sets forth alternative standards for determining death; when either is 
met, the individual is dead. (This also avoids the awkwardness of 
many existing statutes which state that a person "will be considered 
dead.") In most instances, such a determination would be accompanied 
by an explicit declaration of death by a physician or other qualified 
observer. But when such a contemporaneous determination is for some 
reason impossible, not undertaken or actually withheld, the 
determination could be made after the fact (for example, in a legal 
proceeding where the time of a particular death is a matter of 
importance) based upon all the evidence, including the medical records 
and any postmortem examination. 
D. Miscellaneous 
1. Standard for Action: Four variations appeared in the model 
bills to describe the basis on which the criteria and tests used to 
diagnose death are to be selected and employed. The enacted statutes 
are almost evenly divided between "ordinary standards of medical 
practice" and "usual and customary standards of medical practice." 
These two formulae appear to be synonymous. 
Several states require "reasonable medical standards," which is 
the formula of the Uniform Brain Death Act. Florida blends this with 
the notion of acceptability and expects determinations to "be made in 
accordance with currently accepted reasonable medical standards."36  
The Florida provision highlights the problem with "reasonableness" in 
this context. The latter standard invites lay (jury) evaluation after-the-
fact and for this reason it is seldom used in judging the performance of 
professionals. Instead, the competence of professionals is usually 
measured by whether they came within the boundaries of the theories 
and practices accepted by their professional groups. 
The Uniform Determination of Death Act requires that 
determinations of death be based upon "accepted medical standards." 
Idaho, one of the first two states to adopt the new statute, defined 
accepted medical standards as "the usual and customary procedures of 
the community in which the determination of death is made."37
2. Authority to Act: Most of the existing statutes are framed in terms 
of a determination by a "medical doctor" or "physician." The Uniform 
Determination of Death Act does not explicitly require a physician 
because in some instances (for example, in the case of a death 
occurring in a remote area) actions may have to be taken based upon a 
lay deter- 
                                                           
36 Fla. Stat. ' 382.085 (1980). 
37 Idaho Code ' 54-1819 (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
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mination that breathing and heartbeat have ceased and cannot be 
revived. Protection against inappropriate action by a lay person under 
the statute arises from the requirement mentioned above, that all 
determinations "must be made in accordance with accepted medical 
standards." Such standards would not countenance a nonphysician 
diagnosing that all functions of the entire brain had ceased irreversibly 
for an individual with respirator-supported cardiopulmonary functions 
but lacking consciousness. 
Similarly, the Uniform Determination of Death Act leaves to 
current medical standards to establish the number and specialized 
expertise of the physicians who should perform any particular tests. 
Some of the existing statutesCparticularly those that pay direct attention 
to organ transplantationCspecify that two physicians must participate in 
determining death under the brain-based standard. Some even specify 
the physician's professional qualifications (e.g., Florida: "board-eligible 
or board-certified neurologist, neurosurgeon, internist, pediatrician, 
surgeon, or anesthesiologist,"38 and Virginia: "a consulting physician, who 
shall be duly licensed and a specialist in. the field of neurology, 
neurosurgery, or electroencephalography"39). The protection against 
conflict of interestCthat a physician diagnosing death ought not to 
participate in the transplantation of organs from the deceased.Cis spelled 
out in several statutes.40 Such provisions are duplicative of ' 7(b) of the 
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, which has been adopted in all 
jurisdictions in the United States.41
3. Personal Beliefs: None of the existing statutes provide for a 
"conscience clause" for individuals or their families to "opt out" of the 
law's provisions. This absence is not surprising in a law intended to 
establish every individual's status in society (as "alive" or "dead"). The 
Florida statute does provide, however, for notification of the deceased's 
next of kin "as soon as practicable of the procedures [used] to determine 
death" and for the recording in the medical record of such notice or "the 
attempts to identify and notify the next of kin."42 This provision seems 
intended to avoid or reduce misunderstanding. The need for such a 
provision is not immediately apparent if physicians are following ac- 
                                                           
38 Fla. Stat. ' 382.085 (1980). 
39 Va. Code ' 54.325 (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
40  See e.g. Cal. Health & Safety Code ' ' 7180-7182 (Deering Supp. 1980); Hawaii 
Rev. Stat. ' 327C-1 (Supp. 1980). 
41 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, see 8 Uniform Laws Annat. 608 (1972) at ' 7(b); 
Annot. 76 A.L.R. 3d 890. 
42 Alexander Morgan Capron, "The Development of Law on Human Death," 315 
Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 45, 52 (1978). 
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cepted medical procedures in dealing with patients' relatives and 
maintaining medical records; the provision may have resulted from a 
particular controversy in Florida. In any event, it does not authorize 
the next of kin to insist that any particular diagnostic approach be 
employed in preference to another; such matters are left by the statute 
to medical judgment. 
4. Living Will: In a number of jurisdictions bills have been 
introduced that combine provisions "defining" death with those 
permitting the use of "living wills" or similar directives to physicians 
to cease treatment should a person become incompetent while 
suffering from a terminal illness. In North Carolina a "Natural Death 
Act" combining these features was adopted in 1977.43 That statute was 
criticized as "a virtual invitation to litigation, so many are the problems 
and ambiguities it create[d]."44  The statute was subsequently rewritten 
and reenacted as two separate provisions, with most of the problems in 
the "definition" of death section removed.45
5. Liability: The model statute formulated by the American 
Medical Association insulated from civil liability or criminal 
prosecution (i) any physician (or "other person authorized by law to 
determine death") who acted in accordance with the statute, or (ii) any 
person "who act[ed] in good faith reliance on [such] a 
determination."46 Such preclusion of liability provisions appear in the 
statutes adopted in five states.47 They are redundant of the protection 
already provided by the common law and by accepted rules of 
statutory interpretation. The Uniform Determination of Death Act does 
not include any preclusion of liability provisions. 
                                                           
43 N.C. Adv. Legis. Servo Ch. 815, ' 90-322. 
44 Alexander Morgan Capron, "The Development of Law on Human Death" 315 
Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 45, 52 (1978). 
45 N.C. Gen. Stat. ' 90-323 (Cum. Supp. 1979). 
46  243 J.A.M.A. 420 (1980) (editorial). 
47 Ala. ' 22-31-4 (Cum. Supp. 1979); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 
' 19-139i(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1981); Fla. Stat. ' 382.085(4) (1980); Ga. ' 88-
1715.1(b) (Cum. Supp. 1980); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 447t ' 3 (Vernon 
Cum. Supp. 1980). 
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II. MODEL LEGISLATION 
 
ABA 
The following is the text of the model statute proposed 
by the American Bar Association in 1975: 
For all legal purposes, a human body with irreversible 
cessation of total brain function, according to usual and customary 
standards of medical practice, shall be considered dead. 
100 A.B.A. Ann. Rprt. 231-32 (1978) (February 1975 midyear 
meeting) 
AMA 
The following is the amended model state determination of death 
bill approved at the December 1979 Interim Meeting of the 
American Medical Association: 
 
IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
STATE OF __________________ 
An Act  
To Provide for Determination of Death 
 
Be it enacted by the People of the State of 
represented in the General Assembly: 
 
Section 1. An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible 
cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) 
irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, shall be 
considered dead. A determination of death shall be made in 
accordance with accepted medical standards. 
 
(COMMENT: This section is intended to provide a 
comprehensive statement for determining death in all 
situations, by clarifying and codifying the common law in 
this regard. The two bases set forth in the statute are the only 
medically accepted bases for determining death, and the 
statute is therefore all inclusive. "All functions" of the brain 
means that purposeful activity of the brain, as distinguished 
from random activity in the brain, has ceased. "Entire brain" 
includes both the brain stem and the neocortex and is meant 
to distinguish the concept of neocortical death, which is not 
a valid medical basis for determining death. 
It is recognized that physicians may determine death. It is 
also recognized that in some jurisdictions
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non-physicians i.e. coroners) are empowered to determine death. 
It is the intent of this bill to recognize that under accepted 
medical standards a determination of death based on irreversible 
cessation of brain function may be made only by a physician.) 
Section 2. A physician or any other person authorized by law to 
determine death who makes such determination in accordance with 
Section 1 is not liable for damages in any civil action or subject to 
prosecution in any criminal proceeding for his acts or the acts of others 
based on that determination. 
Section 3. Any person who acts in good faith in reliance on a 
determination of death is not liable for damages in any civil action or 
subject to prosecution in any criminal proceeding for his act. 
(COMMENT: While Section 1 is intended to remove legal 
impediments relating to a declaration of death based on 
medically accepted principles, sections two and three are 
intended to remove inhibitions from making a declaration of 
death based on either of the two standards and also to remove 
inhibitions of hospital personnel from carrying out the direction 
of a physician in this regard by removing the threat of liability. 
These sections do not absolve from liability a person who acts 
negligently or contrary to accepted medical standards.) 
 
Section 4. If any provision of this Act is held by a court to be 
invalid such invalidity shall not affect the remaining provisions of the 
Act, and to this end the provisions of this Act are hereby declared to be 
severable. 
 
Capron-Kass 
 
The following is the modified text of a model bill proposed in 
1972 by Professor Alexander M. Capron and Dr. Leon Kass in an 
article in Volume 121 of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review at 
pages 87-118: 
A person will be considered dead if in the announced opinion of a 
physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice, he has 
experienced an irreversible cessation of respiratory and circulatory 
functions, or in the event that artificial means of support preclude a 
determination that these functions have ceased, he has experienced an 
irreversible cessation of total brain functions. Death will have occurred 
at the time when the relevant functions ceased. 
A.M. Capron, "Legal Definition of Death," 315 Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 
349, 356 (1978). 
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Uniform Brain Death Act 
 
The following is a proposal approved and recommended for enactment 
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at 
its Annual Conference on July 28-August 4, 1978: 
Section 1. [Brain Death.] For legal and medical purposes, an 
individual who has sustained irreversible cessation of all functioning of 
the brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determination under this 
section must be made in accordance with reasonable medical standards. 
Comment 
 
This section legislates the concept of brain death. The Act does not 
preclude a determination of death under other legal or medical criteria, 
including the traditional criteria of cessation of respiration and 
circulation. Other criteria are practical in cases where artificial life-
support systems are not utilized. Even those criteria are indicative of 
brain death. 
"Functioning" is a critical word in the Act. It expresses the idea of 
purposeful activity in all parts of the brain, as distinguished from random 
activity. In a dead brain, some meaningless cellular processes, detectable 
by sensitive monitoring equipment, could create legal confusion if the 
word "activity" were substituted for "functioning." 
Section 2. [Short Title.] This Act may be cited as the Uniform Brain 
Death Act.  
Uniform Determination of Death Act 
The following is the text of the statute approved by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at its Annual 
Conference on July 26-August 1, 1980, by the American Medical 
Association on October 19, 1980, by the President's Commission on 
November 7, 1980, and by the American Bar Association on February 
10, 1981 to supersede the existing "model" bills: 
Section 1. [Determination of Death.] An individual who has 
sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory 
functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, 
including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must be made 
in accordance with accepted medical standards. 
Section 2. [Uniformity of Construction and Application.] This Act 
shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make 
uniform the law with respect to the subject of this Act among states 
enacting it. 
Section 3. [Short Title.] This Act may be cited as the Uniform 
Determination of Death Act. 
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III: STATE LEGISLATION ADOPTED 1970-
1981 
 
Alabama 
 
' 22-31-1. Standards and procedures for determination of 
death generally. 
(a) A person is considered medically and legally dead if, in the 
opinion of a medical doctor licensed in Alabama, based on usual and 
customary standards of medical practice, in the community, there is no 
spontaneous respiratory or cardiac function and there is no expectation 
of recovery of spontaneous respiratory or cardiac function. 
(b) In the case when respiratory and cardiac function are 
maintained by artificial means, a person is considered medically and 
legally dead if, in the opinion of a medical doctor licensed in Alabama, 
based on usual and customary standards of medical practice in the 
community for the determination by objective neurological testing of 
total and irreversible cessation of brain function, there is total and 
irreversible cessation of brain function. Death may be pronounced in 
this circumstance before artificial means of maintaining respiratory 
and cardiac function are terminated. In the case described in this 
subsection, there shall be independent confirmation of the death by 
another medical doctor licensed in Alabama. (Acts 1979, No. 79-165, 
' 1.) 
' 22-31-2. Use of other methods. 
Nothing in this chapter shall prohibit a physician from using other 
procedures based on usual and customary standards of medical 
pract e for determining death as the exclusive basis for pronouncing a ic
person dead. (Acts 1979, No. 79-165, '1.)
  
' 22-31-3. Procedure where part of body to be used for 
                    transplantation 
(a) When a part of a donor is proposed to be used for 
transplantation pursuant to article 3 of chapter 19 of this title and the 
death of the donor is determined as set forth in section 22-31-1, there 
shall be an independent confirmation of the death by another medical 
doctor licensed in Alabama. Neither the physician making the 
determination of death nor the physician making the independent 
confirmation shall participate in the procedures for removing or 
transplanting a part. 
(b) When a part of a donor is proposed to be used for 
transplantation pursuant to article 3 of chapter 19 of this title and the 
death of the donor is determined as set forth in 
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section 22-31-1, complete patient medical records shall be kept, 
maintained and preserved. (Act 1979, No. 79-165, ''3,4.) 
' 22-31-4. Liability for acts. 
A person who acts in accordance with the terms of this chapter is 
not liable for damages in any civil action or subject to prosecution in 
any criminal proceeding for his act. (Acts 1979, No. 79-165, ' 5.) 
Ala. Code ' ' 22-31-1 through 22-31-4 (Cum. Supp. 1979) 
(Effective June 5, 1979). 
 
Alaska 
Sec. 09.65.120. Definition of death. A person is considered 
medically and legally dead if, in the opinion of a medical doctor 
licensed or exempt from licensing under AS 08.64, based on ordinary 
standards of medical practice, there is no spontaneous respiratory or 
cardiac function and there is no expectation of recovery of 
spontaneous respiratory or cardiac function or, in the case when 
respiratory and cardiac functions are maintained by artificial means, a 
person h. considered medically and legally dead, if, in the opinion of a 
medical doctor licensed or exempt from licensing under AS 08.64, 
based on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is no 
spontaneous brain function. Death may be pronounced in this 
circumstance before artificial means of maintaining respiratory and 
cardiac function are terminated. (' 1 ch 8 SLA 1974) 
Alaska Stat. ' 09.65.120 (Cum. Supp. 1980) 
 
Arkansas 
82-537. Death defined. -A person is legally dead when the brain has 
irreversibly ceased to function and there is an absence of spontaneous 
breath. [Acts. 1979, No. 99, ' 1] 
82-538. Standard of medical practice. -The diagnosis of death as 
defined in this ACT [' ' 82-537, 82-538] shall be made using ordinary 
standards of medical practice. [Acts 1979, No. 99, ' 2] 
Ark. Stat. Ann. '' 82-537-82-538 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (Effective February 
11, 1979) 
California  
'7180. Pronouncement on determining cessation of brain 
            function: Confirmation: Other procedures. 
A person shall be pronounced dead if it is determined by a physician 
that the person has suffered a total and irreversible cessation of brain 
function. There shall be independent confirmation of the death by 
another physician. 
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Nothing in this chapter shall prohibit a physician from using other 
usual and customary procedures for determining death as the exclusive 
basis for pronouncing a person dead. 
§ 7181. Confirmation in event of transplantation under Uniform 
Anatomical Gift Act: Restriction on physician's participation 
in removal and transplantation. 
When a part of the donor is used for direct transplantation 
pursuant to the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (Chapter 3.5, 
commencing with Section 7150) and the death of the donor is 
determined by determining that the person has suffered a total and 
irreversible cessation of brain function there shall be an independent 
confirmation of the death by another physician. Neither the physician 
making the determination of death under Section 7155.5 nor the 
physician making the independent confirmation shall participate in the 
procedures for removing or transplanting a part. 
§ 7182. Patient medical records. 
Complete patient medical records required of a health facility 
pursuant to regulations adopted by the department in accordance with 
Section 1275 shall be kept, maintained, and preserved with respect to 
the requirements of this chapter when a person is pronounced dead by 
determining that the person has suffered a total and irreversible 
cessation of brain function. 
 
Cal. Health & Safety Code § § 7180-7182 (Deering Supp. 
1980) 
(Added Stats. 1974 ch 1524 § 1, effective September 27, 1974). 
 
 
Colorado 
12-36-136. Determination of death. 
(1) An individual is dead if: 
(a) He has sustained irreversible cessation of circulatory and 
respiratory function; or 
(b) He has sustained irreversible cessation of all functions of the 
entire brain, including the brain stem. 
(2) A determination of death under this section shall be in 
accordance with accepted medical standards. 
SECTION 2. Safety clause. The general assembly hereby finds, 
determines, and declares that this act is necessary for the immediate 
preservation of the public peace, health, and safety. 
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-36-136 (1981). 
(Approved May 21, 1981) 
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 Connecticut 
§ 19-139i. Acceptance and rejection of gift. Determination of time of 
death. Civil and criminal liability. Approved by 
medical examiner or coroner. 
(b) The time of death shall be determined by two physicians who 
attend the donor at his death, or if none, two physicians who certify 
death, who shall use generally recognized and accepted scientific and 
clinical means to determine such time of death. Without limiting any 
other method of determining death, a donor may be pronounced dead 
if two physicians determine, in accordance with the usual and 
customary standards of medical practice, that the donor has suffered a 
total and irreversible cessation of all brain function. A total and 
irreversible cessation of all brain function shall mean that the heart 
and lungs of the donor cannot function, and are not functioning, 
without artificial supportive measures. The physicians who so certify 
shall not participate in the procedures for removing or transplanting a 
part. No organ shall be removed for transplantation until death has 
been pronounced. 
(c) A person who acts in good faith in accordance with the terms 
of sections 19-139a and 19-139c to 19-139j, inclusive, shall not be 
liable for damages in any civil action or subject to prosecution in any 
criminal proceeding for his act. 
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 19-139i (West Cum. Supp. 1981) (1979, 
P.A. 79-556 amended subsec. (b) by inserting the second, third and 
fifth sentences.) 
Florida 
§ 382.085. Recognition of brain death under certain circumstances 
 
(1) For legal and medical purposes, where respiratory and circulatory 
functions are maintained by artificial means of support so as to 
preclude a determination that these functions have ceased, the 
occurrence of death may be determined where there is the irreversible 
cessation of the functioning of the entire brain, including the brain 
stem, determined in accordance with this section. 
(2) Determination of death pursuant to this section shall be made in 
accordance with currently accepted reasonable medical standards by 
two physicians licensed under chapter 458 or chapter 459. One 
physician shall be the treating physician, and the other physician shall 
be a board-eligible or board-certified neurologist, neurosurgeon, 
internist, pediatrician, surgeon, or anesthesiologist. 
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(3) The next of kin of the patient shall be notified as soon as 
practicable of the procedures to determine death under this section. 
The medical records shall reflect such notice; if such notice has not 
been given, the medical records shall reflect the attempts to identify 
and notify the next of kin. 
(4) No recovery shall be allowed nor shall criminal proceedings be 
instituted in any court in this state against a physician or licensed 
medical facility that makes a determination of death in accordance 
with this section or which act in reliance thereon, if such determination 
is made in accordance with the accepted standard of care for such 
physician or facility set forth in s. 768.45. Except for a diagnosis of 
brain death, the standard set forth in this section is not the exclusive 
standard for determining death or for the withdrawal of life-support 
systems. (Added by Laws 1980, c. 80-216, ' 1) 
Fla. Stat. ' 382.085 (1980). 
(Effective October 1, 1980). 
 
Georgia 
'88-1715.1 Determination of death 
 (a) A person may be pronounced dead if it is determined that the 
person has suffered an irreversible cessation of brain function. There 
shall be independent confirmation of the death by another physician. 
(b) A person who acts in good faith in accordance with the provisions 
of subsection (a) shall not be liable for damages in any civil action or 
subject to prosecution in any criminal proceeding for such act. 
(c) The criteria for determining death authorized in subsection (a) 
shall be cumulative to and shall not prohibit the use of other medically 
recognized criteria for determining death. 
(Acts 1975. p. 1629)  
Ga. Code Ann. ' 88-1715.1 (Cum. Supp. 1980) 
(Adopted April 28, 1975) 
 
Hawaii 
' 327C-1. Determination of Death. 
 (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a person shall 
be considered dead if in the announced opinion of a physician licensed 
under chapter 453, based on ordinary standards of current medical 
practice the person has 
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experienced irreversible cessation of spontaneous respiratory and 
circulatory functions. Death will have occurred at the time when the 
irreversible cessation of the functions first coincided. 
(b) In the event that artificial means of support preclude a 
determination that respiratory and circulatory functions have ceased, a 
person shall be considered dead if, in the opinion of an attending 
physician licensed under chapter 453, and of a consulting physician 
licensed under chapter 453, based on ordinary standards of current 
medical practice, the person has experienced irreversible cessation of 
brain function. The opinions of the physicians shall be evidenced by 
signed statements. Death will have occurred at the time when the 
irreversible cessation of brain function first occurred. Death shall be 
pronounced before artificial means of support are withdrawn and 
before any vital organ is removed for purposes of transplantation. 
 
(c) When a part of a donor is used for direct organ transplantation 
under chapter 327, and the donor's death is established by determining 
that the donor experienced irreversible cessation of brain function, the 
determination shall only be made under subsection (b) of this section. 
The physicians making the determination of death shall not participate 
in the procedures for removing or transplanting a part, or in the care of 
any recipient. 
(d) All death determinations in the State shall be made pursuant to this 
section and shall apply to all purposes, including but not limited to 
civil and criminal actions, any laws to the contrary notwithstanding, 
provided that presumptive deaths under the Uniform Probate Code 
shall not be affected by this section. 
 (e) The director of health shall convene in every odd-numbered year, a 
committee which shall be composed of representatives of appropriate 
general and specialized medical professional organizations, licensed 
attorneys, and members of the public. The committee shall review 
medical practice, legal developments, and other appropriate matters to 
determine the continuing viability of this section and shall submit a 
report of its findings and recommendations to the legislature, prior to 
the convening of the regular session held in each even-numbered year. 
[1978, c 248, ' 1; am L 1979, C 193; ' 1] 
 
Hawaii Rev. Stat. ' 327 C-1 (Supp. 1980) 
(L 1979 substituted "person" for "human body" in subsections (a) and 
(b), deleted reference to neurologist and neurosurgeon from subsection 
(b), and rephrased last sentence of subsection (c).) 
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Idaho 
54-1819. Definition and procedure for determination of death. 
(1) An individual who has sustained either (a) irreversible cessation of 
circulatory and respiratory functions, or (b) irreversible cessation of 
all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. 
(2) A determination of death must be made in accordance with 
accepted medical standards which mean the usual and customary 
procedures of the community in which the determination of death is 
made. [I.C., ' 54-1819, as added by 1981, ch. 258, ' 2, p. 549.] 
Former ' 54-1819 (1977, ch. 130, ' 1, p. 276) was repealed by S.L. 
1981, ch. 258, ' 1. 
Illinois 
' 302 Definitions 
(b) "Death" means for the purposes of the Act, the irreversible 
cessation of total brain function, according to usual and customary 
standards of medical practice. 
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 1101/2 '302 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1978) 
(Effective October 1, 1975) 
 
 
 
 
Iowa  
702.8 Death. 
"Death" means the condition determined by the following standard: A 
person will be considered dead if in the announced opinion of a 
physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice, that 
person has experienced an irreversible cessation of spontaneous 
respiratory and circulatory functions. In the event that artificial means 
of support preclude a determination that these functions have ceased, 
a person will be considered dead if in the announced opinion of two 
physicians, based on ordinary standards of medical practice, that 
person has experienced an irreversible cessation of spontaneous brain 
functions. Death will have occurred at the time when the relevant 
functions ceased. 
Acts 1976 (66 G.A.) ch. 1245, ch. 1 ' 208 
Iowa Code Ann. ' 702.8 (West 1980) 
(Effective January 1, 1978) 
Statutes on the Determination of Death 127 
 
 
Kansas 
77-202. Definition of death. 
A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the 
opinion of a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical 
practice, there is the absence of spontaneous respiratory and 
cardiac function and, because of the disease or condition which 
caused, directly or indirectly, these functions to cease, or because 
of the passage of time since these functions ceased, attempts at 
resuscitation are considered hopeless; and, in this event, death will 
have occurred at the time these functions ceased; or 
A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the 
opinion of a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical 
practice, there is the absence of spontaneous brain function; and if 
based on ordinary standards of medical practice, during reasonable 
attempts to either maintain or restore spontaneous circulatory or 
respiratory function in the absence of aforesaid brain function, it 
appears that further attempts at resuscitation or supportive 
maintenance will not succeed, death will have occurred at the time 
when these conditions first coincide. Death is to be pronounced 
before any vital organ is removed for purposes of transplantation. 
These alternative definitions of death are to be utilized for all 
purposes in this state, including the trials of civil and criminal 
cases, any laws to the contrary notwithstanding. 
Kan. Stat. Ann. ' 77-202 (Cum. Supp. 1979) 
(K.S,A. ' 77-202; L. 1979, ch. 199, ' 11; July 1. Deleted the 
provision requiring the pronouncement of death before artificial 
means of supporting respiratory and circulatory functions are 
terminated.) 
(Enacted 
1970) 
 
 
Louisiana 
'111. Definition of death. 
A person will be considered dead if in the announced opinion of a 
physician, duly licensed in the state of Louisiana based on ordinary 
standards of approved medical practice, the person has experienced 
an irreversible cessation of spontaneous respiratory and circulatory 
functions. In the event that artificial means of support preclude a 
determination that these functions have ceased, a person will be 
considered dead if in the announced opinion of a physician, duly 
licensed in the state of Louisiana based upon ordinary standards of 
approved medical practice, the person has experienced an 
irreversible total cessation of brain function. Death will have 
occurred at the time when the rel- 
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evant functions ceased. In any case when organs are to be used in a 
transplant, then an additional physician, duly licensed in the state of 
Louisiana not a member of the transplant team, must make the 
pronouncement of death. 
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. ' 9:111 (West Cum. Supp. 1981) (Added 
by Acts 1976, No. 233, '1) 
 
Maryland 
' 54F. When person considered medically and legally dead. 
(a) A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, based 
on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is the absence of 
spontaneous respiratory and cardiac function and, because of the 
disease or condition which caused, directly or indirectly, these 
functions to cease, or because of the passage of time since these 
functions ceased, attempts at resuscitation are considered hopeless; 
and, in this event, death will have occurred at the time these functions 
ceased; or 
(b) A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the 
opinion of a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical 
practice and because of a known disease or condition, there is the 
absence of spontaneous brain function; and if based on ordinary 
standards of medical practice, during reasonable attempts to either 
maintain or restore spontaneous circulatory or respiratory function in 
the absence of spontaneous brain function, it appears that further 
attempts at resuscitation or supportive maintenance will not succeed, 
death will have occurred at the time when these conditions first 
coincide. Death is to be pronounced before artificial means of 
supporting respiratory and circulatory function are terminated and 
before any vital organ is removed for purposes of transplantation. 
(c) These alternative definitions of death are to be utilized for all 
purposes in this State, including the trials of civil and criminal cases, 
any laws to the contrary notwithstanding. (1972, ch. 693). 
Md. Ann. Code art. 43, ' 54F (1980) 
(Effective July 1, 1972) 
Michigan 
'14.15(1021) Determination of death; means; time of death.  
SEC. 1. A person will be considered dead if in the announced opinion 
of a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice in the 
community, there is the irreversible cessation of spontaneous 
respiratory and circu- 
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latory functions. If artificial means of support preclude a determination 
that these functions have ceased, a person will be considered dead if in 
the announced opinion of a physician, based on ordinary standards of 
medical practice in the community, there is the irreversible cessation 
of spontaneous brain functions. Death will have occurred at the time 
when the relevant functions ceased. (MCL 
'333.1021.) 
'14.15(1022) Pronouncement of death before termination 
 of life support systems. 
SEC. 2. Death is to be pronounced before artificial means of 
supporting respiratory and circulatory functions are terminated. 
(MCL ' 3333.1022.) 
'14.15(1023) Means of determining death, use. 
SEC. 3. The means of determining death in section 1 shall be used 
for all purposes in this state, including the trials of civil and criminal 
cases. (MCL '333.1023.) 
Statutory reference. Section 8b of Act No. 343 of 1925, above 
referred to, is ' 14.228 (2). 
Mich. Stat. Ann. ' 14.15 (1021 to 1024) (Cum. Supp. 1981) 
 
Montana 
50-22-101. Definition of death. 
A human body with irreversible cessation of total brain function as 
determined according to usual and customary standards of medical 
practice, is dead for all legal purposes. 
Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. ' 50-22-101 (1978) 
(Enacted 69-7201 by Sec. 1, Ch. 228, L. 1977, R.C.M. 1947, 69-
7201.) 
(Adopted April 4, 1977) 
 
 
 
Nevada 
' 451.007. Definition of death for legal, medical purposes. 
1. For legal and medical purposes, a person who has sustained 
irreversible cessation of all functioning of the brain, including the 
brain stem, is dead. A. determination under this section must be made 
in accordance with reasonable medical standards. 
2. This section may be cited as the Uniform Brain Death Act. 
Nev. Rev. Stat. ' 451.007 (1979) 
(Added to NRS by 1979, 226) 
(Approved, April 20, 1979) 
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New Mexico  
12-2-4. Death defined. 
 A. For all medical, legal and statutory purposes, death of a human 
being occurs when, and "death," "dead body," "dead person" or any 
other reference to human death means that: 
(1) based on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is the 
absence of spontaneous respiratory and cardiac function and, because 
of the disease or condition which caused, directly or indirectly, these 
functions to cease, or because of the passage of time since these 
functions ceased, there is no reasonable possibility of restoring 
respiratory or cardiac functions; in this event death occurs at the time 
respiratory or cardiac functions ceased; or 
    (2) in the opinion of a physician, based on ordinary 
standards of medical practice: 
            (a) because of a known disease or condition there is 
the absence of spontaneous brain function; and 
(b) after reasonable attempts to either maintain or restore 
spontaneous circulatory or respiratory functions in the absence of 
spontaneous brain function, it appears that further attempts at 
resuscitation and supportive maintenance have no reasonable 
possibility of restoring spontaneous brain function; in this event death 
will have occurred at the time when the absence of spontaneous brain 
function first occurred. Death is to be pronounced pursuant to this 
paragraph before artificial means of supporting respiratory or 
circulatory functions are terminated and before any vital organ is 
removed for purposes of transplantation in compliance with the 
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act [24-6-1 to 24-6-9 NMSA 1978]. 
B. The alternative definitions of death in Paragraphs (1) and (2) of 
Subsection A of this section are to be utilized for all purposes in this 
state, including but not limited to civil and criminal actions, 
notwithstanding any other law to the contrary. 
 
12-2-5. Death defined; presumptive decedents. 
Presumptive decedents under Section 31-41-1 NMSA 1953 shall not 
be affected by this act [12-2-4, 12-2-5 NMSA 1978]. 
N.M. Stat. Ann. ' 12-2-4 (1978) 
(1953 Comp., ' 1-2-2.2, enacted by Laws 1973, Ch. 168,'' 1-22) 
(Laws 1973, Ch. 168 contains no effective date provision, but was 
enacted at a session which adjourned on March 17, 1973.) 
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North Carolina 
' 90-323. Death; determination by physician. 
The determination that a person is dead shall be made by a 
physician licensed to practice medicine applying ordinary and 
accepted standards of medical practice. Brain death, defined as 
irreversible cessation of total brain function, may be used as a sole 
basis for the determination that a person has died, particularly when 
brain death occurs in the presence of artificially maintained respiratory 
and circulatory functions. This specific recognition of brain death as a 
criterion of death of the person shall not preclude the use of other 
medically recognized criteria for determining whether and when a 
person has died. (1979, c. 715, s. 3.) 
N.C. Gen. Stat. ' 90-323 (Cum. Supp. 1979) 
 
Oklahoma 
' 1-301. Definitions. As used in this article: 
(g) The term "dead body" means a human body in which there is 
irreversible total cessation of brain function; and if, based upon 
ordinary standards of medical practice, during reasonable attempts to 
either maintain or restore spontaneous circulatory or respiratory 
function in the absence of aforesaid brain function, it appears that 
further attempts at resuscitation or supportive maintenance will not 
succeed, death will have occurred at the time when these conditions 
first coincide. Death is to be pronounced before artificial means of 
supporting respiratory and circulatory function are terminated and 
before any vital organ is removed for purposes of transplantation. 
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, ' 1-103 (g) (West Cum. Supp. 1981) 
(Effective April 28, 1975) 
 
Oregon 
146.087 Criteria for determination of death. 
In addition to criteria customarily used by a person to determine 
death, when a physician licensed to practice medicine under ORS 
chapter 677 acts to determine that a person is dead, he may make such 
a determination if irreversible cessation of spontaneous respiration and 
circulatory function or irreversible cessation of spontaneous brain 
function exists. [1975 c. 565 ' 1] 
Or. Rev. Stat. ' 146.087 (1977) 
Tennessee 53.459. 
Death Defined. 
For all legal purposes, a human body, with irreversible 
cessation of total brain function, according to the usual and 
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customary standards of medical practice, shall be considered dead. 
[Acts 1976 (Adj. S.), ch. 780, ' 1.] 
Tenn. Code Ann. ' 53-459 (Cum. Supp. 1980) 
(Adopted March 18, 1976) 
 
Texas 
Art. 4447t. Determination of death. 
Section 1. (a) A person will be considered legally dead if, based on 
ordinary standards of medical practice, there is the irreversible 
cessation of spontaneous respiratory and circulatory functions. 
(b) If artificial means of support preclude a determination that 
spontaneous respiratory and circulatory functions have ceased, a 
person will be considered legally dead if in the announced opinion of 
a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is 
the irreversible cessation of all spontaneous brain function. Death 
will have occurred at the time when the relevant functions ceased. 
(c) Death is to be pronounced before artificial means of 
supporting respiratory and circulatory functions are terminated. 
Section 2. A physician who determines death in accordance with 
the provisions of Section l(b) of this Act is not liable for damages in 
any civil action or subject to prosecution in any criminal proceeding 
for his or her acts or the actions of others based on that determination. 
Section 3. A person who acts in good faith in reliance on a 
determination of death by a physician is not liable for damages in any 
civil action or subject to prosecution in any criminal proceeding for 
his or her act. 
Act 1979, 66th Leg., p. 368, ch. 165. 
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4447t (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1980) 
(Effective May 15, 1979) 
 
Virginia 
' 54-325.7. When person deemed medically and legally dead. 
A person shall be medically and legally dead if, (a) in the opinion of a 
physician duly authorized to practice medicine in this 
Commonwealth, based on the ordinary standards of medical practice, 
there is the absence of spontaneous respiratory and spontaneous 
cardiac functions and, because of the disease or condition which 
directly or indirectly caused these functions to cease, or because of 
the passage of time since these functions ceased, attempts at 
resuscitation 
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would not, in the opinion of such physician, be successful in restoring 
spontaneous life-sustaining functions, and, in such event, death shall 
be deemed to have occurred at the time these functions ceased; or (b) 
in the opinion of a consulting physician, who shall be duly licensed 
and a specialist in the field of neurology, neurosurgery, or 
electroencephalography, when based on the ordinary standards of 
medical practice, there is the absence of spontaneous brain functions 
and spontaneous respiratory functions and, in the opinion of the 
attending physician and such consulting physician, based on the 
ordinary standards of medical practice and considering the absence of 
spontaneous brain functions and spontaneous respiratory functions and 
the patient's medical record, further attempts at resuscitation or 
continued supportive maintenance would not be successful in restoring 
such spontaneous functions, and, in such event, death shall be deemed 
to have occurred at the time when these conditions first coincide. 
Death, as defined in subsection (b) hereof, shall be pronounced by the 
attending physician and recorded in the patient's medical record and 
attested by the aforesaid consulting physician. 
Notwithstanding any statutory or common law to the contrary, 
either of these alternative definitions of death may be utilized for all 
purposes in the Commonwealth, including the trial of civil and 
criminal cases. 
(Code 1950, ' 32-364.3:1; 1973, c. 252; 1979, c. 720) 
Va. Code ' 54-325.7 (Cum. Supp. 1981) 
(Effective March 13, 1973) 
 
West Virginia 
16-19-1. Definitions. 
(c) "Death" means that a person will be considered dead if in 
the announced opinion of the attending physician, made in accordance 
with reasonable medical standards, the patient has sustained 
irreversible cessation of all functioning of the brain. 
W. Va. Code ' 16-19-1 (Supp. 1980) 
(Effect of amendment of 1980.- The amendment, in subsection (c), 
substituted the language beginning "made in accordance with 
reasonable medical standards" for "based on ordinary standards of 
medical practice, the patient has experienced an irreversible cessation 
of spontaneous respiratory and circulatory function; or, in the event 
that artificial means of support preclude a determination that these 
functions have ceased, a person will be considered dead if in the 
announced opinion of a physician, based on ordinary standards of 
medical practice, the patient has experienced an irreversible cessation 
of spontaneous brain functions," 
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and deleted the former second paragraph, which read: "Death will 
have occurred at the time when the relevant functions ceased.") 
 
Wyoming 
' 35-19-101. Brain death; determination in accordance with 
medical standards. 
For all legal purposes, a human body, with irreversible cessation 
of total brain function, including the brain stem, according to the 
usual and customary standards of medical practice, is dead. Total 
brain function shall mean purposeful activity of the brain as 
distinguished from random activity. 
(Laws 1979, ch. 101, ' 1.) 
Wyo. Stat. ' 35-19-101 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (Effective February 
22, 1979) 
 
 
Judicial Developments 
in the "Definition" 
of Death D
Judicial decisions "defining" death are of three types: those that 
adhere to the cardiopulmonary standard, those that updated the 
cardiopulmonary standard prior to any legislative "modernization," 
and those that interpret recent statutes which include brain-based 
language. 
I. Traditional Rulings 
The courts long ago established that "the cessation of life" was to 
be judged primarily by "a total stoppage of the circulation of the 
blood," in the words of Black's Law Dictionary.1 Black'sCwhich is not 
usually a leading legal authorityCis associated with this "definition" 
because the dictionary language was repeated in haec verba in a 
number of judicial opinions. Indeed, this interpretation was reiterated 
despite the development of medical techniques that could revive 
respiration and circulation in a corpse. Though medical evidence was 
presented in litigation contradicting the old "definition," courts into the 
1970's favored consistency over modernity in the law. The most recent 
example of this is State v. Johnson: 
There are presently no statutory provisions in the Ohio 
Revised Code which define death. . . . [W]hile the present trend 
is toward adoption of some phase of the general "brain death" 
theory, most states, including Ohio, have not yet altered the 
traditional common law approach that death means the 
permanent cessation of all vital functions and the fact and time 
of its occurrence are questions for the jury.2
                                                           
1 Black's Law Dictionary, (4th ed.) West Publishing Co., St. Paul, .1inn., (1968) at 488, 
but see Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.) Vest Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn. (1979) at 
170, which now includes an entry under the heading "brain death." 
2 State v. Johnson, 395 N.E.2d 368, 371-72 (Ohio 1977). 
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Nevertheless, courts of late have generally -been willing either to "update" the 
"definition" of death or to avoid the incongruous results that would follow from 
applying cardiopulmonary standards in determining death for individuals on 
respirator support. 
 
II. Judicial Revisions of the Law 
A. Criminal Cases Updating the Common Law 
Opportunities to update the common law in the absence of a statutory 
definition have arisen in two major contexts. The first is in murder trials where 
defendants have maintained that the victim of their act was still "alive" when 
artificial life-support systems were removed. This defense has (with one reported 
exception at the trial level, which was thereafter reversed1) been uniformly rejected 
by the judiciary.2 Courts have articulated three reasons for regarding the defendant 
as responsible for the victim's death: "proximate cause," "cause in fact," and a 
judicial recognition of a new standard of death. Only the last group of cases 
explicitly updates the common law rules. 
The "proximate cause" argument relies upon the well accepted legal principle 
that a criminal defendant is liable for the natural consequences of his act.3 Even 
negligent care by physicians attending the victim of an alleged criminal act does 
not relieve the defendant from responsibility for the consequences. Thus, even if 
the defendants in these cases were correct that their victims had still been legally 
alive when artificial respiratory support systems were removed, their indictments 
and convictions would not thereby be invalid. "The state is only required to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's acts were 'a substantial factor in 
producing the death'."4 (Moreover, in the case that emphasized this view most 
clearly, People v. Olson,5 the Illinois court found the physicians' decision to 
withdraw heart-lung support measures to be reasonable.)  
 
                                                           
1 People v. Flores, No. 7246-C (Sonoma County, Cal., Super. Ct. 1974). After Flores' indictment was 
reinstated, he was tried and convicted of vehicular manslaughter and felony drunk driving. The light 
sentence he received (less than five months) was attributed by the prosecutor to "the uncertain state of 
the case and statutory law on the subject of brain death." Frank J. Veith, Jack M. Fein, Moses D. 
Tendler, Robert M. Veatch, Marc A. Kleiman & George Kalkines, "Brain Death: II. A Status Report of 
Legal Considerations," 238 I.A.M.A. 1744, 1746 (1977). 
2 See e.g. People v. Saldana, 47 Cal. App. 3d 954, 121 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1975); State v. Brown, 
8 Or. App. 72,491 P.2d 1193 (1971). 
3 Johnson v. State, 64 Fla. 321, 59 So. 894 (1912); Hamblin v. State, 81 Neb. 148,115 N.W. 
850 (1908). 
4 Cranmore v. State, 271 N.W.2d 402, 428 (Wis. App. 1978). 
5 People v. Olson, 377 N.E.2d 371 (Ill. 1978). 
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In a similar "proximate cause" case, State v. Fierro,1 the Arizona 
Supreme Court held that although the common law cardiopulmonary 
standard is still sufficient to establish death, the medical criteria of the ad 
hoc Harvard Committee or the legal standard put forward by Uniform 
Brain Death Act (which are not in actuality comparable documents) are 
also valid bases for declaring death, when properly supported by medical 
testimony. The removal of the respiratory-support systems was thus found 
not to be the proximate cause of the victim's death. It was not error for the 
trial court to have found that the gunshot wound inflicted by the defendant 
caused the victim's death. 
Other courts have relied on “cause in fact.” Under this approach, the 
courts do not explicitly revise the "definition" of death, but they accept the 
physicians' conclusions about the occurrence of death as matters of fact. 
For instance, in a case involving a gunshot wound to the head, State v. 
Brown,2 the Oregon appellate court held that the victim's life was 
terminated by the bullet wound that caused "damage to the vital centers of 
the brain which control respiration and other body activities."3
 
In People v. Saldana4 the doctor testified that death is "a failure of 
part of that organism such that the total organism is no longer functioning 
in a manner which a reasonable, intelligent person would recognize as the 
purpose of that organism."5 In the absence of evidence to contradict the 
doctor's testimony that the victim suffered brain death, the court held that 
the victim's death was caused by the defendant's act. "Given the current 
state of medical science . . . we cannot say as a matter of law that the 
victim was not dead when he reached the hospital, much less when the 
artificial life-support systems were-removed."6
The third ground on which homicide defendants' claims have been 
rejected is the most sweeping, namely, judicial revision of the common 
law standard for deciding when death has occurred. In upholding criminal 
convictions, the highest courts of both Massachusetts and Colorado have 
explicitly adopted a "brain death" standard. 
 
                                                           
1 State v. Fierro, 124 Ariz. 182,603 P.2d 74 (1979). 
2 State v. Brown, 8 Or. App. 72,491 P.2d 1193 (1971). 
3 Id. at 1195. 
4 People v. Saldana, 47 Cal. App. 3d 954, 121 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1975). 
5 2ld. at 245. 
6 Id. at 244. 
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The first state supreme court case was that of Commonwealth v. 
Golston,1 a 1977 Massachusetts case. The trial judge had instructed the 
jury "as a matter of law, the occurrence of a brain death, if you find it, 
satisfies the essential element of the crime of murder requiring proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of the death of the victim."2 Borrowing from 
the language of the recent statutes, the judge stated that, "Brain death 
occurs when, in the opinion of a licensed physician, based on ordinary 
and accepted standards of medical practice, there has been a total and 
irreversible cessation of spontaneous brain functions and further 
attempts at resuscitation or continued supportive maintenance would 
not be successful in restoring such functions."3
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts held the trial judge had acted 
correctly in accepting the medical concept of brain death. 
(Alternatively, the court held any error in this respect to be harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.) The court limited its holding to criminal 
cases, however. 
In the Colorado case of Lovato v. District Court4 the trial judge 
had held "[A]s the rule of this case. .. to be followed until otherwise 
changed legislatively or judicially, we adopt the provisions of the 
proposed Uniform [Brain Death] Act. . . Our recognition of this concept 
of brain death does not preclude continuing recognition of the standard 
of death as determined by traditional criteria of cessation of respiration 
and circulation."5 The effect of the decision was to provide alternative 
determinations of death. 
The Supreme Court of Colorado upheld the District Court. In 
doing so, the court explicitly addressed two important issues: the 
relationship between judicial and legislative revision of the common 
law, and the grounds on which established precedent may sometimes be 
abandoned: 
We recognize the authority of, and indeed encourage, the 
General Assembly to pronounce statutorily the standards by 
which death is to be determined in Colorado. We do not, 
however, believe that in the absence of legislative action we 
are precluded from facing and resolving the legal issue of 
whether irretrievable loss of brain function can be used as a 
means of detecting the condition of death. Under the 
circumstances of this case we are not only entitled to resolve 
                                                           
1 Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249,366 N.E.2d 744 (1977), 
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978). 
2 Id. at 747. 
3 Id. at 747-8. 
4 Lovato v. District Court, 601 P.2d 1072 (Colo. 1979) (en banc). 
5 Id. at 1081. 
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the question, but have a duty to do so. To act otherwise 
would be to close our eyes to the scientific and medical 
advances made worldwide in the past two or three decades.1
B. Civil Cases Updating the Common Law 
The second major legal context affording judges the opportunity to 
update the common law has been in civil actions. These cases have 
addressed directly the issue of organ transplantation based upon the 
"definition" of death. 
The 1972 Virginia case of Tucker v. Lower has received 
considerable attention although it did not progress beyond the trial leve1.2 
Following a workplace accident, the plaintiff's brother had been taken 
unconscious to a hospital where surgery for severe head injuries was 
performed. After the treating physicianAs decided the victim was "brain 
dead," he was taken off the respirator and his heart and kidneys were 
removed for transplantation. The victim's brother brought suit against the 
physicians and surgeons under the Virginia wrongful death act.3 One of 
his grounds for recovery was that the operation had been commenced 
before death had occurred. To support this contention, the plaintiff 
established that the brother's heart was still beating as a result of the 
respiratory treatment at the time death was declared. 
The trial judge refused the defendants' motion to dismiss the case or 
to grant summary judgment in their favor. He held that the "definition" of 
death was the "all vital bodily functions" test established by the common 
law. Yet at the last minute, the judge apparently reconsidered his decision 
and instructed the jury that: 
You shall determine the time of death in this case by using the 
following definition of the nature of death. Death is a cessation of life. It 
is the ceasing to exist. Under the law, death is not continuing, but occurs 
at a precise time, and that time must be established according to the facts 
of each specific case. In determining the time of death, as aforesaid, under 
the facts and circumstances of this case, you may consider the following 
elements, none of which should necessarily be considered controlling, 
although you may feel under the evidence, that one or more of these con- 
                                                           
1 Id. at 1081. 
2 Tucker v. Lower, No. 2831 (Richmond, Va. L. & Eq. Ct., May 23, 1972); 
See, e.g., Robert M. Veatch, Death, Dying and the Biological Revolution: 
Our Last Quest for Responsibility, Yale University Press, New Haven, 
Conn., (1977) at 21-24; Alexander Morgan Capron, "Legal Definition of 
Death," 315 Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 349,351 (1978). 
3 Va. Code ' 8-633 et seq. (1970). 
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ditions are controlling: the time of the total stoppage of the circulation 
of the blood; the time of the total cessation of the other vital functions 
consequent thereto, such as respiration and pulsation; the time of 
complete and irreversible loss of all function of the brain; and, whether 
or not the aforesaid functions were spontaneous or were being 
maintained artificially or mechanically.1
The jury acquitted the defendants. Because there was no appeal, 
higher courts did not have occasion to rule on the soundness of the 
trial judge's revision of the standards for determining death. Thus, the 
case did not establish a new rule on the legal standard to be used in 
Virginia for determining when death occurs. It did, however, prompt 
the Virginia medical society to support a statute which was adopted by 
the legislature the year after Tucker v. Lower recognizing brain 
cessation as one ground for declaring death.2 (Indeed, in most of the 
states in which cases illuminating the inadequacies of the common law 
"definition" have arisen, the legislature has reacted by enacting a 
statute on the subject.3) 
The "definition" arose in a narrower but more conclusive fashion 
in New York City Health and Hospital Corp. v. Sulsona,4 another 
organ transplant case. The petitioner sought a declaratory judgment to 
construe the time of death provisions in New York's Anatomical Gift 
Act.5 Section 7(b) of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act merely 
provides that' 'The time of death shall be determined by a physician 
who attends the donor at his death or, if none, the physician who 
certifies death." 
The controversy in Sulsona arose because of the difficulty, under 
the common law and the policies of the Chief Medical Examiner of 
New York City, in carrying out organ transplants from suitable donors 
who were determined to be dead on neurological grounds. The trial 
judge held: "The context in which the term 'death' is used in Sections 
4301 and 4306 of Article 43 of the Public Health Law implies a 
definition consistent with the generally accepted medical practice of 
doctors primarily concerned with effectuating the purposes of this 
statute."6 The judge noted that this 
                                                           
1 Tucker v. Lower, No. 2831 (Richmond, Va. L. & Eq. Ct., May 23, 
1972). 
2 Va. Code ' 54.325.7 (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
3 See e.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code ' ' 7180-7182 (Deering Supp. 
1980) Or. Rev. Stat. ' 146.087 (1977). 
4 New York City Health and Hospital Corp. v. Sulsona, 81 Misc. 2d 
1002, 367 N.Y.S.2d 686 (Sup. Ct. 1975). 
5 N. Y. Pub. Health Law Article 43, '' 4301-4307 (1977). 
6 New York City Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Sulsona, 81 Misc. 2d 
1002, 367 N.Y.S.2d 686, 691 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
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definition was applicable in her court only; furthermore, it would be 
limited to potential donors from whom organs were to be removed 
upon death, under the procedures defined in the anatomical gift law. 
The judge urged the legislature to remedy the situation immediately. 
The "definition" of death has also arisen in civil cases not 
involving organ transplantation. For example, a large body of law 
concerning the time of death in inheritance cases has provided a major 
focus of the "existing law "defining" death. Recently, the question of 
whether respiratory support is being given to a live patient or a dead 
body has been presented a number of times1 but has been decided by 
the highest court of a state in only one case, In re Bowman.2 Late in 
1980, the Supreme Court of Washington affirmed a lower court's 
ruling that a person without any brain functions is dead. Five year-old 
Matthew Bowman had suffered massive physical injuries from a 
nonfamily member who was caring for him. He was admitted to the 
hospital in critical condition and placed under the guardianship of the 
Department of Social and Health Services. When his natural parents 
were located, Matthew's court-appointed guardian objected to being 
dismissed on the ground that the parents would order the withdrawal 
of the respirator and other medical care supporting Matthew. 
Although it ruled that Matthew was dead, the trial court enjoined 
the removal of the "extraordinary measures" sustaining respiration and 
heartbeat, pending an appeal. The case was set down for argument 
before the state's highest court a week later, but a day before the 
argument was scheduled all of Matthew's bodily functions ceased 
irretrievably. 
Since the issue was of such importance, the Washington 
Supreme Court decided to rule on it even though the particular case 
had become technically moot upon Matthew Bowman's death.3 The 
Washington Supreme Court reviewed the medical findings and the 
attending physician's conclusion that "Matthew's brain was dead under 
the most rigid criteria available, called the 'Harvard criteria,' and that 
his cardiovascular system would, despite the life support systems, fail 
in 14 to 60 days."4 The physician also cited the 
                                                           
1 People v. Lyons, 15 Crim. L. Rptr. 2240 (Cal. Super. Alameda Co. 
1974); Cranmore v. State, 271 N.W.2d 402 (Wis. App. 1978). 
2 In re Bowman, 617 P.2d 731 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1980). 
3 Id. at 734; Sorenson v. Bellingham, 80 Wash. 2d 547, 496 P.2d 512 
(1972). 
4 In re Bowman, 617 P.2d 731, 733 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1980). 
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agreement of "all physicians in the Children's Orthopedic Hospital 
intensive care unit. . . that Matthew was no longer alive"1 at the time of 
the hearing, and conveyed their recommendation, to which Matthew's 
mother consented, that he be removed from the ventilator. 
As in the Colorado decision,2 the Washington court decided that the 
failure of the state legislature to adopt the new standard did not pose a 
barrier to judicial recognition of such a formula. In the year that had 
passed since the Lovato decision in Colorado, the statute recommended 
in the present Report had been taken for approval to the uniform law 
commissioners. The Commissioners approved it in August 1980 in 
place of the Uniform Brain Death Act embraced in Lovato.3 
Accordingly, the Washington court in Bowman "adopted" the 
provisions of the Uniform Determination of Death Act while explicitly 
leaving to the medical profession the definition of "acceptable 
diagnostic tests and medical procedures. . . taking into account new 
knowledge of brain function and new diagnostic procedures."4
 
III. Statutory Construction 
Finally, a few cases have arisen in states having a statutory "definition" 
of death, in which the courts have had to interpret the meaning of the 
statutes as applied to a particular set of facts. For the most part the 
statutes have fared well: they have been upheld and have been 
interpreted in a straightforward and biomedically appropriate fashion. 
Peculiarities of the statutes in two states led to odd outcomes in two 
cases, however, and point to conclusions that ought to enter into the 
thinking of those who draft statutes. 
A. Cases Upholding Statutes 
In State v. Shaffer,5 the landmark Kansas statute was challenged. 
Shaffer, convicfed of first degree murder, claimed the statute was never 
intended to apply to criminal homicide trials and that the instruction 
given to the jury pursuant to the statute was thus erroneous. The court 
held that it is proper in a criminal trial to instruct the jury on the statute 
as the basis for determining when death occurs. The court also held that 
the Kansas statute when applied to murder in the first degree is not 
unconstitutionally vague in allowing either of two standards to be 
applied to determine death. The Court found the alternative brain-based 
standard to the traditional cardiopulmonary standard to be grounded
                                                           
1 Id. 
2 Lovato v. District Court, 601 P.2d 1072 (Colo. 1979) (en banc). 
3 Colo. Rev. Stat. ' 12-36-136 (1981). 
4 In re Bowman, 617 P.2d 731, 738 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1980). 
5 State v. Shaffer, 223 Kan. 244, 574 P.2d 205 (1977). 
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on sound considerations in keeping with advanced medical technology. 
It found no constitutional requirement that a single standard be used. 
Nor was the statute unconstitutionally vague for failure to enumerate 
procedures for determining when death has occurred. A determination 
based on the "ordinary standards of medical practice" was held 
sufficient. 
The court also relied upon the "proximate cause" theory of 
criminal responsibility. It held that if the defendant has caused wounds 
to be inflicted on the victim, and if the jury found that those wounds 
contributed to the death of the victim, the defendant could not avoid 
responsibility by showing that the treating physicians had turned off 
the respirator and transplanted the victim's kidneys. 
Similarly, in People v. Vanderford,1 the Capron-Kass statute 
adopted in Michigan2 withstood challenge by a criminal defendant. 
Convicted of involuntary manslaughter, the appellant challenged the 
Michigan statute as unconstitutionally vague or not sufficiently 
rigorous. He claimed that death might have been caused by the 
respirator having been prematurely terminated (i.e., because a patient 
who was actually alive had been incorrectly declared dead under the 
statute). 
The Michigan court held the defendant was not in a position to 
challenge the statute. First, he had no personal interest in the 
constitutionality of the statute since, even if it were found 
unconstitutional, his conviction would stand because Michigan also 
employs the usual legal rule that intervening medical error is not a 
defense when the accused has inflicted a mortal wound upon another. 
Second, Vanderford was held not to have standing to attack the statute 
on the ground that its application might deny the constitutional rights 
of another. 
The defendant's claim that the trial court should have instructed 
the jury that death must be pronounced before artificial life support 
systems are terminated was found by the Michigan court to be without 
merit, since the time at which death was pronounced, either before or 
after the life support system is terminated, is not material to his guilt. 
In North Carolina v. Holsclaw3, the court held the "brain death" 
provisions of the state's 1977 Natural Death Act irrelevant to a 
homicide case where a determination had to be made as to the 
proximate cause of death. In a 
                                                           
1 People v. Vanderford, 77 Mich. App. 370, 258 N.W.2d 502 (1977). 
2 Mich. Stat. Ann. ' 14.15 (1021 to 1024) (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
3 North Carolina v. Holsclaw, 42 N.C. App. 696, 257 S.E.2d 650 (1979). 
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criminal prosecution, the North Carolina court held, an intervening 
cause of death must be the sole cause in order to release the criminal 
defendant from responsibility for murder. It was held to be a jury 
function to resolve the issue of proximate cause involved in the 
determination of "brain death" and termination of life supports. 
B. Cases Demonstrating Some Problems with the Statutes 
The first serious problem with a statutory "definition" of death 
arose in a 1979 Maryland case interpreting a statute patterned on the 
original legislation in Kansas. In State v. Robaczynski1 a Baltimore 
nurse was tried for murdering a 48 year-old comatose cardiac patient 
by disconnecting his respirator. 
Although the case initially appeared to be one of "mercy killing," 
at trial the defense contended that the patient was actually "brain 
dead" before Ms. Robaczynski "pulled the plug." The state's evidence, 
supplied by the victim's cardiologist and by the medical examiner who 
conducted the autopsy, was that his brain was functioning (and his 
general condition was improving) at the time the respiratory support 
was withdrawn, causing his heart to fail completely within 25 
minutes.2
After three days of deliberation the jury was unable to reach a 
verdict and a mistrial was declared.3
Reports revealing the trouble the jurors had in reaching a verdict 
are instructive. In Maryland the jury is the arbiter of the law as well as 
the facts in criminal cases and thus was left on its own to interpret the 
statute.4 Interviews with the jurors revealed that their inability to 
reach a verdict hinged on the interpretation of the word "spontaneous" 
in the Maryland law which lists the "irreversible cessation of 
spontaneous brain function" as one standard for determining death.5 
                                                           
1 State v. Robaczynski, No.5 78-23001 (Criminal Court of Baltimore, 
1979). 
2 Alexander Morgan Capron, "Death and the Law: A Decade of 
Change," 63 Soundings 290, 304-05 (1980). 
3 Saundra Saperstein, "Maryland Law on Brain Death Was Unclear to 
Jurors," March 21, 1979, Wash. Post, ' C at 1, col. 1; Saundra 
Saperstein, "Md. Nurse to be Freed of Charges: Law Defining Death 
Held Too Ambiguous," March 29, 1979, Wash. Post, ' B at 1, col. 6. 
4 Md. Canst. art. 23.; Wyley v. Warden, 372 F.2d 742 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 389 U.S. 863 (1967). 
5 Md. Ann. Code art. 43, ' 54F(a)(b) (1980); Millard Bass, "Definition 
of Brain Death," (letter to editor) 242 J.A.M.A. 1850 (1979). 
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The word "spontaneous" as related to brain function apparently 
was intended to have a meaning analagous to its use in the context of 
circulation and respiration—that is, an inherent rather than artificially 
maintained function. But since the heart and lungs can be maintained 
artificially by a respirator, while brain activity cannot likewise be 
supported with artificial technology, the use of "spontaneous" as a 
modifier of "brain functions" was unnecessary and, as it turned out, 
confusing. Defense testimony was introduced to show that under the 
accepted medical tests upon which the prosecution was relaying to 
show that the victim had still been alive, his brain activity was not 
manifested spontaneously but would have had to be evoked by the 
application of external stimuli. Thus, confusion was established 
between the legal meaning of the word spontaneous (i.e. inherent v. 
artificially maintained) and the medical use of the word (manifested 
without intervention v. apparent only upon stimulation). Unable to 
reconcile the two, the jury was stymied. 
After the mistrial, the prosecuting attorney, William A. Swisher, 
declined to retry Ms. Robacynski. The initial charge and three similar 
ones were dropped in exchange for the return of her Maryland nurse's 
license and her promise to forego the practice of nursing. Newspaper 
accounts quoted Swisher as saying, "The law should be clarified. We 
need an acceptable universal definition of death."1
The second serious problem in statutory interpretation appeared 
in a Connecticut case. Commentators on statutes "defining" death 
have long argued against attaching such statutes to special purpose 
legislation—such as the laws on organ transplantation—lest a special 
category of "death" be created. In enacting statutes on the 
determination of death, state legislatures have overwhelmingly heeded 
this advice. The unfortunate consequences of a special 
transplantation-only "definition" of death manifested themselves 
earlier this year in a case in Connecticut, one of the two states to have 
made its statute on death a part of its organ transplantation law. 
On January 30, 1981, Melanie Bacchiochi suffered a cardiac 
arrest while having her wisdom teeth removed under general 
anesthesia.2 After resuscitation she was admitted to a Stafford, 
Connecticut hospital. By February 11, her physician and consultants 
found her to have suffered 
                                                           
1 T. Humphrey, "Md. Drops Euthanasia Charges," March 30, 1979, Phila. Inquirer 
at 7 A, col. 1.  
2 Fred Fabro, "Bacchiochi vs. Johnson Memorial Hospital," 45 Conn. Med. 267 
(1981); Fred Fabro, "The Bacchiochi Case-Continued" 45 Conn. Med. 334 (1981). 
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total, irreversible loss of the functions of her entire brain, including 
the brain stem. In the physician's view, his patient had died. Thus, it 
was no longer appropriate to continue treatment (estimated to cost 
$1,000 per day) that should be made available instead for those whom 
it might benefit. 
Nevertheless, Ms. Bacchiochi's doctor refused to remove her 
from the respirator unless he was granted immunity from prosecution 
by the Chief State's Attorneys Office. His request was supported by 
the hospital's attorney. Since Connecticut's statute recognizing "brain 
death" had been adopted in 1979 as part of the State's Uniform 
Anatomical Gift Act, its application is limited to potential organ 
donorsCa group into which Ms. Bacchiochi did not fall. 
Ms. Bacchiochi's family brought suit to have her removed from 
the respirator. Four days of court hearings, attended by attorneys 
representing at least eight different parties, were held before Judge 
Harry Hammer of the Hartford/New Britian Superior Court. 
Although Judge Hammer declined to bring the general common 
law on death into line with the statutory law on organ donors or, 
indeed, to issue any formal ruling in the case, the Assistant State's 
Attorney stated informally that he had no intention of prosecuting. 
Reassured, Ms. Bacchiochi's doctor removed her respirator on March 
13, 1981, and the artificially-supported cardiopulmonary functions 
ceased. The irony of the Bacchiochi case is that had she been an organ 
donor, she could have been declared dead under Connecticut law and 
removed from the respirator on February 11. Furthermore, the 
prosecutor stated that his position in Bacchiochi was limited to the 
facts of that case and would not preclude prosecution of physicians or 
others for actions they take in any future "brain death" cases. 
 
International Rules E 
Argentina 
The law on determination of death in Argentina is found in a 1977 
statute11 related to the donation and transplantation of organs. It provides 
for a determination of death when "all brain functions have totally and 
irreversibly ceased." Certification of death of a transplant donor is to be 
made by a team of experts consisting of a general practitioner, a 
neurologist or neurosurgeon and a cardiologist, none of whom are 
members of the team that will perform the operation on either the donor 
or recipient. 
Regulations pursuant to the 1977 statute require that all of the 
following confirmatory tests be performed:2
1. Total absence of response of any kind to external stimuli, 
especially to those of a nociceptive nature applied above the occipital 
orifice. 
2. Electroencephalographs on patients not intoxicated and those not 
affected by hypothermia, with the observance of the following 
requirements: 
a) Flat lineal reading with no bioelectrical response to several 
sensitive-sensorial stimuli applied during the test. 
b) Utilization of at least eight electrodes at a minimum 
interelectrodic distance of at least eight centimeters.  
c) Setting of the equipment at its maximum capacity of 
amplification (up to 25 microvolts per 1 centimeter).  
d) Time constant of 0.3. 
                                                           
1 Law 21, 541 of March 2, 1977, Boletin Oficial [B.D.] March 18, 1977, art. 21. 
2 Decree 30011 of October 3, 1977, Boletin Oficial [B.D.] October 13, 1977, 
art. 21. 
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e) Registry of a minimum duration of fifteen minutes with    
repetition after six hours. 
3. Lack of spontaneous breathing, with the absolute necessity of 
an artificial respirator. 
4. Fixed mydriatric pupils or pupils in an intermediate position 
despite the use of intense photic stimuli to observe pupilar reactivity. 
5. Lack of oculocephalic reflexes during the passive cephalic 
rotations. 
6. Vestibular caloric tests. After otological examination, irrigate 
with a clyster tube each external duct with 200 cubic centimeters of 
iced water in an alternated manner, and with a ten-minute interval 
between each irrigation. There should be no ocular movements during 
and at the end of the test. 
7. Atropine test. Inject two to four milligrams of atropine 
intravenously observing for possible changes on the 
electrocardiogram. There should be no acceleration of the cardiac 
frequency during the test. This observation should last no less than six 
minutes. 
8. When tests 4, 5, and 6, above, may not be conducted because 
of severe ocular lesions, it shall be required that tests leading to a 
certification of the total lack of cerebral circulation be conducted for 
no less than thirty minutes. 
Australia 
In an extensive 1977 report entitled "Human Tissue Transplants"1 the 
Law Reform Commission of Australia recommended a statute which 
was adopted in the following fashion by the Northern Territory of 
Australia and the Australian Capital Territory. 
For the purpose of the law of the Territory, a person has died 
when there has occurredC 
(a) irreversible cessation of all function of the brain of the 
person; or 
(b) irreversible cessation of circulation of blood in the body of 
the person. 
The following recommendations accompanied the Law Reform 
Commission's statute: 
The Commission offers a number of comments on the 
recommended provision. Flexibility to allow adoption of criteria to 
accord with the best current professional procedures is preferable to 
verbose legislation. The brevity of the recommended statutory 
provision, and the deliberate omission of detailed criteria, may be 
taken as a reflection and 
                                                           
1 The Law Reform Commission of Australia, Human Tissue Transplants 
(Report No.7) Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra (1977). 
 
International Rules 149 
 
confirmation of the Australian community's general confidence in the 
medical profession. The creation and prescription of techniques of 
diagnosis should be the responsibility of the medical profession. 
Thirdly, although appearing in this context of transplantation, the 
recommended statutory definition of death is intended to have general 
application. It should not be limited in its legal effect to any particular 
kind of patient, nor to patients maintained by support machinery 
(although, in practice it will no doubt principally, if not exclusively, 
affect only such patients), nor to transplantation. The inclusion in the 
statutory provision of references both to "brain death" and to 
traditional criteria serves a useful purpose. Despite the greater 
accuracy of determining death by reference to cessation of brain 
function, it is clear that in most cases, death will be certified or 
determined according to the traditional respiratory-circulatory-cardiac 
standards. There will not be a great number of cases in which the need 
and facilities for, and opportunity of, employing the necessary "brain 
death" criteria will be present. 
Canada 
There is no Canadian federal case or statutory law on the subject of 
the use of brain-oriented criteria to determine death. However, in 
response to a 1974 report by the Manitoba Law Reform Commission, 
the Province of Manitoba enacted the following statute (the only 
province to do so): 
For all purposes within the legislative competence of the 
Legislature of Manitoba, the death of a person takes place at the 
time at which irreversible cessation of all that person's brain 
function occurs. 
More recently, as part of a series of reports in its "Protection of Life 
Project" which began in 1976, the Law Reform Commission of 
Canada issued a report, the "Criteria for the Determination of Death" 
(Working Paper No. 23). The Commission recommended that the 
following statute be adopted as federal statutory law by way of an 
amendment to the Interpretation Act of 1970: 
(1) A person is dead when an irreversible cessation of all that 
person's brain functions has occurred. 
(2) The cessation of brain functions can be determined by the 
prolonged absence of spontaneous cardiac and respiratory 
functions. 
(3) When the determination of the absence of cardiac and 
respiratory functions is made impossible by the use of artificial 
means of support, the cessation of the brain functions may be 
determined by any means recognized by the ordinary standards 
of current medical practice. 
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In drafting the statute the Commission noted the following series of 
objectives: 
(1) The proposed legislation must avoid arbitrariness and give 
greater guidance to doctors, lawyers and the public, while 
remaining flexible enough to adapt to medical changes. 
(2) The proposed legislation must not attempt to solve all the 
problems created by death, but only the problem of establishing 
criteria for its determination. 
(3) The one proposed piece of legislation must apply equally in 
all circumstances where a determination of death is at issue. 
(4) The proposed legislation must recognize only the standards 
and criteria of death; it must not define the medical procedure to 
be used, nor the instruments or procedures by which death is to 
be determined. 
(5) The proposed legislation must recognize standards and 
criteria generally accepted by the Canadian public. 
(6) To remain faithful to the popular concept, the proposed 
legislation must recognize that death is the death of an 
individual person, not of an organ or cells. 
(7) The proposed legislation must not in practice lead to 
wrong or unacceptable situations. 
(8) The proposed legislation must not determine the criteria of 
death by reference only or mainly to the 
practice of organ transplantation. 
Czechoslovakia 
Criteria for the determination of death can be found in a directive 
entitled "Extraordinary Removal of Tissues and Organs from Dead 
Bodies" which was promulgated by the Ministry of Health of the 
Czech Socialist Republic and took effect on April 1, 1978. 
Artificial respiration support may be given up after diagnosis of death 
of the brain when the following criteria are complied with: 
a) deep coma with total unreceptivity to internal or external 
stimuli 
b) no muscular reflexes 
c) no vegetative reflexes 
d) lack of spontaneous respiration 
e) angiography by contrast material which does not penetrate to 
the brainstem, visualizing only the extra cranial sections of those 
arteries that supply blood to the brain [angiography is to be done 
twice with a thirty minute interval; or an isoelectric 
electroencephalogram is to be done three times within twenty 
four hours] 
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Finland 
Act Number 260 of July 8, 1957 entitled "The Use of Tissues of a 
Dead Person for Therapeutic Purposes, "includes the following 
provisions: 
The removal of tissues must not be begun until the corpse shows 
unmistakable signs of death. The National Board of Health 
decides how death shall be determined before the removal of 
tissues referred in this act. 
Regulations pursuant to the above act were promulgated in 1971 by 
Finland's national board of health. (Reg. No. 10063. 1969. S). 
I Place of venue 
* * * * 
 
II Ascertaining death 
Death has to be ascertained by the appropriate chief physician, or by 
another hospital physician, who has a written authorization from the 
chief physician. The physician who has ascertained the death shall not 
participate in the transplantation of tissues. 
III The grounds for ascertaining death 
Before tissues are removed, the following signs of death, as referred 
to in subsection 2 of section 1 of the above Act, must be present: 
Cpermanent cessation of the activity of the brain or of the heart; as 
specified in detail in subsections 1) and 2) below. It is assumed that all 
therapy required by the patient under the circumstances has been 
carried out. A person is dead when his or her brain is so damaged that 
the vital functions of the brain have ceased regardless whether the 
heart has stopped or not; 
or: 
Csecondary signs of death such as postmortem lividity, cooling of 
the body and rigor mortis (subsection 3). 
1) Permanent cessation of functions of the brain 
The underlying cause of brain death must be known with absolute 
certainty. If the cause of the brain damage is a condition leading to 
raised intracranial pressure (e.g. a severe brain injury, an intracranial 
hemorrhage, a brain tumor), the permanent cessation of the functions 
of the brain is ascertained as follows: 
a) the pupils are permanently dilated, with no reaction to light; 
b) spontaneous breathing has stopped and does not start after 
2 B 1 hour of efficient artificial respiration; 
c) cranial nerves show no reaction. 
In other cases, and if there remains the slightest doubt about brain 
death, further examinations must be carried 
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out, such as electroencephalogram, cerebral angiography, etc. 
For the electroencephalogram, at least a 6-channel recording with 
needle electrodes is required. The electroencephalogram must be 
isoelectric, nor must there be noise impairing the assessment of 
isoelectricity, nor must there be any response to any stimuli. 
In childhood, in hypothermia and in acute intoxication the lack of 
electrical activity of the brain is not a reliable sign of death. 
2) Permanent cessation of the heart beat 
The absence of the heart beat is not in itself a sign of death. If all 
therapeutic and resuscitating measures required by the condition of the 
patient and by the circumstances have been carried out, the patient is 
considered dead when the vital functions of the brain have irrevocably 
stopped. If the asystolic heart cannot be made to function effectively 
after 2 B 1 hour of resuscitation, the signs of death apply as set out in 
subsections 1), a to c. 
3) Secondary signs of death, 
such as post mortem lividity, cooling of the body and rigor mortis are 
not applicable if organs are to be removed for transplantation. 
However, tissues such as skin and cornea may still be removed. In the 
latter case it is sufficient that the physician in charge has certified the 
death. 
 
France 
French law contains no legal definition of death as such; however, 
there are several provisions establishing the occurrence of death which 
are given by the Decree of October 20, 1947, and the Law of July 7, 
1949. These two provisions stipulate that death must be established by 
two physicians who must use all the means which are recognized to be 
valid by the Ministry of Public Health to make certain that death has, 
indeed, occurred.1
France recognizes the criteria adopted by the Scientific Conference of 
the World Health Organization held in Geneva from June 13-14, 1968. 
1. loss of all vital signs of life; 
2. complete areflexy and atony of the muscles; 
3. complete halt of spontaneous breathing; 
4. complete pulse arrest, if not artificially stimulated;  
and 
5. an absolutely linear electroencephalographic drawing.2
                                                           
1 Repertoire de droit penal Medicine, 21 (Paris, Dalloz, 1978). 
2 Id. 
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The memoranda issued by the French Ministry of Public Health on 
February 3, 1948, September 19, 1958, and April 25, 1968, also 
require, besides and in addition, the use of the following direct 
examinations: 
1. arteriotomy; 
2. a fluorescein test; and 
3. an absolutely linear electroencephalogram for a sufficient 
time.1
Documents published by the Ministry of Health in April 1968 
endorsed criteria close to those adopted by the Harvard school.2
 
Great Britain 
Although there is no official legal definition of death in Great Britain 
the issue has been addressed in an October 1979 pamphlet entitled 
"The Removal of Cadaveric Organs for Transplantation: A Code of 
Practice." This code was drafted by a working party under the the 
aegis of the Health Department of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
as a guide for hospital practice. It states: 
There is no legal definition of death. Death has traditionally 
been diagnosed by the irreversible cessation of respirator and 
heart beat. This working party accepts the view held by the 
Conference of Royal Colleges that death can also be diagnosed 
by the irreversible cessation of brains stem functionC"brain 
death." In diagnosing brain death the criteria laid down by the 
Colleges should be followed. 
It is sometimes necessary to carry out the diagnostic tests on 
more than one occasion. As a patient must be presumed to be 
alive until it is clearly established that he is dead, the time of 
death should be regarded as the time when death was 
conclusively established, not some earlier or a later time when 
artificial ventilation is withdrawn, or the heartbeat ceases. 
The following are some excerpts from the paper produced by the 
Conference of Royal Colleges and Faculties of the United Kingdom 
which is included by reference in the Working Party document3 
(Some explanatory notes have been deleted.) 
                                                           
1 Id. 
2 Law Reform Commission of Canada Working Paper 23 Criteria for the 
Determination of death, 1979. 
3 Conference of Medical Royal Colleges and Faculties of the United 
Kingdom "Diagnosis of Brain Death" ii Lancet 1069 (1970). 
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Conditions under which the Diagnosis of Brain Death should be 
considered 
1. The patient is deeply comatose. 
(a) There should be no suspicion that this state is due to 
depressant drugs. 
(b) Primary hypothermia as a cause of coma should have been 
excluded. 
(c) Metabolic and endocrine disturbances which can be 
responsible for or can contribute to coma should 
have been excluded. 
2. The patient is being maintained on a ventilator because 
spontaneous respiration had previously become inadequate or had 
ceased altogether. 
(a) Relaxants (neuromuscular blocking agents) and other 
drugs should have been excluded as a cause of 
respiratory inadequacy or failure. 
3. There should be no doubt that the patient's condition is due to 
irremediable structural brain damage. The diagnosis of a disorder 
which can lead to brain death should have been fully established. 
Diagnostic tests for the confirmation of Brain Death 
All brainstem reflexes are absent: 
(i) The pupils are fixed in diameter and do not respond to sharp 
changes in the intensity of incident light. 
(ii) There is no corneal reflex. 
(iii) The vestibulo-ocular reflexes are absent. 
(iv) No motor responses within the cranial nerve distribution can be 
elicited by adequate stimulation of any somatic area. 
(v) There is no gag reflex or reflex response to bronchial stimulation 
by a suction catheter passed down the trachea. 
(vi) No respiratory movements occur when the patient is disconnected 
from the mechanical ventilator for long enough to ensure that the 
arterial carbon dioxide tension rises above the threshold for stimulation 
of respiration. 
Other considerations  
1.  Repetition of Testing 
It is customary to repeat the tests to ensure that there has been no 
observer error. The interval between tests must depend upon the 
primary pathology and the clinical course of the disease. The interval 
between tests depends upon the progress of the patient and might be as 
long as 24 hours. This is a matter for medical judgement and repetition 
time must be related to the signs of improvement, stability, or 
deterioration which present themselves. 
It is now widely accepted that electroencephalography is not necessary 
for the diagnosis of brain death. Electroen- 
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cephalography has its principal value at earlier stages in the care of 
patients, in whom the original diagnosis is in doubt. When 
electroencephalography is used, the strict criteria recommended by the 
Federation of E.E.G. Societies must be followed. 
Other investigations such as cerebral angiography or cerebral 
bloodflow measurements are not required for the diagnosis of brain 
death. 
 
Greece 
The law establishing the definition of death in Greece is found in 
Article 9 of Law No. 821 of October 14, 1978, a statute entitled 
"Concerning the Removal and Transplantation of Biological 
Substances of Human Origin." 
(1) Any activity undertaken on the corpse for the removal of biological 
material is forbidden as long as it has not been previously established 
that the individual is dead. For the purpose of implementation of the 
provisions of the present law, an individual is considered dead when 
doctors establish, according to the provisions of paragraph two and 
through established and indisputable scientific methods, that there 
exist signs indicating the definite (irrevocable) termination of the 
functioning of the central nervous system, independently of the time of 
appearance and duration of presence of such signs and including 
indispensably all of the following signs: 
a) Termination of automatic and provoked movements. 
b) Termination of reflexes, and especially of the cornea.  
c) Mydriasis and lack of any reaction of the eye pupil. 
d) The lack of appearance of respiratory motion after an 
experimental interruption of the operation of the 
resuscitation apparatus, provided that the individual is 
connected to one, for a period of time sufficient to cause 
automatic respiratory motion as a result of the 
accumulation of carbon dioxide. 
e) Electroencephalographic silence. 
(1)  Artificial prolongation of the functioning of certain isolated 
organs of systems cannot place in doubt the ascertainment of 
death according to the above criteria, nor does it suspend the 
undertaking of removal of biological material. 
(2) The ascertainment of death according to the previous 
paragraph is done by two doctors practicing medicine for at least 
five years; one of these two doctors must be a neurology 
specialist. 
Neither of the ascertaining doctors is allowed to have a relationship 
with any scientific team interested in and occupied with 
transplantation. 
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Norway 
Regulations regarding the definition of death were promulgated by 
Royal Decree in June of 1977 pursuant to Act No. 6 of February 1973, 
"Transplantation, Hospital Autopsies and Donation of Bodies." 
It is the cessation of brain function which decides that continued life 
is not possible. A universally valid definition of death must therefore be 
based on the fact that brain function has ceased. 
The following definition shall be the basis of the diagnosis of death: 
Death has taken place when there is total destruction of the brain 
with complete and permanent cessation of all functions in the cerebrum, 
the cerebellum and the brainstem (mesencephalon, pons and medulla 
oblongata). 
This definition of death is of universal validity and covers all causes 
of death. 
The signs of the total destruction of the brain are either permanent 
cessation of heartbeat and respiration or the following criteria which  
must be satisfied if heartbeat and respiration are artificially maintained. 
 
Recognized intracranial pathological process 
Total destruction of the brain occurs if the pressure inside the cavity 
of the skull rises to the same level as the blood pressure, so that the blood 
supply to the brain ceases. The rise of pressure in the cavity of the skull is 
caused by space-consuming pathological processes and/or swelling of the 
brain (i.e. brain edema or an increase of fluid content in the brain). 
The destruction of the brain may be due to disease or injury inside 
the cavity of the skull itself, such as hemorrhages, abscesses, inflamations 
and head injuries (primary causes) or disease or injury outside the cavity 
of the skull which lead to lack of oxygen in the brain (secondary causes). 
Total unconsciousness 
Here there must be failure to react to light, sound, touch and pain-
producing stimuli. The spinal cord—which lies outside the cavity of the 
skull—may have reflex functions even if the brain in its entirety has been 
destroyed. Spinal cord reflexes (i.e. muscle contractions in response to 
tapping of the sinews) may therefore be present, even if death has 
occurred. 
 
Cessation of own respiration 
 This is an absolute requirement for the diagnosis of death. 
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Cessation of all brain nerve reflexes 
Reflexes which pass the brain stemCwhich lies in the cavity of the 
skullCmust not be able to be obtained: the pupils must not react to light, 
the corneal reflex (movement of the eyeball following the injection of 
cold water into the auditory canal) must not be able to be produced. 
Cessation of the electrical activity of the brain 
An isoelectrical or "flat" electroencephalogram is usually an 
indication of the total destruction of the brain. On its own the EEG 
examination is not sufficient proof that the brain has been totally 
destroyed, because in cases of poisoning by soporific drugs and narcotics, 
of low body temperature (hypothermia) or of acute lack of oxygen 
patients may temporarily have an isoelectrical electroencephalogram. If 
radiological examination (cerebral angiography, see under next heading) 
has already shown that the blood supply to the brain has ceased, the EEG 
examination may be omitted. 
 
Cessation of blood supply to the brain demonstrated by cerebral 
angiography 
Confirmation by angiography that the blood supply to the brain has 
ceased is the decisive indication of total destruction of the brain. The 
injection of contrast medium must be made into all four arteries which 
carry blood to the brain, namely both arteries of the neck (the carotid 
arteries) and both arteries of the cervical vertebrae (the vertebral arteries). 
If the injection of contrast medium in both the carotid arteries has 
shown that neither of these is carrying blood to the brain, it is sufficient 
to make an injection of contrast medium into one of the vertebral arteries 
if the contrast medium flows back in the other without the veins in the 
cavity of the skull being filled with contrast medium. 
The blood pressure must be measured before, during and after the 
radiological examination, so that it is certain that the absence of contrast 
medium in the veins in the brain is not due to a fall in blood pressure 
during the actual examination. If the blood pressure falls while the 
examination is being carried out, it must be repeated with a stabilized 
blood pressure. 
CONCLUSION 
If all the criteria 1-6 are satisfied, the patient shall be declared dead. 
 
Spain 
Spain recognized brain-based criteria for determining death in its Law 30 
of October 27, 19791
                                                           
1 Boletin Oficial [B.O.], November 6, 1979. 
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Art. 5. The extraction of organs or of any other anatomical parts of 
deceased persons may be made after the death of that person has been 
attested to. When the attestation is based on the existence of data 
concerning the irreversibility of cerebral damage, and therefore, 
incompatible with life, the death certificate shall be subscribed by 
three doctors, among whom will be one neurologist or neurosurgeon 
and the chief of the corresponding medical unit, or his or her 
substitute. None of these physicians may favor part of the team that 
will use the organ(s) or make the transplant. 
 
Guidelines for the 
Determination of Death 
 
 
F 
 
 
Report of the Medical Consultants on the Diagnosis of Death to the 
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine 
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research * 
 
* The guidelines set forth in this report represent the views of the signatories as 
individuals; they do not necessarily reflect the policy of any institution or 
professional association with which any signatory is affiliated. Although the 
practice of individual signatories may vary slightly, signatories agree on the 
acceptability of these guidelines: Jesse Barber, M.D., Don Becker, M.D., Richard 
Behrman, M.D., J.D., Donald R. Bennett, M.D., Richard Beresford, M.D.,J.D., 
Reginald Bickford,M.D., WilliamA.Black,M.D., Benjamin Boshes, M.D., Ph.D., 
Philip Braunstein, M.D., John Burroughs, M.D., J.D., Russell Butler, M.D., John 
Caronna, M.D. Shelley Chou, M.D., Ph.D., Kemp Clark, M.D., Ronald Cranford, 
M.D., Michael Earnest, M.D., Albert Ehle, M.D., Jack M. Fein, M.D., Sal Fiscina, 
M.D., J.D., Terrance G. Furlow, M.D., J.D., Eli Goldensohn, M.D., Jack Grabow, 
M.D., Phillip M. Green, M.D., Ake Grenvik, M.D., Charles E. Henry, Ph.D., John 
Hughes, M.D., Ph.D., D.M., Howard Kaufman,M.D.,Robert King, M.D., Julius 
Korein, M.D. Thomas W. Langfitt, M.D., Cesare Lombroso, M.D., Kevin M. 
McIntyre, M.D., J.D., Richard L. Masland, M.D., Don Harper Mills, M.D., J.D., 
Gaetano Molinari, M.D., Byron C. Pevehouse, M.D., Lawrence H. Pitts, M.D., A. 
Bernard Pleet, M.D., Fred Plum, M.D., Jerome Posner, M.D., David Powner, 
M.D., Richard Rovit, M.D., Peter Safar, M.D., Henry Schwartz, M.D., Edward 
Schlesinger, M.D., Roy Selby, M.D., James Snyder, M.D., Bruce F. Sorenson, 
M.D., Cary Suter, M.D., Barry Tharp, M.D., Fernando Torres, M.D., A. Earl 
Walker, M.D., Arthur Ward, M.D., Jack Whisnant, M.D., Robert Wilkus, M.D., 
and Harry Zimmerman, M.D. 
The preparation of this report was facilitated by the President's Commission 
but the guidelines have not been passed on by the Commission and are not 
intended as matters for governmental review or adoption. 
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Foreword 
The advent of effective artificial cardiopulmonary support for 
severely brain-injured persons has created some confusion during the 
past several decades about the determination of death. Previously, loss 
of heart and lung functions was an easily observable and sufficient 
basis for diagnosing death, whether the initial failure occurred in the 
brain, the heart and lungs, or elsewhere in the body. Irreversible 
failure of either the heart and lungs or the brain precluded the 
continued functioning of the other. Now, however, circulation and 
respiration can be maintained by means of a mechanical respirator and 
other medical interventions, despite a loss of all brain functions. In 
these circumstances we recognize as dead an individual whose loss of 
brain functions is complete and irreversible. 
To recognize reliably that death has occurred, accurate criteria 
must be available for physicians' use. These now fall into two groups, 
to be applied depending on the clinical situation. When respiration and 
circulation have irreversibly ceased, there is no need to assess brain 
functions directly. When cardiopulmonary functions are artificially 
maintained, neurologic criteria must be used to assess whether brain 
functions have irreversibly ceased. 
More than half of the states now recognize, through statutes or 
judicial decisions, that death may be determined on the basis of 
irreversible cessation of all functions of the brain. Law in the 
remaining states has not yet departed from the older, common law 
view that death has not occurred until "all vital functions" (whether or 
not artificially maintained) have ceased. The language of the statutes 
has not been uniform from state to state, and the diversity of proposed 
and enacted laws has created substantial confusion. Consequently, the 
American Bar Association, the American Medical Association, the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and 
the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in 
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research have proposed the 
following model statute, intended for adoption in every jurisdiction: 
Uniform Determination of Death Act 
An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible 
cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) 
irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, 
including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must 
be made in accordance with accepted medical standards. 
This wording has also been endorsed by the American Academy of 
Neurology and the American Electroencephalographic Society. 
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The statute relies upon the existence of "accepted medical 
standards" for determining that death has occurred. The medical 
profession, based upon carefully conducted research and extensive 
clinical experience, has found that death can be reliably determined by 
either cardiopulmonary or neurologic criteria. The tests used for 
determining cessation of brain functions have changed and will 
continue to do so with the advent of new research and technologies. 
The "Harvard criteria" (JAMA, 205:337, 1968) are widely accepted, 
but advances in recent years have led to the proposal of other criteria. 
As an aid to the implementation of the proposed uniform statute, we 
provide here one statement of currently accepted medical standards. 
Introduction 
The criteria that physicians use in determining that 
death has occurred should: 
(1) Eliminate errors in classifying a living individual as dead, 
(2) Allow as few errors as possible in classifying a dead body 
as alive, 
(3) Allow a determination to be made without unreasonable 
delay, 
(4) Be adaptable to a variety of clinical situations, and 
(5) Be explicit and accessible to verification. 
Because it would be undesirable for any guidelines to be mandated by 
legislation or regulation or to be inflexibly established in case law, the 
proposed Uniform Determination of Death Act appropriately specifies 
only "accepted medical standards." Local, state, and national 
institutions and professional organizations are encouraged to examine 
and publish their practices. 
The following guidelines represent a distillation of current 
practice in regard to the determination of death. Only the most 
commonly available and verified tests have been included. The time of 
death recorded on a death certificate is at present a matter of local 
practice and is not covered in this document. 
These guidelines are advisory. Their successful use requires a 
competent and judicious physician, experienced in clinical 
examination and the relevant procedures. All periods of observation 
listed in these guidelines require the patient to be under the care of a 
physician. Considering the responsibility entailed in the determination 
of death, consultation is recommended when appropriate. 
The outline of the criteria is set forth below in capital letters. The 
indented text that follows each outline heading explains its meaning. 
In addition, the two sets of criteria (cardiopulmonary and neurologic) 
are followed by a pre- 
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sentation of the major complicating conditions: drug and metabolic 
intoxication, hypothermia, young age, and shock. It is of paramount 
importance that anyone referring to these guidelines be thoroughly 
familiar with the entire documents, including explanatory notes and 
complicating conditions. 
The Criteria for Determination of Death 
An individual presenting the findings in either section A 
(cardiopulmonary) or section B (neurologic) is dead. In either 
section, a diagnosis of death requires that both cessation of functions, 
as set forth in subsection 1, and irreversibility, as set forth in 
subsection 2, be demonstrated. 
A. AN INDIVIDUAL WITH IRREVERSIBLE CESSATION 
OF CIRCULA TORY AND RESPIRATORY FUNCTIONS IS 
DEAD. 
1. CESSATION IS RECOGNIZED BY AN APPROPRIATE 
CLINICAL EXAMINATION. 
Clinical examination will disclose at least the absence of 
responsiveness, heartbeat, and respiratory effort. Medical 
circumstances may require the use of confirmatory tests, such as an 
ECG. 
2. IRREVERSIBILITY IS RECOGNIZED BY PERSISTENT 
CESSATION OF FUNCTIONS DURING AN APPROPRIATE 
PERIOD OF OBSERVATION AND/OR TRIAL OF THERAPY. 
In clinical situations where death is expected, where the course 
has been gradual, and where irregular agonal respiration or heartbeat 
finally ceases, the period of observation following the cessation may 
be only the few minutes required to complete the examination. 
Similarly, if resuscitation is not undertaken and ventricular 
fibrillation and standstill develop in a monitored patient, the required 
period of observation thereafter may be as short as a few minutes. 
When a possible death is unobserved, unexpected, or sudden, the 
examination may need to be more detailed and repeated over a longer 
period, while appropriate resuscitative effort is maintained as a test 
of cardiovascular responsiveness. Diagnosis in individuals who are 
first observed with rigor mortis or putrefaction may require only the 
observation period necessary to establish that fact. 
B. AN INDIVIDUAL WITH IRREVERSIBLE CESSATION 
OF ALL FUNCTIONS OF THE ENTIRE BRAIN, INCLUDING 
THE BRAINSTEM, IS DEAD. 
The "functions of the entire brain" that are relevant to the 
diagnosis are those that are clinically ascertainable. Where indicated, 
the clinical diagnosis is subject to confirmation by laboratory tests as 
described below. Consultation with a physician experienced in this 
diagnosis is advisable. 
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1. CESSATION IS RECOGNIZED WHEN EV ALUA TION 
DISCLOSES FINDINGS OF a AND b: 
a. CEREBRAL FUNCTIONS ARE ABSENT, AND . . . 
There must be deep coma, that is, cerebral unreceptivity and 
unresponsivity. Medical circumstances may require the use of 
confirmatory studies such as EEG or blood flow study. 
b. BRAINSTEM FUNCTIONS ARE ABSENT. 
Reliable testing of brainstem reflexes requires a perceptive 
and experienced physician using adequate stimuli. Pupillary light, 
corneal, oculocephalic, oculovestibular, oropharyngeal, and 
respiratory (apnea) reflexes should be tested. When these reflexes 
cannot be adequately assessed, confirmatory tests are 
recommended. 
Adequate testing for apnea is very important. An accepted 
method is ventilation with pure oxygen or an oxygen and carbon 
dioxide mixture for ten minutes before withdrawal of the 
ventilator, followed by passive flow of oxygen. (This procedure 
allows PaC02 to rise without hazardous hypoxia.) Hypercarbia 
adequately stimulates respiratory effort within thirty seconds when 
PaC02 is greater than 60 mmHg. A ten minute period of apnea is 
usually sufficient to attain this level of hypercarbia. Testing of 
arterial blood gases can be used to confirm this level. Spontaneous 
breathing efforts indicate that part of the brainstem is functioning. 
Peripheral nervous system activity and spinal cord reflexes 
may persist after death. True decerebrate or decorticate posturing 
or seizures are inconsistent with the diagnosis of death. 
2. IRREVERSIBILITY IS RECOGNIZED WHEN EV 
ALUATION DISCLOSES FINDINGS OF a AND b AND c: 
a. THE CAUSE OF COMA IS ESTABLISHED AND IS 
SUFFICIENT TO ACCOUNT FOR THE LOSS OF 
BRAIN FUNCTIONS, AND. . . 
Most difficulties with the determination of death on the 
basis of neurologic criteria have resulted from inadequate 
attention to this basic diagnostic prerequisite. In addition to 
a careful clinical examination and investigation of history, 
relevant knowledge of causation may be acquired by 
computed tomographic scan, measurement of core 
temperature, drug screening, EEG, angiography, or other 
procedures. 
b. THE POSSIBILITY OF RECOVERY OF ANY 
BRAIN FUNCTIONS IS EXCLUDED, AND . . . 
The most important reversible conditions are sedation, 
hypothermia, neuromuscular blockade, 
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and shock. In the unusual circumstance where a sufficient cause 
cannot be established, irreversibility can be reliably inferred only 
after extensive evaluation for drug intoxication, extended 
observation, and other testing. A determination that blood flow to 
the brain is absent can be used to demonstrate a sufficient and 
irreversible condition. 
c. THE CESSATION OF ALL BRAIN FUNCTIONS 
PERSISTS FOR AN APPROPRIATE PERIOD OF OBSERV A 
TION AND/OR TRIAL OF THERAPY. 
Even when coma is known to have started at an earlier 
time, the absence of all brain functions must be established by 
an experienced physician at the initiation of the observation 
period. The duration of observation periods is a matter of 
clinical judgment, and some physicians recommend shorter or 
longer periods than those given here. 
Except for patients with drug intoxication, hypothermia, 
young age, or shock, medical centers with substantial experience 
in diagnosing death neurologically report no cases of brain 
functions returning following a six hour cessation, documented 
by clinical examination and confirmatory EEG. In the absence 
of confirmatory tests, a period of observation of at least twelve 
hours is recommended when an irreversible condition is well 
established. For anoxic brain damage where the extent of 
damage is more difficult to ascertain, observation for twenty-
four hours is generally desirable. In anoxic injury, the 
observation period may be reduced if a test shows cessation of 
cerebral blood flow or if an EEG shows electrocerebral silence 
in an adult patient without drug intoxication, hypothermia, or 
shock. 
Confirmation of clinical findings by EEG is desirable when 
objective documentation is needed to substantiate the clinical 
findings. Electrocerebral silence verifies irreversible loss of 
cortical functions, except in patients with drug intoxication or 
hypothermia. (Important technical details are provided in: 
American Electroencephalographic Society, Guidelines in EEG 
1980, Section 4: "Minimum Technical Standards for EEG 
Recording in Suspected Cerebral Death," pp. 19-24, Atlanta, 
1980.) When joined with the clinical findings of absent 
brainstem functions, electrocerebral silence confirms the 
diagnosis. 
Complete cessation of circulation to the normothermic adult 
brain for more than ten minutes is incompatible with survival of 
brain tissue. 
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Documentation of this circulatory failure is therefore evidence 
of death of the entire brain. Four-vessel intracranial 
angiography is definitive for diagnosing cessation of circulation 
to the entire brain (both cerebrum and posterior fossa) but 
entails substantial practical difficulties and risks. Tests are 
available that assess circulation only in the cerebral 
hemispheres, namely radioisotope bolus cerebral angiography 
and gamma camera imaging with radioisotope cerebral 
angiography. Without complicating conditions, absent cerebral 
blood flow as measured by these tests, in conjunction with the 
clinical determination of cessation of all brain functions for at 
least six hours, is diagnostic of death. 
 
Complicating Conditions 
A. Drug and Metabolic Intoxication 
Drug intoxication is the most serious problem in the 
determination of death, especially when multiple drugs are used. 
Cessation of brain functions caused by the sedative and anesthetic 
drugs, such as barbiturates, benzodiazepines, meprobamate, 
methaqualone, and trichloroethylene, may be completely reversible 
even though they produce clinical cessation of brain functions and 
electrocerebral silence. In cases where there is any likelihood of 
sedative presence, toxicology screening for all likely drugs is 
required. If exogenous intoxication is found, death may not be 
declared until the intoxicant is metabolized or intracranial circulation 
is tested and found to have ceased. 
Total paralysis may cause unresponsiveness, areflexia, and 
apnea that closely simulates death. Exposure to drugs such as 
neuromuscular blocking agents or aminoglycoside antibiotics, and 
diseases like myasthenia gravis are usually apparent by careful 
review of the history. Prolonged paralysis after use of succinylcholine 
chloride and related drugs requires evaluation for pseudo-
cholinesterase deficiency. If there is any question, low-dose atropine 
stimulation, electromyogram, peripheral nerve stimulation, EEG, tests 
of intracranial circulation, or extended observation, as indicated, will 
make the diagnosis clear. 
In drug-induced coma, EEG activity may return or persist while 
the patient remains unresponsive, and therefore the EEG may be an 
important evaluation along with extended observation. If the EEG 
shows electrocerebral silence, short latency auditory or 
somatosensory evoked potentials may be used to test brainstem 
functions, since these potential are unlikely to be affected by drugs. 
Some severe illnesses (e.g., hepatic encephalopathy, 
hyperosmolar coma, and preterminal uremia) can cause 
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deep coma. Before irreversible cessation of brain functions can be 
determined, metabolic abnormalities should be considered and, if 
possible, corrected. Confirmatory tests of circulation or EEG may be 
necessary. 
B. Hypothermia 
Criteria for reliable recognition of death are not available in the 
presence of hypothermia (below 32.2 oC core temperature). The 
variables of cerebral circulation in hypothermic patients are not 
sufficiently well studied to know whether tests of absent or diminished 
circulation are confirmatory. Hypothermia can mimic brain death by 
ordinary clinical criteria and can protect against neurologic damage 
due to hypoxia. Further complications arise since hypothermia also 
usually precedes and follows death. If these complicating factors make 
it unclear whether an individual is alive, the only available measure to 
resolve the issue is to restore normothermia. Hypothermia is not a 
common cause of difficulty in the determination of death. 
C. Children 
The brains of infants and young children have increased 
resistance to damage and may recover substantial functions even after 
exhibiting unresponsiveness on neurological examination for longer 
periods than do adults. Physicians should be particularly cautious in 
applying neurologic criteria to determine death in children younger 
than five years. 
D. Shock 
Physicians should also be particularly cautious in applying 
neurologic criteria to determine death in patients in shock because the 
reduction in cerebral circulation can render clinical examination and 
laboratory tests unreliable. 
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